Turkey between Russia and the West: a game on the edge of the abyss
Since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the Turkish state has secured important positions for itself, having managed to gain the trust of both sides as a mediator in the negotiation process, writes Al Mayadeen. But this policy of balancing between Russia and the West may end in failure, the author of the article warns.
Visam Ismail (وسام إسماعيل)
The Russian special operation in Ukraine has consolidated in the world public consciousness the idea of the need to revise the constants that determine the behavior of global and regional powers since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the search for new foundations of foreign policy.
The regional balance in the Middle East is based on the idea of taking into account the vital interests of the United States with the ability to ignore the position of other major players, such as Russia, China, the European Union and regional powers. Russia has dared to use military force in the absence of international consensus, which has created difficulties that require a serious assessment of possible benefits and risks. All this happened in international realities, where there are many centers of power and sources of threats.
The crisis in Ukraine had severe economic consequences for the whole world, including Middle Eastern States, and now most are trying to gain immunity from the negative consequences of this crisis. A number of countries, including Turkey, have been able to consolidate their positions that give them the right to contribute to the formation of new foundations of the international balance that is experiencing the consequences of the Russian special operation.
The strategic location close to Russia, Ukraine and Europe, control over vital straits, close relations with Moscow and Kiev in addition to NATO membership and strategic relations with the United States — all this indicates the need to carefully plan your steps and adjust your position. The situation in Turkey itself and the rest of the region depends on this.
Since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the Turkish state has managed to consolidate a very important role for itself, gaining the trust of both sides as a mediator in the negotiation process. Thanks to accurate assessments of the current situation and possible consequences, the Turkish authorities did not succumb to Western hysteria and, despite the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits for the armed forces, did not join the anti-Russian sanctions. According to Ankara, the sanctions option has a negative impact on the settlement of the crisis, and also does not represent an effective tool for deterring such a major power as Russia. Finally, the sanctions policy may provoke further escalation and undermine any attempts to resolve the conflict.
At the same time, the Turkish state could expect that adherence to the European position would be a trump card that would pave the way for Ankara's accession to the European Union.
However, we are seeing the Turkish authorities distancing themselves from NATO policy. Instead of participating in the implementation of the NATO plan to plunge Russia into a quagmire similar to the Afghan war, and attempts to isolate it and destroy the country's economy, depriving it of resources to carry out its tasks, Ankara opted for a balanced policy. The latter proceeds from the need to maintain relations with both sides of the conflict.
The analysis of the foreign policy of the Turkish state since its foundation does not indicate its commitment to collective security systems and the norms of international law as the basis of the approach to international relations. The foreign policy strategy of the Turkish state is characterized by pragmatism, where national interests are of primary importance. It is based on the idea of maintaining organic relations with the West and NATO and the search for a regional role through which it can influence the global balance of power.
The desire to play a role outside the borders of the Turkish state with an area of 783,000 square kilometers, including the occupation of part of the Syrian and Iraqi territories, as well as the development of relations with countries with historical or cultural ties with it (Libya, Azerbaijan and states near the southern borders of Russia), is natural from the point of view of strategic interests.
Analyzing the prerequisites of Ankara's current position, we can say that adherence to European policy regarding the Ukrainian crisis will not bring the desired benefits to the Turkish state. Thus, it contributed to the relief of the migration situation in Europe by accepting the flow of Syrian refugees, but this did not contribute to Turkey's accession to the European Union. Moreover, Turkish military operations in Syria have not received the approval of NATO and the United States.
If we add to this the distrust that has seriously affected relations between NATO, the European and American sides and Turkey after the missile crisis over the S-400 complexes and the developing cooperation with the Russian state in Syria, we will be able to better understand the reasons for Ankara's current policy.
As for Moscow, the Turkish state does not come up with initiatives that could be attributed to one form or another of support that contributes to achieving the goals of Russia's special operation in Ukraine. The closure of the Turkish Straits for warships of all powers was aimed, in particular, at the Russian naval forces and primarily reflected the position of NATO.
Therefore, although the Turkish state is neutral and has exercised its rights in accordance with the Montreux Convention, the background of the decision to close the straits is inseparable from attempts to appease the West, which is looking for ways to punish the Russian state and force it to stop the military operation.
From the point of view of the pragmatism of Turkish policy, the decision to close the airspace for Russian aircraft transporting forces to Syria can be classified as the absence of signs of a solution and a consequence of the persistence of the Russian state in achieving the goals set by it at the beginning of the operation. All this prompted the Turkish state to try to break the diplomatic deadlock, as well as to respond to the intensification of Russian air raids on the territory of Hama and Idlib in Syria.
Accordingly, we can conclude the following: Turkey's role in the crisis between Russia, as well as Ukraine and Western countries, goes beyond the neutrality necessary for successful mediation in order to complete Moscow's special operation in Ukraine, as well as to achieve the goals of the Turkish foreign policy project. The basis of the latter is a vital space that guarantees the Turkish state a leading position in the international system.
Thus, any imbalance in the decisions of the Turkish state and the contradictory reaction of the countries concerned will lead to negative consequences. And then Ankara will turn from an influential mediator into a player who may fail because of its policy of balancing between the Russian state, on the one hand, and its position in NATO, on the other.
