The threat of radicalization of Southeast Asia in connection with the escalation in Afghanistan
The rise to power in Afghanistan of the radical Islamist movement "Taliban" (banned in the Russian Federation) has thrown many challenges to regional security. Meanwhile, rival terrorist groups are seeking to capitalize on the growing social unrest and radicalization of the local population. One of the clearest examples of this is the growth of extremist sentiments in Southeast Asia.
THE TURMOIL IN KHORASAN
The most aggressive rival of the Taliban in Afghanistan is now a regional offshoot of the terrorist "Islamic State" (IS) called "ISIL-Khorasan" (both organizations are banned in the Russian Federation). It regularly attacks members of ethnic and religious minorities and takes advantage of instability in the eastern and northern provinces of Afghanistan.
A recent UN report highlighting the strained relations between the Taliban associated with Al-Qaeda (also banned in Russia) and ISIS-Khorasan indicated that there are from eight to ten thousand foreign fighters in Afghanistan. Most of them come from Central and Southeast Asia, as well as from the Caucasus, Pakistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. The groups have been feuding since the founding of ISIS-Khorasan in 2015, when ISIS sought to expand its territorial expansion beyond Iraq and Syria.
Foreign fighters were recruited by ISIS-Khorasan to attack Afghan civilians and infrastructure facilities.
After the Taliban seized power, thousands of detained ISIS-Khorasan militants were released from custody in Afghanistan, which was preceded by the execution by the Taliban regime of the former commander of the group Abu Omar Khorasani in August 2021. In view of the rapid withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan a month later and the inconsistency of Washington's counter-terrorism strategy, the solution of the country's internal security issues fell entirely on the shoulders of the Taliban.
In turn, this made it possible for ISIS-Khorasan to expand the scope of subversive activities. According to various sources, among its commanders are several Malaysians from a militant group that paved the way from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan to join ISIS-Khorasan after the fall of ISIS in Syria in 2019. Having overcome the difficult route through Kabul and Herat, most of the militants ended up in Nangarhar, known as the stronghold of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Discontent with the Taliban is growing in jihadist circles because of the "liberal" approach adopted by the current government. ISIS-Khorasan, in turn, continues to promote the unification of Khorasan province to attract citizens of Southeast Asian countries and other militants to the Afghan theater of operations. According to the slogans of "ISIS-Khorasan", the unification of the army of Islamic warriors on the historical lands of Khorasan will revive the lost glory of Islam. But in fact, the terrorist group seeks to strengthen its position in Afghanistan and use the country as a base for terrorist operations around the world.
All this may affect the security situation in Southeast Asia for several reasons.
AFGHANISTAN AS A NURSERY AND A SPRINGBOARD
First, despite the Taliban's promise to create an open and inclusive government in Afghanistan, many signs point to the return of a repressive theocratic regime of rule. The Taliban clearly state their goal – the restoration of an "Islamic Emirate" with a strict version of Sharia law. According to some experts, they can lay the foundations of a universal caliphate, which will become a haven for extremists and aggressive Islamists from all over the world who seek to be trained for the subsequent conduct of subversive activities in their homeland.
The return of the Taliban has also boosted the morale of extremists in Southeast Asia, prompting the security services of States in the region to warn of a potential increase in the number of recruiters associated with terrorist groups. Some extremist elements may travel from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to the Afghan theater of operations. Such fears are far from groundless: in the years leading up to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Al-Qaeda militant camps created within the framework of the Maktab al-Hidamat organization turned into ideological and training centers for such extremist groups in Southeast Asia as Jemaah Islamiyah (DI) and "Kumpulan Militan Malaysia" (KMM).
Today, there are fears that Al-Qaeda will again want to benefit from ties with the Taliban, and Afghanistan will once again become a springboard for training militants and planning terrorist attacks. In Southeast Asia, there is also the potential to strengthen the presence of Al-Qaeda: previously, the Abu Sayyaf, DI and KMM groups associated with it had strategic centers in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. There are signs that elements of the DEE are resuming indirect links with Al-Qaeda in the virtual space. Younger and more technologically savvy fighters seek to popularize their image by spreading it on social networks to attract more peers to their ranks. According to Indonesian terrorism expert Dr. Nur Khuda Ismail, such posturing is positively perceived in some circles, as evidenced by Facebook posts and approving messages in WhatsApp groups supporting the DEE and Al-Qaeda.
EXPANSION INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA
Secondly, the situation regarding antiterrorist security in the region can be affected by the fact that the authorities of Southeast Asia have to deal with the threat posed not only by the regional network of IS, but also by the cells of the Islamic State as part of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. And also from "Jama'ah Ansharut Tawhid" (JAT), "Jama'ah Ansharut Daula" (JAD) and "Mujahideen Indonesia Timur" (MIT) in Indonesia – given that Abu Sayyaf and DI, which are not directly associated with ISIS, have recently received more and more pronounced ideological and political support. Having strengthened its positions in Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan may try to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia with the support of local terrorist groups. Such fears are reinforced by the previous success of Al-Qaeda and the continued vulnerability of the region to the financing of international terrorism.
