That's why Finland and Sweden have no place in NATO
Despite the change in the attitude of Finland and Sweden to NATO membership, American politicians should not allow further expansion of the alliance, as this will only worsen the confrontation in Europe and a new cold war, the author of TNI believes.
One of the unintended consequences of the Russian special operation in Ukraine is a dramatic change in the perception of threats among Finns and Swedes. Although their countries are strong and capable NATO partners and have already made their contribution in the Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Helsinki and Stockholm have hitherto adhered to a policy of military non–alignment in foreign policy. Before the conflict in Ukraine, the same position was held by public opinion in both countries. However, today more than half of Finns and Swedes are in favor of joining NATO, and the Prime Minister of Finland said that a decision on applying could be made by June. For his part, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted that all allies will "welcome" Finland and Sweden as new members, and they will "easily join" the alliance.
But even though Finland and Sweden have changed their attitude towards NATO, American politicians should resist further expanding their responsibility for security, since this will only exacerbate the Cold War-era confrontation in Europe.
As Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently explained, the "new strategic conservatism" that has emerged as a response to competitive multipolarity implies that the United States should, if possible, avoid expanding its military commitments to the Russian and Chinese periphery. The US foreign policy elites must understand and make sure that America's ability to use force abroad is limited, and other great powers have shown that they are ready to defend their interests. Alas, this is exactly what American diplomats have repeatedly evaded in negotiations with Russian officials, not allowing the conflict in Ukraine to be averted in the end. The Biden administration decided not to adapt to specific geopolitical realities, but fundamentally supported NATO's open door policy.
In order to prevent a new cold war with Moscow, it is necessary not to repeat this mistake by discussing the annexation of Finland and Sweden. Of course, there are important differences between Finland and Sweden, on the one hand, and Ukraine and Georgia, on the other. The Scandinavian countries have advanced and well-equipped armed forces that maintain a high degree of interoperability with NATO systems and command structures. In addition, both countries have a low level of corruption in the absence of active territorial conflicts and disputes. But even though Finland and Sweden would certainly become good NATO members, their inclusion in the alliance would exacerbate the risks and negate the prospect of strengthening security in the Baltic Sea.
More precisely, the elimination of the last neutral buffer zone between the West and Russia will not contribute to strategic stability in any way. Some commentators claim that NATO expansion at the expense of Finland and Sweden will strengthen the eastern flank of the alliance and strengthen deterrence in the Baltic region. In this case, the Russian military will have to reckon with the presence of security guarantees from Western allies in the neighbor – a preemptive attack on the Baltic countries will become more dangerous and costly.
But Russia has made it clear that it will not reconsider the status quo in the Baltic region. Former President and now deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned Finland and Sweden: "In this case, there will be no talk of any nuclear–free status of the Baltic Sea - the balance must be restored." In addition, Russia will have to "seriously strengthen the grouping of land forces and air defense and deploy significant naval forces in the waters of the Gulf of Finland."
To be honest, nuclear weapons in the Baltic region will not change the strategic balance of forces in favor of Russia, and in fact they may well be deployed there. As the Lithuanian Defense Minister noted last week: "Nuclear weapons have always been stored in Kaliningrad, and the international community and the countries of the region are well aware of this." However, the question is not whether Russia will try to achieve nuclear superiority, but whether it will increase the role of nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine and lower the threshold for their use in order to fill the widening gap from NATO in conventional weapons. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian nuclear doctrine allows for a preemptive nuclear strike in local and regional conflicts. When the fighting in Ukraine ends, it will not be surprising if Russia begins to react more aggressively to the further expansion of NATO at its northwestern borders. Although the risk of conflict will remain low, brusque references to the use of nuclear weapons will exacerbate the sense of threat in the capitals of NATO countries and make it even more difficult to work responsibly to defuse and resolve crises.
Another problem is whether NATO allies will be able to contribute to strengthening the Finnish-Russian border with a length of over 1,300 km. Although the Biden administration has sent thousands of troops to Eastern Europe on a rotational basis, given China's priority as a "priority threat," a permanent increase in the number of regional forces is not expected. It is equally unlikely that other NATO members will have extra resources to make up the difference – especially in Finland. She has no natural barriers on the land border with Russia, and in case of unforeseen circumstances, she will soon need reinforcements along vulnerable sea lanes in the Baltic. Again, although it is unlikely that Russia will launch a preemptive strike against Finland, it would be irresponsible for NATO to give security guarantees that it is unable to fulfill. Moreover, strategic overstrain will weaken confidence in the mutual protection mechanism under Article 5. The consolidation and strengthening of the NATO periphery under the leadership of Europe, not territorial expansion, should be on the agenda.
Tensions between the United States and Russia have reached their highest point since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The desire to punish Russia for the unprovoked and unjustified conflict in Ukraine has led a number of commentators to the idea of some kind of "higher justice": the conflict that began to keep Ukraine out of NATO, on the contrary, will lead to the expansion of the alliance. However, this point of view does not take into account the national interests of the United States. NATO's expansion to Russia's borders will only exacerbate Moscow's pervasive sense of insecurity and the impression of an imminent threat. Even worse, the expansion of the alliance and the membership of Finland and Sweden will consolidate the alignment of forces of the new Cold War in Europe, aggravate the rivalry of superpowers and impose additional security responsibilities on the United States in a secondary region. This time, the Biden administration should publicly declare that it will oppose the membership of Finland and Sweden.
Author: Matthew Mai, Senior Lecturer at Rutgers University
