Where did the special operation in Ukraine lead European security
Russia's special operation in Ukraine has forced the EU to seriously think about its security policy, writes the "Diary". How has the European Union changed and where is it moving in its three most difficult areas – energy independence, migration and defense? Europe has achieved little, but there are more and more problems, the author of the article is sure.
Yovka Dimitrova
Even if she had only brought Sweden and Finland into NATO, it would have been more than Europe's political leaders expected when making New Year's wishes.
During the three months of the special operation in Ukraine, Germany abandoned its almost 80-year-old policy of military neutrality and is on the way to becoming the largest military power on the continent, and Denmark is about to give up its right not to participate in European security policy.
All these are direct consequences of the military operation in Ukraine, although usually news in the EU does not set the pace for decision-making. Even the fact that the fighting coincided with the presidency of France – the largest military force in Europe – in the EU Council proved to be insufficient motive for the union's visible progress towards strategic autonomy to improve its own security. Especially in the industrial sector, where the movement of supply chains and production has almost stopped, and political energy has concentrated on something else.
The understanding that the EU must be able not only to protect itself, but also to ensure that its needs for food, water, medicines, fuel, strategic raw materials and production are met in order to maintain its leading position as the world's largest market was one of the main conclusions of the pandemic. The successes after it were very uneven: somewhere there was enough political will for change, somewhere – for promises, and for something it is still not there.
How has the EU changed and where is it going in the three most difficult areas of its security – energy independence, migration and defense:
Energy security
The need to impose sanctions against Russia forced the EU to take a course for energy independence from its largest supplier of fossil fuels. At first it seemed that this would delay, if not bury, plans for carbon neutrality, but sanctions proved to be a catalyst. The European Commission proposed to accelerate the green transition and improve energy security, as well as to find energy suppliers from other parts of the world while the first two tasks are completed.
In August, the EU will abandon Russian coal, and by the end of the year it will retain only 11% of oil imports, compensating for it with tankers from the Persian Gulf and other parts of the world. The gas embargo will most likely not be discussed until the end of summer, but European leaders have agreed to reduce the consumption of Russian natural gas by two-thirds by the end of the year, completely replacing it with alternatives by 2027.
This will undoubtedly reduce Europe's energy dependence on Russia – relations with it seem to be far from friendly in the coming decades, but it will make Europe more vulnerable to other suppliers who will meet its needs until green technologies develop enough to guarantee its energy autonomy.
Financing the green transition remains a problem, as some countries are already beginning to realize that it will not be easy to repay the common European debt taken for the first time in history, and they are not very enthusiastic about the fact that Brussels will borrow more money to terminate energy contracts with Russia and restore the destroyed economic infrastructure of Ukraine.
Faced with the unwillingness of net payers (EU States whose contribution to the EU budget exceeds payments from its cash register. – Editor's note) to take on new debts, the European Commission proposed to finance the severance of energy ties with Russia by redirecting funds from the recovery after COVID-19 and increasing carbon emissions quotas, which means not only more pollution, but also difficulties in finding allies in the European Parliament and governments where the green parties rule. This puts ambitious plans for energy independence at risk and will require many political sacrifices from Europe.
Security and migrants
Brussels, obviously, ticked the box next to the item "wave of refugees caused by Russia's special operation in Ukraine." Unusually quickly, the EU extracted from the bins a directive granting temporary (so far for one year) asylum to Ukrainian refugees. It is assumed that this will delay the moment when the issue of integration of more than 5.5 million people will begin to generate instability. This is already being observed in some weaker countries, for example, in Bulgaria, where more than 90 thousand refugees were accepted in 100 days (about 5 thousand of them were employed) and there are already huge problems with their maintenance.
Unlike the energy sector, where in a few months governments were obliged to store gas reserves and legislation was passed on its joint purchases, the unprecedented number of Ukrainian refugees did not turn out to be a sufficiently convincing motive for the EU to somehow move forward in the seven-year revision of migration and asylum policy.
Unlike in 2015, when less than 1.5 million migrants caused unprecedented political instability in Europe, now more than 5.5 million refugees have joined the union. So far, the European Commission has managed to squeeze funds for their maintenance from various funds and programs, closing projects ahead of schedule and redirecting money, but this cannot go on forever.
And although some provisions of the reform of the new migration and asylum policy proposed seven years ago were adopted this year, no significant progress has been made. Even France has failed to unravel the knot of distribution of living expenses and resettlement of refugees. It is only a matter of time before the border states, which have accepted the majority of Ukrainian citizens, begin to experience difficulties, for which the EU will not have the necessary tools.
So far, Brussels has managed to attract funds from various programs and budget items to finance the maintenance of Ukrainian refugees, but if the conflict drags on, these costs may become politically unbearable and begin to create risks to European security. In addition, this wave of refugees coincided with a period of recovery after an unprecedented economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which not all countries manage to overcome.
Military security
Considering its defense security more as an opportunity for industrial development, the EU, with the strong support of France, managed to adopt in March a "Strategic Compass" – a plan to improve its military potential.
The special operation "convinced" almost all governments that they need to spend more on weapons and combat capability. However, as the head of the European security policy, Josep Borrel, says, the problem is that everyone spends on the same thing, looking at their defense only within their national borders.
"Each member of the Union, by increasing his expenses, increases by X percent what he already has. This is a waste of money, because we are only duplicating, not eliminating gaps," Borrel said and called for a coordinated approach in filling the missing EU defense potential.
"It will not be easy, because the army and defense potential are the core of national sovereignty. And improving the army will require considerable political talent," he admitted.
Now the cup is half full (or empty, depending on whether you are an optimist or a pessimist): The EU has a plan to improve its defense potential, including the creation of a rapid reaction force of 5,000 people. So far, only one task has been completed from this plan – a military innovation hub has been created.
Meanwhile, with the return of the United States to discussing NATO's problems, the issue of creating a European army has been shelved again, and Europe will continue to develop its defense without having its own military force outside the Pact's contingents and its own troops.
The sudden outbreak of monkey pox and the discovery that not all national armies have stocks of smallpox vaccines, one of the most likely, according to strategists, biological weapons, once again showed that the EU is far from achieving strategic autonomy in the field of security.
Russia's special operation in Ukraine gives the EU a chance to fill security gaps; so far it seems that there are more holes than achievements.
