About a new dimension of space activity safety
Today, the focus of international attention is on the events taking place in and around Ukraine. They directly affect Russia's security interests, affect both the state of affairs at the regional (European) level and global processes.
Meanwhile, it seems hardly justified to divert to the periphery of attention other constantly acting factors that can have a long-term and increasing impact on international and national security.
These factors include various aspects of the safety of space activities (BCD), primarily related to aspects of "military" space.
SIGNS OF AN ARMS RACE
It should be emphasized from the very beginning that it is unrealistic to talk about security in space if shock weapons are placed in it. In this case, talking about the safety of expensive property and ensuring reliable space traffic will be devoid of practical meaning.
Based on this thesis, it is legitimate to raise the question: is it possible to put a proactive ban on the path of "weaponization" of space (from the English weaponization – "equipping with weapons").
Opponents of this approach, as a rule, speak out directly – and then their arguments show a desire not to close space for their weapons systems.
At the same time, they hide behind considerations about "leadership" in space, about protecting their space property, about the need to respond to "qualitatively new threats", etc.
Other opponents' unwillingness to put an international legal barrier to the transfer of an arms race into outer space boils down to the assertion that it is practically impossible to develop such a universal instrument through multilateral negotiations.
Meanwhile, the issue of weapons in outer space leads us to the problem of military dominance. The essence here is simple: if someone places shock weapons in space ahead of others, masters practically working forms and methods of their use, he will also gain dominant control over outer space. And not just over him.
The space arms race itself, in a visible and large-scale sense, may not have begun yet. However, there are signals that individual States are creating political, economic, scientific and technical groundwork for the implementation of plans to deploy shock weapons systems in space. Moreover, weapons-grade elements, including dual-use ones, are already being tested in outer space.
We should talk about at least four groups of signs/indicators of such a race: political, economic, doctrinal, military and military-technical.
At the same time, if political, economic and doctrinal factors can be attributed to indirect signs, then military factors are direct signs of the beginning of an arms race in outer space.
In practice, these groups of factors often do not exist separately, but are combined with each other. Thus, actions in the military sphere are accompanied by decisions in the political sphere and at the doctrinal level. The necessary budgetary allocations are made for all these activities.
When the whole set of these signs is present, we can talk about the desire of the state to deploy weapons in space. If some of the above is not available, then it is more logical to talk about the formation of prerequisites for such an arms race.
BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE
As for the current security situation in outer space, it is appropriate to talk about a certain "borderline" state, when the presence of indirect indicators of a qualitative arms race in outer space begins to be closely intertwined with direct indications of preparations for it.
In political, doctrinal and economic relations, the necessary signs are already present in the policies of some States. With increasing intensity, they are also manifested in the military-technological plan. And this is a direct indication that the basis for a breakthrough in the space military race is being prepared.
The danger of the consequences of placing weapons in space is obvious. Such weapons would have a global area of action, high readiness for use, the possibility of sudden and covert impact on space and ground objects. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, they would not become a deterrent tool, but a weapon of real use.
At the same time, time is rapidly running out, the "window of opportunity" for preventing an arms race in space is narrowing. A security dilemma arises. Is it too late to talk about preventive measures? What – the arms race in space has already been unleashed, but so far in latent forms? And how to deal with this – should we agree on certain rules of conduct in space in the conditions of the actual deployment of weapons harbingers, or should we still try to agree on pre-emptive measures?
It seems that the possibilities for measures to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space have not yet been fully exhausted. Hopefully, the presence of these "signs" does not mean that the situation is irreversible.
In this context, it is appropriate to emphasize the task of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space, which is enshrined in the traditional resolution of the UN General Assembly on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). This resolution is traditionally submitted alternately by Egypt and Sri Lanka; before the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, the resolution had universal support, since the 73rd session, this support has been lost: the United States and Israel are opposed.
An international legally binding agreement on the PAROS, the elements of which the relevant UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established by the UN General Assembly resolution (document A/RES/72/250) tried to work out, would also be very significant.
