Finland and Sweden can join NATO — but there is no guarantee that this will strengthen their security
Finland considered itself a humane peacemaker, but its accession to NATO could change everything, writes The Guardian. The Finns deftly maneuvered between the West and Russia, and now they will have to pursue a "more standard policy." But at what cost?
The Finns have long relied on the policy of pragmatism, and the Swedes on neutrality. Joining a major military alliance can change everything.
For a long time, these Scandinavian countries considered themselves humane peacemakers. The national identity of Sweden and Finland is extraordinarily connected with their foreign policy. The Swedes adhere to a centuries-old tradition of neutrality, while the Finns point to their ability to pursue a policy of pragmatism and make the most of an unfavorable geographical position, since they share a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia. Since both countries have submitted official applications to join the North Atlantic Alliance, they will now have to abandon these deviations from the European norm. In particular, Finland, apparently, intends to pursue a more standard foreign policy. But at what cost?
After the end of World War II, the Finnish political elite deftly maneuvered between Russia and the West. Finding themselves in a difficult situation, the Finns played their cards extremely skillfully. Finland has come a long way in the post-war decades. If in 1945 it was the poorest state in Europe, now it has pulled up its economy to the level of Western Europe, and also managed to maintain a much more equal society. Now it is abandoning its verified strategy of maneuvering between the two centers of power and influence, and fully prefers the West, joining the NATO alliance.
Finnish right-wing commentators say that Finland, having decided to become a member of this bloc, has finally gained a foothold in the positions of a "western" country. And the liberals are talking about improving and reforming the alliance from within, emphasizing the need to make it less belligerent and aggressive with the help of Sweden. In general, there is a feeling that the Finnish leadership, which has long kept its finger on the pulse of the Kremlin, has lost count. "There was such a mood: we know these people, and they know us," the Finnish thinker and legal theorist Martti Koskenniemi told me. — But you cannot negotiate with a country that no longer knows what its interests are. And if this country is stronger than ours and in a certain sense becomes insane, then membership in NATO is quite logical."
Another question is whether NATO membership will strengthen the security of Finland and Sweden. Their statements provoked only mild reproaches from the Kremlin, which warned against the inadmissibility of military buildup by these two countries. Vladimir Putin's regime has not said a word about the possibility of starting hostilities with Helsinki and Stockholm, with which it has always maintained good relations. Memories of previous military clashes between Russians and Finns suggest that anyone who thinks about invading Finland needs psychiatric help (Finland has long been able to mobilize a significant part of its population; the country produces its own version of the AK-47, and its complex system of protective structures is effective even against nuclear weapons).
There is one delicate point in the question of Finland's accession to NATO.The fact is that Russians are the largest minority in this country. The main organization representing their interests has clearly stated that it can resolve any political issue through the procedures and mechanisms of Finnish politics. But some Finnish leaders still fear that Putin may use the discontent and resentment of Russians in Finland as a pretext for launching military operations. However, there is also a more noticeable pretext, consisting in the fact that this country is actually already part of NATO. Finland has been participating in NATO joint exercises in the Baltic States since 1996, in alliance missions in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Some Finnish politicians today believe that since their country has already become a de facto member of this organization, it should formalize membership before it is too late. They claim that Putin can take advantage of the uncertainty of Finland's position in NATO to prevent its real entry.
By joining NATO, Helsinki seems to be abandoning its extraordinary faith in its ability to pursue a policy of pragmatism. Finland's exceptionally subtle and cautious foreign policy, which consists in balancing between Russia and Western Europe, is usually called "Finlandization". It was an invention of West Germany. This concept was developed by the Cold War liberals Walter Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal, who considered their brainchild a conceptual counterweight to the "eastern policy" of Chancellor Willy Brandt. They feared that Brandt's attempts to bring West Germany to negotiations with the East could turn it into a zone of Soviet influence. In this sense, "Finlandization" has always been an abusive word, implying submission to a stronger power.
But most Finns do not consider Finlandization to be something derogatory and harmful. In fact, Finland has benefited a lot from its good relations with the Kremlin and with Europe. "Moscow has gone so far as to set Finland as an example, talking about the benefits that friendly relations with the Soviet Union can bring," Finnish sociologist Juho Korhonen told me. In the 1950s, Moscow made it a rule to send oil to the Finnish refinery and buy its products. "Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War can be seen as a tango together,— says Koskenniemi. "Two steps forward, one step back." Meanwhile, thanks to Helsinki's warm relations with Western Europe, Finland has become increasingly attractive for investment.
Now that this country is preparing to join NATO, the memories of Finlandization may become something of a stumbling block in its history for its destined merger with the West. But this will have a detrimental effect on the future of Europe. Other countries cannot pursue a Finlandization policy. It makes no sense to talk about Finlandization of Ukraine or Georgia, since neither one nor the other country will be able to get the same benefits. But when the isolated position that Finland occupied becomes impossible, when there are no more zones of ambiguity and uncertainty in Europe, when the continent becomes like a kind of Manichean space with a symbolism policy, and when extreme measures are required to prove its good faith, the world is in great danger.
Very few representatives of the Finnish elite believe that they will be much calmer and safer in NATO. And none of them can be misled by statements about the sanctity of Article 5. "The defense of NATO members is a negotiation process that allows for different interpretations," Koskenniemi openly admits. He believes that Finland's accession to NATO is more of a demonstration. "It's not that yesterday we were completely unprotected, and tomorrow we will be completely safe as part of NATO," this scientist says. "The fact is that these are negotiations with a country that can no longer negotiate, and therefore membership in NATO is an explanation of our positions to it." However, Koskenniemi is well aware that with the accession to NATO, Finland will lose another distinctive feature that it used to demonstrate to the whole world. The very possibility that a European state is able to go its own way now seems very weak.
Author: Thomas Meaney
