Today we are all not Ukrainians
The interests of the West and Kiev are not identical, writes Politico. The author comes to a very obvious, but fair conclusion: flirting with Ukraine is fraught with further escalation with disastrous consequences.
Patrick Porter, Justin Logan, Benjamin H. Friedman (Benjamin H. Friedman)
Insisting that the United States and its NATO allies should want exactly what Ukraine is doing is an understandable but dangerous policy.
Such statements are fraught not only with the fact that they can drag us into a nuclear war. They create a danger that they will give Ukraine false hope and delay the settlement of the crisis. Our natural sympathy for Ukraine should not be confused with a complete coincidence of interests.
The Russian military operation has rallied the West in a widespread desire to support Kiev. NATO members helped thwart Russia's plans and allowed Ukraine to actively resist with the help of arms supplies, intelligence sharing and economic sanctions. And civil society mobilized help, turning the Ukrainian flag into a popular symbol of heroic disobedience, internationalism and the existence of sovereign freedom.
For British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, "one of the most important objects of pride in the free world is the opportunity to declare"I am a Ukrainian."" According to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, "our job is to support Ukrainians. They will set military goals, goals at the negotiating table... We are not going to determine the outcome of these events for them. It's up to them to decide, and we support them in this." Even President Joe Biden claims that Ukraine is not just a humanitarian problem for the United States, but a state standing on the front flank in the global war between freedom and autocracy.
But at the same time, the UK and US governments make it clear that they will not provide Ukraine with all the weapons it wants to receive, or directly enter into conflict by introducing a no-fly zone or sending troops there. This reluctance reflects a clear divergence of interests between the West and Kiev.
Ukraine, which has put its independence on the line, wants to get all possible help from NATO — escalation serves its interests. On the other hand, NATO countries, prudently wary of Russia and its nuclear arsenal, quite reasonably resist.
Thus, in Western countries, a discrepancy has arisen between deeds that suggest an external limit to involvement in the conflict, and words that suggest harmony of interests.
For the most part, this is just politics. Leaders of democratic countries tend to exaggerate the stakes by promoting policies that involve significant risk. But such a discrepancy is dangerous.
Firstly, it entails internal calls for escalation, including demands for setting the maximum number of military targets, from the return of Crimea to direct military intervention. Secondly, the White House's rhetoric calls into question its own refusal to comply with Ukraine's demands for high-risk assistance in the form of no-fly zones, bringing Russia to a complete economic crisis or the actual transfer of troops. It devalues his own restraint.
But what if the West's stakes were really as high as Ukraine's? If the future of the world order depended on the course of this conflict, and our democracy was at stake together with Ukraine, then why did NATO not want to take part in this struggle?
It is important to note that this discrepancy between rhetoric and politics may also cause Kiev to have excessive expectations. But those who insist that the West should give Ukraine everything it wants do not take into account that what Kiev wants depends in part on what the West will give it — or at least on what it promises to give. And statements about the complete coincidence of interests can fuel Ukrainians' dreams of complete victory, which are probably unrealistic and only prolong the conflict.
Although peace talks have now reached an impasse, they may resume when Russia's offensive in the Donbas either succeeds or stops at a dead point, and Ukraine may again make an unpleasant peace offer — to remain without Crimea, agree to additional autonomy for most of the Donbass, give firm guarantees to observe neutrality. If Kiev believes that the support of the West is endless or is likely to become more direct, it may eventually abandon the agreement that was offered to it and suffer because of this when the support it was counting on will not be there.
The problem here is not in helping Ukraine, but in the fact that the West pretends that this assistance is unconditional.
The conflict itself was partly provoked by some false, but tempting assurances from Washington to Kiev, which gave the impression of a coincidence of interests.
During this fatal "flirtation" there were promises of "one hundred percent" support, empty hints about possible membership in NATO and the establishment of a security partnership, backed up by an increase in material and military assistance, which was not guaranteed. Thus, Ukraine found itself in a vulnerable state of uncertainty — without protection in the form of real obligations of the West. At the same time, she became emboldened to such an extent that she took steps that accelerated Russia's decisive actions aimed at preventing it from joining the West — for example, she refused neutrality.
The idea that countries can contribute significantly to the war effort without directly participating in it is harmful. Those who are arming Kiev may not be risking enough to meet Ukraine's demands, but they are still risking — the danger of Russia's retaliatory actions still exists. And sanctions entail economic hardships both for those who impose them and for those who are under them.
Moreover, NATO countries will be affected by the conditions and terms of ending the conflict. They will determine the degree and severity of the negative economic consequences, as well as the likelihood of a new invasion and subsequent crisis. Of course, Western leaders have the right (and even the obligation to their constituents) to determine how to use their military assistance and economic sanctions in a way that meets not only the interests of Ukraine, but also their own.
The remark on duty under normal conditions that Ukraine's interests differ from those of the United States or Great Britain has now become mandatory for the correct choice of policy. And pretending that there is no difference between them is fraught with escalation with potentially terrible consequences.
Sane people may disagree with what exactly the interests of the West are in terms of ending the conflict. But they will not argue with the fact that the interests of the West and Ukraine are not identical.
Patrick Porter is a professor at the University of Birmingham, teaches a course on international security and strategy. Benjamin H. Friedman is the Director of Political Affairs at the analytical center Defense Priorities. Justin Logan is a senior researcher at the Cato Institute.