The initiative to create a GGE on PAROS belongs to Russia and China, which aimed to give an additional impetus to the discussion of the PAROS issues, followed by negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD).
Unfortunately, the GGE failed to reach a consensus decision. The elements of the eventual agreement on the PARAC were never agreed upon – they were blocked by the American representative.
DIPLOMACY AND LAW
It is obvious that international law should be the basis of any agreement on outer space. However, space has its own specifics. The threat posed by the deployment of weapons in outer space should be clearly distinguished from the risks associated with the objective development of space activities.→
Accordingly, approaches to solving these problems also differ. In the case of the deployment of weapons in outer space, we should still talk about taking preventive measures.
In the second case, we are faced with already clearly expressed problems (space debris, traffic density, the impact of space "weather", etc.). Here it is possible to use elements of "soft law", including the development of codes of conduct, principles and standards of responsible behavior – transparency and confidence measures in space (MTDC), measures to maintain sustainability of space activities.
By the way, as a follow–up to the final report of the Group of Governmental Experts on MTDK, which worked from 2014 to 2017, the UN General Assembly resolution on MTDK was adopted by consensus with an unprecedented initial trilateral co–authorship of Russia-China-the United States. However, during the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, which was to a certain extent a milestone for the BCD, the resolution (A/RES/73/72), traditionally adopted by consensus, was put to the vote: 180 votes in favor with one abstention (Palau) and two against (Israel and the USA).
This indicates a significant evolution of US approaches – from the joint development of MTDC to their actual denial. Which is a serious indicator of military space preparations and the desire to dominate in space.
To resolve the issue of the deployment of weapons in outer space, agreements of a different nature are required. Such standards are ensured through the development of a legally binding instrument. This is a very long and time-consuming process. However, diplomatic practice shows that this is the only way to develop effective international legal instruments.
As you know, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the deployment of any type of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space. Other types of weapons are not affected in the Treaty. More than 50 years have passed since its signing, and the threat of an arms race in outer space has also increased.
It is on this basis that Russia, back in 2008, at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), jointly with China, submitted a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). In June 2014, Russia and China presented an updated draft of the PPWT to the CD, taking into account the proposals made by interested States since its introduction.
It is not possible to start a full-scale official discussion of this issue on the basis of the draft PPWT due to the inconsistency of the work program of the CD. An important role in the development of a tool that puts a barrier to weapons in outer space should have been played by the above-mentioned UN profile GGE. However, it was unable to ensure the adoption by consensus of the elements of the eventual agreement. Nevertheless, it seems that it will be problematic to put a real practical barrier to the placement of weapons in space without a PARAC instrument.
OUTLINES OF POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS
When determining the obligations that should be placed at the center of the PAROS document, it is appropriate to be guided by the existing gaps in international space law. The most important gap today is the absence of restrictions on the launch of conventional weapons into space. Therefore, any agreement on the PARAC should include a similar rule.
The Angara-1.2 light rocket launched a Russian Defense Ministry spacecraft into orbit from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk Region in April. Photo from the page of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in VKontakte
The following obligations may be fixed:
– do not place any weapons in outer space;
– not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force against space objects;
– not to carry out space activities within the framework of international cooperation that do not correspond to the subject and objectives of the eventual agreement;
– finally, not to assist or encourage other parties to participate in activities that do not correspond to the subject and objectives of the eventual agreement.
In the event of an armed conflict in outer space, it will affect all participants in space activities. Then, for example, the problem of space debris, which a number of experts talk about, reducing the BCD problem to this issue, will move into the category of unsolvable.
There are other gaps: ground-based anti-satellite weapons (ASW), the use of cyber and laser weapons against space infrastructure. Among the latest "achievements" are means of passive, that is, non–kinetic influence, etc. At the same time, it is important to note that space debris is not a problem of agreement in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
With regard to PSO, it seems appropriate to use the provisions contained in the draft PPWT, which addresses the problem of land-based PSO, when formulating general approaches to PARCS.
In the draft Agreement, this problem is partly solved not directly, but by creating conditions under which it becomes unprofitable to have such systems. It is argued, in particular, that if the PARAC instrument is adopted by the international community, the incentives for the development and production of anti-satellite systems (ASPS) could be significantly reduced.
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITIONS
The draft PPWT also takes into account other gaps in international space law. For example, the updated version of the document offers definitions of four important terms: "space object", "weapons placed in outer space", as well as "use of force" or "threat of force". These definitions can also be used in a possible PARAC document.
The definition of "weapons in outer space" is the most significant and, as the discussions at the CD site and the profile GGE have shown, the most problematic.
The draft PPWT proposes to consider as such "any space object or its component part created or converted for the destruction, damage or disruption of the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the surface of the Earth or in its airspace, as well as for the destruction of humans, components of the biosphere important for human existence, or for causing them damage, and whose action is based on any physical principles."
It seems that this definition is very successful and capacious, and it can be adopted in the preparation of a future agreement on PARCS and other agreements in this area. Its advantage lies in the fact that not all devices belong to the category of weapons, but only those that are "created or converted" to perform the tasks listed in article 1.
Thus, the definition is given "for growth", that is, taking into account the already existing latest and possible promising developments, "sharpened" for the purposes of shock destruction. At the same time, following the example of the PPWT, the regulation of the use of devices in outer space that are not weapons in their basic characteristics can again be ensured in the future agreement on the PARAC by the principle of "non-use of force" or "threat of force" against space objects.
In accordance with the draft PPWT, in order to be called a weapon, the device must be specially created or re-equipped to perform the appropriate tasks. Such a device must be given the appropriate characteristics. Other devices, which are often referred to as "dual-use" devices or systems (in conflict conditions they can be used as "possible weapons", although they have a peaceful purpose) cannot be classified as weapons, since they are not specially designed and re-equipped for these tasks and they are not given the appropriate characteristics.
It is appropriate to emphasize that the definition of "weapons in outer space" plays an important role in the draft PPWT – indeed, in any draft on the PARAC and other agreements in this regard. It not only contributes to a clearer understanding of the subject of the treaty, but is also an integral part of the key obligation of any eventual document in this regard – not to place weapons in outer space.
At the same time, it is important to make a reservation that, in principle, the definition of "weapons in outer space" is not contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which in article IV has provisions regarding non-WMD weapons. However, in the long term, it is extremely necessary in order to distinguish weapon systems from "dual-use" systems. Especially in the context of the latest trends – an increasingly close interweaving of functions and tasks of various types of spacecraft (spacecraft). Such a definition would be very much in demand for various formats of bilateral or multilateral dialogue on this issue.
Finally, the definition of "use of force" or "threat of force" in relation to space objects. It is also intended to be part of possible commitments.
The most significant point: as one of the criteria for the "use of force" or "threat of force" in the draft PPWT, it was proposed to use the factor of "premeditation" of actions aimed at causing damage to space objects.
The principle of non-use of force or threat of force is a long-established basic provision of international law. It is enshrined in paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter. In addition, article 3 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty stipulates that all activities in outer space must be carried out in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. Which automatically means compliance with the principle of non-use of force or threat of force.
However, it seems appropriate to concretize the concept of the use of force or threat of force against outer space for the purposes of a future PARAC Treaty or other arrangements in this regard. It is significant that in the latest version of the PPWT, a reservation is made in this definition that actions to remove unguided and dangerous objects (for example, satellites) from orbit within the framework of the agreement will not fall under the "use of force". However, it is fundamentally important to fix for the future that such actions should be stipulated by the consent of the party under whose jurisdiction the space object is located.
It is also appropriate to note that the developers refused to include the definition of "outer space" in the latest version of the PPWT. This is probably due to the fact that this issue has been under consideration by the UN Committee on Outer Space (in particular, its legal subcommittee) for several decades, but there is no consensus on it yet (see, for example, document no. AC.105/C.2/L.306 of March 9, 2018).
It would also be desirable for a future agreement on PAROS to contain a broad set of definitions. However, in the end everything will depend on the scope of the document. The document itself could be extremely compact, while the conceptual apparatus would be reduced to several key definitions.