Together, the potential resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the growing influence of ISIS-Khorasan (both organizations, we recall, are banned in the Russian Federation) in Afghanistan, combined with the territorial ambitions of the latter, can create a domino effect throughout the region. For example, elements of the Muslim population in some Southeast Asian countries who are supporters of the regional extremist organization Abu Sayyaf may swear allegiance to the two aforementioned organizations. It is also impossible to discount the possibility of a terrorist relapse involving former criminals from Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, who could plan subversive activities through guerrilla attacks.
SYMPATHIES OF LOCAL ISLAMISTS
Thirdly, it is worth noting that, despite the caution of local governments, the foreign policy of the Southeast Asian States towards Afghanistan and the new radical Taliban regime is generally favorable.
For example, Malaysia is negotiating with the Government of Afghanistan to help rebuild the country while respecting democratic norms and women's rights there – which generally corresponds to the current foreign policy position of Malaysia's Western partners regarding Afghanistan. Malaysia's Deputy Foreign Minister Kamarudin Jaffar spoke in Parliament on November 22, 2021, cautiously stating that the government had called on the Taliban to solve international problems related to democracy and human rights, as well as emphasizing Kuala Lumpur's continued support for Afghanistan.
The Islamist party Parti Islamic SeMalaysia (PAS) became one of the first Malaysian political organizations to publicly express support for Afghanistan after the Taliban came to power, citing the conviction that the current position of the movement differs from the regime that ruled the country until 2001. On August 25, 2021, PAS Chairman Abdul Hadi Awang expressed satisfaction with the achievements of the Taliban and called on the whole world to accept their regime.
At the same time, given the ongoing confrontation of the Taliban with Al-Qaeda and ISIS-Khorasan, public support of the Taliban movement by PAS may attract unwanted attention of terrorist organizations to Malaysia. The country's position on combating terrorism is that the main terrorist threat to the country comes from within, in particular, due to the incitement of interethnic and interfaith discord by some local politicians. According to security analysts, the PAS's "open support" for the Taliban movement could draw Malaysia into a conflict between the Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan, increasing the likelihood that the country will become a target for terrorist attacks.
SUPPORT BANK
Fourth, there is a possibility of turning Southeast Asia into a center of terrorist financing due to the potential flow of donations and other illegal activities involving followers and supporters of ISIS-Khorasan. It is worth recalling that in 2001-2002, funds raised in Malaysia were used to finance terrorist attacks in Bali and Holo.
Before the September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden's terrorist network included Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Hambali, world–famous jihadists who traveled around the region with intelligence operations and operational planning missions.
Later, direct money transfers through the Islamic Hawala system and humanitarian donations were used to finance militants from Southeast Asia fighting on the side of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Thus, if appropriate measures are not taken in the foreseeable future to combat extremist sentiments and terrorist financing in Southeast Asia, the growth of the terrorist threat in the region will become even more noticeable. The Afghan diaspora, whose number in Malaysia alone, according to official estimates, is up to 5 thousand people, should also be closely monitored to prevent the activation of elements involved in the financing of militants and the spread of extremist ideologies. This is especially true for Afghan refugees who may be inclined to support ISIS-Khorasan because of previous unpleasant experiences with the Taliban.
Analyzing the situation in the region as a whole, it should be noted that today Malaysia, compared with Indonesia and the Philippines, manages to avoid direct or large–scale terrorist attacks - partly due to the country's extensive experience in combating the communist insurgency after World War II. Nevertheless, Malaysian jihadists continue to occupy a prominent place in the list of threats to the region after the September 11 attacks.
As for the IG, the organization will most likely continue to use social networks to recruit new members. The long period of isolation and restrictions on movement imposed in Southeast Asia as a result of COVID-19 has led to more and more people spending time in front of computers and other electronic devices. This increased the likelihood of their indoctrination and recruitment on the Internet by terrorist networks. In addition, organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah, as well as IS cells in Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines, are likely to continue to speculate on interethnic and religious problems to radicalize the population and recruit new fighters.
To achieve their strategic goals, Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf are deploying bases in politically unstable areas of Southeast Asia with poor law enforcement and a huge population. Tawau and Semporna off the coast of Sabah, for example, were used as transit points by foreign terrorists traveling between the Indonesian islands of Kalimantan and Sulawesi and the Philippine region of Zambasulta. While the eastern coast of Sabah also represents a strategic location for terrorist groups involved in the smuggling of weapons and explosives.
In addition, the decades-old blood ties between terrorists and local residents make the Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia triangle even more vulnerable to terrorist operations.
Together, regional partners need to take a set of measures to mitigate the threats arising against the background of the aggravated situation in Afghanistan. And at the same time take into account the activation of local groups associated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS-Khorasan. Constructive dialogue with the Taliban government may be required to keep jihadists in Southeast Asia from joining ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan, as well as to identify radical returnees.
Larisa Shashok
Larisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is a teacher at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
