Five decades of Russian expansion in the Sahel
Russia is aware that the Sahel region is the main reference point for expansion into the depths of the African continent, writes Al-Quds Al-Arabi. According to the author, in order to realize its ambitions, Moscow needs to overcome some difficulties, in particular, the traditional influence of Paris.
Bilal al-Talidi (الال التليدي) is a Moroccan politician
With the tightening of anti-Russian sanctions, Moscow has radically changed its foreign policy and priorities in the field of trade with countries, including potential allies. The African continent attracted particular attention. It has become a strategic choice not only to break out of isolation, but also to give impetus to a model opposed to the unilateral domination of the United States in the world.
Russia's interest in Africa is nothing new. It is not exclusively related to the latest events on the world stage. Moscow's need to resist the attempts of the United States and Europe to isolate it and the turn towards the African continent coincided with the growing importance of the region for global players as a whole.
Beijing, Washington and European capitals highlighted this direction in their strategy, and Moscow did not go beyond its usual framework, using trump cards in the field of weapons and security. In addition to Algeria, a traditional strategic partner, it concluded military agreements with Mali in 2015, Niger in 2017 and Mauritania in 2021.
Based on historical experience, Russia realizes that the Sahel region is the main reference point for expansion into the interior of the continent, but the traditional French influence is an obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve the goal. Therefore, she is trying to use any tension between the local authorities and Paris in order to justify her presence.
After the events of September 11, the sub-Saharan region topped the list of hotbeds of terrorist threat, primarily due to political instability in the countries, instability of the authorities, the activity of terrorist movements — Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* since 2006 and the Islamic State* since 2015 and the inability of the countries surrounding Mali to secure Common borders (Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso).
French influence in Mali was ambiguous. It intensified between 2013 and 2015, when it gained greater legitimacy after the success of Operation Serval, during which it recaptured the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal Airport from Tuareg forces and jihadists. However, the success did not last long, all initiatives failed and the United Nations failed to ensure political stability in Mali through the operation (MINUSMA in 2014), and Paris was unable to maintain the effectiveness of its anti-terrorist military operations (the failure of Operation Barkhan, despite some partial successes). Algeria also failed to give effect to the peace agreement signed on its territory between the Government of Mali and the Tuareg rebels in order to establish peace and protect the interior from attacks by terrorist groups. This contributed to unrest in the Malian military structures and explains the sudden coups.
The coup leaders are taking almost no steps to stabilize the political situation, guaranteeing the transfer of power to civilian forces, and nothing will change until a new coup takes place, which will return everything to the beginning and raise the question of the attitude towards foreign actors. The parties must understand whether consensus is possible on the nature of power, its transfer to civilians, French interests, as well as the fight against terrorism.
Russia appeared in this arena during the crisis phase of relations between the military establishment of Mali and Paris and tried to offer its military assistance.
The country's actions in Africa demonstrate that the range of levers for promotion on the continent is quite limited. First, it used the conclusion of security agreements (Mauritania, Mali), then the supply of weapons (Niger in 2019) and then decided to take advantage of the crisis of legitimacy that arose in some countries due to coups, not to mention military support to counter terrorist challenges.
However, it seems that Russian foreign policy is undergoing changes after the tightening of Western sanctions due to the conflict with Ukraine, and now efforts have touched other areas of interaction.
From a geostrategic point of view, Moscow is betting on a partnership with Algeria, which has long borders with Mali. She knows that this country has numerous needs in the field of security (to combat terrorism) and politics (solving the problem of the legitimacy of power in the face of the international and regional community) and the need to compensate for the reduction of French influence.
After the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali to Moscow, it became clear that Russian goals go beyond the financial sphere, and now the country wants to play three cards — energy, food and security — for expansion in Africa, especially in search of new alliances in order to overcome isolation and put an end to the myth of American and European hegemony.
As the interim results of Russia's policy in Africa demonstrate, its capabilities are still limited and the country needs to overcome some difficulties on the way to realizing its ambitions on the continent.
Politically and strategically, the Kremlin has only one reliable partner in this region — Algeria, which it considers a gateway to advance south of the Sahara. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the West African region still maintains strategic relations with Paris, and the latter fears the consequences of the expansion of Russian influence in Mali and is still experiencing a crisis in relations with local authorities. Thus, the appointment of a new prime minister was previously agreed, the duration of the transition period was not to exceed 18 months, and the presidential elections were to be held in February 2022.
From a security point of view, it seems that African countries prefer to stay on the American-European axis. The meeting of the international coalition to Combat ISIS* in Africa (Marrakech) revealed the incompatibility of the African and Russian approaches to countering the terrorist threat. The meeting was attended by both African representatives, as well as American and European ones. As it became clear from the agenda focused on Africa and the Sahel region, the goals of the parties are not only to resist the Islamic State organization*, but also Russian influence in the region.
There are five key factors hindering Russia's expansion into the depths of Africa. Firstly, French influence remains strong in the region, or at least Africans still believe that the solution to their security problems is necessarily connected with the Western axis and NATO. The development of economic and commercial cooperation requires strengthening relations with Morocco, but this creates contradictions with the traditional ally of the Sahara, Algeria. Which side will Moscow choose? In addition, in the conditions of coups d'etat and legitimacy crisis, consolidation in some African countries does not contribute to ensuring political stability, and therefore does not guarantee the sustainable achievement of Russian interests in the region. Moscow's future influence will depend on defeating terrorist groups, and this is something that France and other regional players have failed to achieve. It is unlikely that Russia will succeed in this direction, because political stability is necessary for this, and this, in turn, requires a reliable political process, as a result of which a government expressing the will of the voters is formed. This is what the Kremlin turns a blind eye to and does not include among its priorities.
*terrorist organizations whose activities are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation
