What can China learn from the experience of the Russian special operation in Ukraine
Japan believes that China is carefully studying the experience of the Russian operation in Ukraine for its possible application in Taiwan. The author of the article names eight important moments of the special operation that particularly attract Beijing.
Tough anti-Russian sanctions continue, as many countries of the world oppose Russia's military special operation in Ukraine. According to world media reports, China, which has deep political, economic and military relations with Russia, is wary of this event. On the other hand, there are reports that the US military believes that "China is closely monitoring the special operation in Ukraine and is preparing to fully take into account its lessons in the event of an invasion of Taiwan." What is Beijing paying special attention to in the Ukrainian military conflict? And how are they preparing to use his lessons? The editors of JB Press spoke with Kiyofumi Iwata, the former chief of the Joint Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The conversation was conducted by journalist Norifumi Yoshida.
America sent the wrong message to the world
Norifumi Yoshida: What do you think the Chinese government and the Chinese army (People's Liberation Army of China) are watching with special attention during Russia's military special operation in Ukraine?
Kiyofumi Iwata: I think there are at least eight such moments.
First, it is the reaction of the international community to the Russian special operation. In particular, China is very closely watching the military assistance provided to Ukraine by the Western camp. The United States and NATO member countries have provided Kiev with anti-tank missiles and man-portable surface-to-air missiles from the very beginning. Apparently, with this in mind, China will carefully reconsider its views on what weapons the West will provide to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Since Taiwan is an island country, China will primarily be interested in possible shipping routes for Western aid to Taiwan, as well as delivery ports and their infrastructure. In general, China can learn a lot from the experience of Ukraine in terms of ideas about the volume and coherence of military assistance from Western countries to Taiwan.
Secondly, economic sanctions against Russia imposed by many countries of the world. China is carefully studying what real damage Russia will suffer from them, and how long these sanctions will last. If the world imposes economic sanctions against Beijing in the event of its invasion of Taiwan, will China be able to stand on its own strength and its own currency? And what impact will this have on the standard of living of the Chinese people? These issues are also in the zone of close study in China.
Thirdly, Beijing is closely monitoring the dynamics of American leadership in the world in the context of the course of the Russian special operation in Ukraine and global approaches to preserving the established world order. For example, the American army and the military-industrial complex direct most of their military resources to counter the growth of the power of the Chinese army (PLA). Beijing is carefully analyzing whether there are changes in this policy against the background of Ukraine? I think that China is interested in principle in the American armed forces taking part in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. If the potential of the US military confrontation with China decreases, it will be easier for the Chinese to carry out their military advance to Taiwan.
The fourth is China's reassessment of the US nuclear strategy. US President Joe Biden and White House spokesman Gene Psaki from the very beginning, from the first press conference after the start of the special operation at the end of February, did not tire of repeating that "nuclear war should be avoided by all means, and we will not allow ourselves to be drawn into it." Russian President Vladimir Putin, who, according to the world, can exercise nuclear deterrence against the United States, has already hinted at the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This means that non-strategic nuclear weapons (small nuclear weapons) become an applicable type of weapons. Against the background of Ukraine, China needs to determine whether the United States will develop this idea of "small nuclear weapons" in the future or will proceed from the possibility of using standard nuclear forces even against conventional weapons.
— I feel that the United States is generally sending the wrong signal to the world regarding nuclear weapons. What is your opinion?
— I think so too. The United States and other nuclear powers of the world previously had an approach that the possibility of using "small nuclear weapons" could be restrained by strategic nuclear weapons. However, President Biden's vague position changed these approaches, creating a situation in which small-sized nuclear weapons could be used.
China cannot ignore this change. I think with concern that by continuing to strive for nuclear parity with the United States in strategic weapons, China will now significantly accelerate the development and production of small nuclear charges.
The importance of information wars today
Fifthly, using the example of Ukraine, China is carefully studying the limits of the effectiveness of hybrid warfare. Throughout the course of its special operation and long before it, Russia is actively engaged in the so-called hybrid war, which includes political propaganda operations and sabotage, as well as cyber attacks on important infrastructure facilities, such as electric power and communications, work to spread fake news and incline Ukrainian public opinion in its favor.
But this time, the information war, which, in contrast, was mainly waged by the United States, reduced the effect of Russia's hybrid operations.
It is this information war that is the sixth point that Beijing is very interested in.
For example, even before the start of its special operation in Ukraine, Russian special forces falsified operations "under a false flag" (operations that made the pro-Russian region look attacked by Ukrainian troops), and Russian special information services launched a whole war of fake news. However, the US government disclosed the essence and details of such operations to the mainstream media and the whole world in time. And now the United States continues to disclose such attempts by Russia. As a result, Washington manages to ensure Western unity on the Ukrainian conflict and turn international public opinion into its ally.
This information war and the operations of the Ukrainian army are supported by cyberwar capabilities. After the annexation of Russia in 2014, the United States trained Ukrainian troops in this. As a result, the Ukrainian army can now enter cyberspace inside Russian state and military bodies and monitor what is happening in them. Since Ukrainian cyber forces are able to penetrate Russian designs, they can provide Ukraine with information that allows it to benefit from military operations. Using the example of Ukraine, China felt threatened by the enemy's cyber operations, and I believe that it will seriously think about how the United States and its allies will wage an information war against Beijing in the event of its invasion of Taiwan.
The German strategist Clausewitz used the term "fog of war". But the information warfare practiced by American and Ukrainian forces, including the provision of real-time images from artificial satellites by the United States to Ukraine, seems to dispel this definition of Clausewitz and allows Ukraine to have fairly accurate information about the movement of Russian troops and use it to deliver targeted strikes on them.
Seventh, it is the study of the factor of high patriotism of the Ukrainian people. This seriously increases the morale of the Ukrainian army. I think there is no such thing in the Russian army. If a soldier does not have a high noble purpose for fighting, his morale will not be high.
China will study the Taiwanese spirit of resistance very carefully. For example, he is doing everything possible to plant in Taiwan the idea that the populations of the island and the mainland belong to the same ethnic community, and therefore should be united. Beijing is pushing such ideas to Taiwan with all its might. However, on the island, people increasingly feel their identity as "Taiwanese", and not as "Chinese". Therefore, Chinese propaganda of ethnic affinity with them hardly penetrates, and even more so takes root in Taiwan. And in this regard, the example of the ideological influence of the Kiev authorities on the population of Ukraine in the sense of instilling Ukrainian identity for China is very indicative and disturbing.
— What is the eighth important lesson China can learn from the Russian special operation?
— The inadmissibility of the slightest inconsistency in the actions of the land, naval and air forces, which manifested itself during Russia's joint operations in Ukraine. One of the reasons why the Russian ground forces are still moving forward slowly enough is that the Russian Aerospace Forces have not been able to fully secure air supremacy. At the beginning of the special operation, Russia probably thought that the bombing by missiles and fighter jets had completely destroyed the Ukrainian air defense network, such as radars and anti-aircraft missiles, and that it had seized full control of the airspace in Ukraine. However, Ukraine has not destroyed radars and air defense positions, as well as helicopters and planes that were not hit by missile and bomb attacks, which it was even able to use.
China will strengthen control over the information space in the country
— What do you think China will focus on regarding Taiwan in the future?
— China, of course, should have felt that the Russian government is quite successful in carrying out internal information control in the country during the special operation. Therefore, I think that in the future Beijing will also further strengthen information control in China.
He will also be wary of economic sanctions against China, increasing the dependence of the world's countries on the Chinese economy and not allowing them to go against Beijing.
In addition, China is likely to strengthen its relations with Russia and North Korea, including in the military field. It can be assumed that in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the Russian Navy will simultaneously conduct major exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk, and North Korea will launch another long-range ballistic missile. Under these conditions, a significant contingent of the Japanese Self-defense Forces and part of the US armed forces in the region will be forced to distract themselves by intensifying their actions to monitor and deter the enemy. China's goal will be to prevent the concentration of Japanese and American forces on the Taiwan front through such interaction with its partners in the region.
The emergency situation (i.e. war) in Taiwan is an emergency situation around Japan. In this regard, it is extremely important to strengthen Japan's security system so that such issues can be widely condemned in Japanese society and effectively addressed.
Author: Norifumi Yoshida (Norifumi Yoshida)
Kiyofumi Iwata is the former Chief of the Joint Staff of the Japan Self—Defense Forces, retired Colonel General. He served in the Japanese armed forces from 1979 to 2016. During his tenure as Chief of the Joint Staff, he carried out major reforms in the self-defense forces, paying special attention to the Chinese direction. Author of the books "The Reality of China's invasion of Japan" and "The Emergency situation in Taiwan, told by the head of the Self-Defense Forces."