CONTROL AND VERIFICATION
It is also important to strive to ensure that compliance with the obligations proposed under the contract can be monitored. At the same time, the developers of the PPWT refused to include in the draft treaty a ban on research, development, production and ground storage of space-based weapons. For a very good reason: control over such obligations is hardly practicable. For the same reasons, there is no ban on ground-based PSO.
In general, it should be recognized that verification is an important aspect of a possible future agreement on PAROS. It is certainly important to verify the commitment that was put at the center of the draft PPWT – a ban on the deployment of weapons in outer space. However, it depends on the scope of the document.
When considering the feasibility of developing an effective control mechanism for any PAROS treaty or arrangements in this regard, the following circumstances should be taken into account.
Firstly, there are significant financial costs associated with the implementation of such projects.
Secondly, in political terms, verification is related to the problem of protecting promising technologies and classified military information. At the moment, only a few States have mastered the technology of remote observation using satellites. If we talk about multilateral agreements, it is difficult to imagine that these States will be ready to share their "national means of control" with other States, and those will be able to use them.
A different logic works with bilateral agreements. But even here there is a whole complex of problems.
It should also be borne in mind that verification provisions are not included in all arms control treaties.
Despite the absence of a separate full-fledged verification mechanism, the draft PPWT contains provisions related to verification. Thus, article VII provides for a consultation mechanism that can be activated in case of suspected violations of the treaty.
Individual agreed MTDCS may well contribute to monitoring the fulfillment of obligations. As such measures, some of the MTDCS recommended in the final report of the UN profile GGE can be used. These are the exchange of information on the principles and objectives of state policy in the space sphere, the exchange of information on the orbital parameters of space objects and possible coincidences of orbits, as well as notifications about planned maneuvers, spacecraft launches, visits of specialists to launch sites, etc.
Finally, it is quite possible to use the experience of other international documents for the purposes of an agreement on the verification of an eventual agreement on PAROS. In particular, a very interesting verification provision contains the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Placement of Nuclear Weapons or Other Types of WMD on the Seabed and Oceans and in its Depths of 1970 (the Seabed Treaty). Its article 3 assigns to the States parties to the agreement the right to monitor the fulfillment of relevant obligations on the understanding that monitoring will not interfere with such activities. There is a mechanism for consultations between the State having doubts about the performance of the Contract by another party and the State responsible for the activities that cause these doubts. If these doubts are not eliminated, the State can notify other countries of its concern.
In addition, elements of the verification mechanism were contained in the 1972 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, which ceased to exist after the United States withdrew from it. In particular, article 12 confirmed the right of States "to use the national technical means of control at their disposal in such a way that it complies with the generally recognized principles of international law." The parties to the agreement were obliged "not to interfere with the national technical means of control of the other party", as well as "not to intentionally apply masking measures that complicate the implementation of such control"
In any case, let us express the opinion that the absence of a detailed mechanism should not be an insurmountable obstacle to the conclusion of a PARAC agreement or agreements in this regard. In the case of the PPWT, Russian representatives have repeatedly stressed that it will be possible to return to a detailed consideration of this issue at the stage after adoption, in the context of a ban on the withdrawal of weapons into space. A separate protocol on this topic was proposed as one of the forms.
Realizing that it is not easy to move towards a legal ban, back in October 2004, in the first committee of the 59th session of the UN General Assembly, as a first step towards the PPWT, Russia unilaterally assumed a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space (NPOC). To date, the obligations under the NPC have been recorded in joint interstate statements of more than 30 States.
The political commitment to the NPC at the moment is one of the few really working measures to prevent the withdrawal of weapons into space. At the same time, it should be noted that the requirements that are usually imposed on binding international legal instruments are not applicable to it. And with all the importance of the NPC in the face of growing practical measures to "weaponize" space, this measure is clearly not enough.
Andrey Malov
Andrey Yuryevich Malov – Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of International and National Security of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, expert of the Center for Military and Political Studies of MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, member of the Expert Council of the PIR Center.
