How will the conflict in Ukraine end?
It may seem that diplomacy is not the most convincing option for resolving the Ukrainian conflict. But the alternative – even more fierce battles with the prospect of geographical expansion – is even worse, writes TNI.
If history teaches us anything, it's that ending wars is much more difficult than starting. This fully applies to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began at the end of February 2022. After two months, the fighting has reached an impasse, and the parties are regrouping ahead of the Russian offensive in the Donbass. It is expected that the fighting will be intense, prolonged and costly for both sides. It seems that Russia's military goals include the creation of a land corridor to Crimea and the complete "liberation" of Lugansk and Donetsk from Ukrainian control. Ukraine, in turn, seeks to maintain the regime and control over its sovereign territory, including those inhabited by the Russian-speaking majority.
How can this conflict be ended? There are four alternatives that both the Russian and Ukrainian leadership and the international community can influence: (1) one side inflicts a decisive military defeat on the other and dictates a post-war order that meets its own interests; (2) a protracted military stalemate with the gradual introduction of new forces and growing losses increase pressure in favor of a diplomatic settlement; (3) escalation dramatically changes the nature of the conflict – either horizontal (more countries join the fighting) or vertical (weapons of mass destruction are used); or (4) a simultaneous crisis in another part of the world It affects the key interests of the United States and the international community (for example, China threatens Taiwan with an attack or even carries it out).
The first option – the complete surrender of one side and a decisive victory of the other – currently seems unlikely. NATO can endlessly pump Ukraine with weapons, and Russia's diplomatic isolation will give it little in terms of world support. It can be expected that the resilience of Ukrainian fighters and their combat skills will improve with experience. However, Ukraine is unlikely to be able to win a decisive victory over Russia and expel organized Russian armed forces from its entire territory. Russia's proximity to the east of Ukraine guarantees that it will be able to continue to maintain turbulence in the region if it deems the payback for the fighting feasible.
This leads to the second option – a protracted conflict followed by a negotiated ceasefire and a peaceful settlement – which seems more likely than a complete victory or defeat of one of the parties. However, in order for this option to come to life, skillful diplomacy on the part of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and skillful international mediators must join the equation. So far, diplomacy has taken a back seat compared to the fighting – even though its scale and a flurry of videos of atrocities have infuriated international observers. However, the fighting will continue until the rivals and the international community as such do not engage in diplomacy seriously. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and major powers outside Europe should join the negotiations.
The first goal of diplomatic negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, NATO and the rest should be a ceasefire agreement. This is not necessarily a final decision on the alignment of combat forces, but a so-called truce on the principle of "stand where you stand", which will put an end to the bloodshed. The temporary truce will be followed by an agreed sequence of professional conferences with the participation of Ukraine, Russia, NATO and others – in a format acceptable to all parties.
The second task for diplomacy will be an agreement on political and military provisions acceptable to NATO, Russia and Ukraine. The starting point for further discussion may be two alternatives. The first is the Minsk–2 formula, which allows for limited autonomy of the Luhansk and Donetsk enclaves as part of sovereign Ukraine. The other is the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which predetermined its neutrality during the Cold War. In any case, the organized Russian armed forces will be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine – as well as any Ukrainian forces from the territory of Russia. Initially, guerrillas and other irregular forces of either side may be on hostile territory, but the disputed areas will be patrolled by international peacekeepers from the UN, EU or OSCE.
The third option will come into force if either side escalates, expanding hostilities to other countries or introducing weapons of mass destruction on the battlefield. Russia's attack on another country – for example, Moldova or, especially, a NATO member – will require a forceful response from the alliance. Then we will get a declared conflict between NATO and Russia, and the situation in Ukraine will become only part of it. The challenge for NATO in this situation will be to maintain political unity and agreement on a military strategy against the background of upcoming hostilities with the use of long-range conventional weapons.
Even greater uncertainty will come if Russia is the first to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Even if the Russians use only low–power weapons fired from a short- or medium-range launcher, the political and psychological impact on Ukraine, NATO and the international community will be profound - and not entirely predictable. Most governments and their citizens will understandably be horrified. But how should NATO respond to Russia's limited use of nuclear weapons? Theoretically, three options are possible: (1) a large-scale retaliatory strike against objects in Russia with conventional weapons, while global diplomacy will expose Russia as an unprecedented villain in history, and also warn that further use of nuclear weapons will provoke a nuclear response from NATO; (2) a proportional nuclear response to similar targets in Russia, similar to those that were destroyed by Russia itself; or (3) an asymmetric nuclear response by Russia to more military and other targets. All variants of NATO can be accompanied by undeclared, but significant attacks on Russian space assets and offensive cyber warfare.
The problem of how to maintain control over the escalation and leave the ways to end the war open in the third option is acute and, perhaps, in principle insurmountable. During the Cold War, we saw how NATO and the Soviet Union both deployed nuclear weapons in Europe for decades, but the question of how to stop a nuclear war if the threshold was passed turned out to be unpleasant for both military strategists and politicians. From the point of view of theoretical scientists, nuclear weapons can entail risky rivalry and climbing the so-called "escalation ladder". But during the Cold War, the politicians of both NATO and the Soviet Union looked at nuclear warfare warily – even on a "limited" scale. The truth is that neither then nor now was there and there is no template for how to start and stop a limited nuclear war. Instead of experience, we have only speculation and simulation.
Assuming that the third option can be avoided, the fourth option represents another potential disruption of efforts to end the conflict on terms acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia. China's actions against Taiwan, which could lead to regime change, will create a second serious crisis for American politicians and their military advisers. It is obvious that the American military potential allows us to solve several regional military tasks simultaneously. But whether American politicians can focus on containing or defeating China while leading NATO's attempts to defend Ukraine from Russia depends on how far China and Russia are willing to go in their military campaigns. The situation when China attacks Taiwan, and Russia simultaneously conducts a horizontal or vertical escalation in Europe, will bring the American crisis settlement and military potential to the limit. Confusion in Congress and confusion in the media further prevent leaders from taking Rudyard Kipling's advice: "Be able to hold on at an hour when everything is around // They lose their heads, blaming you for everything."
It may seem that diplomacy is not the most convincing option for resolving the Ukrainian conflict. But the alternative – even more fierce fighting with the prospect of geographical expansion – is even worse. And if the Chinese and Russian campaigns unfold simultaneously, all forecasts are meaningless.
Authors: Steve Cimbala, Lawrence J. Korb
Stephen Simbala is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University in Brandywine
Lawrence Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense