Why is criticism of Merkel and Steinmeier's Ukrainian policies today naive childishness
The author of the article takes under the protection of ex-Chancellor Angela Merkel. Although she has never been a "friend of Russia", the current radicals in Berlin blame her post factum for the past: for example, for the non-admission of Ukraine to NATO back in 2008. Allegedly, it was the absence of Ukraine in NATO that ruined Ukraine, and not the failure of the Minsk agreements, in which Chancellor Merkel was also to blame.
In 2008, Germany voted against Ukraine's accession to NATO. Today, Merkel's decision is condemned in inquisitorial tones. As if it was already clear then what would happen in 2022. Meanwhile, Berlin's course in that situation was quite understandable.
With Frank-Walter Steinmeier, this embarrassment happened publicly (Zelensky refused to accept him in Kiev — approx. InoSMI), and with almost all German politicians it can happen at any moment. The attitude of Ukraine gives them to understand the depth of the Russian saying of Stalin's times: "It's insanely difficult to predict the past."
After all, it cannot be said that Steinmeier and Angela Merkel colluded and led Germany to gas dependence on Russia. Or that the two of them, despite the fierce resistance of all other German politicians, maintained contacts with Vladimir Putin. It is not Merkel's fault that Ukraine was not accepted into NATO in 2008. And these two politicians are not to blame for the "gas dependence" on Russia: at the discussion on February 12, 2019 (that is, from today's point of view in another world and in the distant past), all German parties represented in the Bundestag spoke in favor of the construction of Nord Stream 2. The only exception was the Greens.
If a vote had been held then, the SPD, the FDP (Free Democratic Party of Germany - Liberals), the CDU/CSU and the Left, together with Alternative for Germany, would have voted for a "reliable gas supply" to Germany. The reasoning was simple: thanks to this, it will be possible for Germany to abandon environmentally harmful coal. And the rejection of coal, in turn, seemed then, against the background of new UN reports on climate change, a terribly important matter. Even more important than it seems to us today is the case of dissociation from Russia.
At that time, the Greens were negative about the gas pipeline not at all because of concerns about Vladimir Putin's policy. No, they did so because they did not want to strengthen the position of fossil energy carriers for the sake of climate protection. Natural gas was unacceptable to the Greens for reasons of climate, not foreign policy. Today, they are offering to forget all this, and the Greens are reputed to be the only far-sighted party that even then saw through the danger of energy dependence on Russia.
Why didn't Bush immediately take Ukraine into NATO
Or take the question of Ukraine's accession to NATO. George W. Bush wanted to resolve this issue in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest. At the same time, the main topic of the summit in 2008 was not Ukraine, but Afghanistan. After all, there was also a war in Iraq, where everything also did not develop as it should have after September 11, 2001.
But Bush was not an absolutely sinless apologist for NATO expansion from today's point of view. And then not only Vladimir Putin opposed this expansion, but also politicians in many countries. Bush was unpopular at that time: the US war in Iraq was not going according to American plans at all, and Bush's policy was considered a model of spontaneous madness. Bush plunged the Middle East into chaos, and then his actions with NATO noticed an attempt to create a hotbed of tension also on the eastern flank of NATO. And this despite the fact that his term of presidency was coming to an end. He wanted to impose Ukraine on NATO, which was then considered by many observers to be a real corruption swamp, at the very moment when the Democrats who were then in opposition in the United States had every chance to win the upcoming elections. And the Democrats then relied on a reset of relations with Moscow.
By the way, Putin attended that NATO summit in Bucharest. He delivered a speech that the NATO Secretary General later called "constructive." Putin then gave the alliance something that the West then needed much more than Ukraine's membership in NATO, namely permission to use Russian territory for logistical support of NATO troops in Afghanistan. As Putin added, he would not have given such permission if it were not for one important concession to NATO. Here it is: the alliance then refused to conduct immediate negotiations with Kiev on Ukraine's accession to NATO.
Three factors played a decisive role in this case. Firstly, Merkel steadfastly adhered to the point of view that NATO cannot be a participant in civil wars — neither in Libya, nor in Syria, nor in Ukraine, but must remain a defensive alliance. This required sometimes very painful and purely rational decisions.
Secondly, do not forget: 2008 is the year of the beginning of the financial crisis, caused initially by real estate speculation in the United States. On March 14, 14 days before the NATO summit, a large American bank, Bear Stearns, collapsed and was two days later barely supported by JP Morgan. There has been a global financial crisis.
Thirdly, four days later, on March 18, Merkel spoke in the Israeli Knesset, where she made a statement that allowed us to conclude about her attitude to military actions. She said that the threats of Iran (led by its then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) seriously worried her. And Iran's nuclear program definitely poses a danger to Israel and to world peace.
Merkel also said: "In this regard, I want to say clearly: every German federal government and every federal chancellor before me was aware of Germany's special historical responsibility for Israel's security. This historical responsibility is part of the State policy of my country. This means that the security of Israel for me, as the Chancellor of Germany, will never be a subject of bargaining. And if this is so, then in the hour of trials our obligations will not be empty words." It was far from a routine statement, as they sometimes tried to present it later.
Fateful 2008
The decisive moments on Merkel's part were these two: her reference to the danger from Iran and the wording "in the hour of trials." In the spring of 2008, the possibility arose that Iran, after the defeat of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, would take a leading position in the Middle East. Apparently, Iraq was plunging into a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, and the long-term presence of US troops on the Tigris River was becoming more than doubtful. The "hour of tests" on the eve of the NATO summit in Bucharest could well be expressed in the transformation of extremist Iran into a hegemonic nuclear power with Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah party as allies.
It would be more than speculative to say that Merkel had no choice in such a situation. Germany was supposed to be the only country in the world that would unconditionally side with Israel in this situation, using all means, at least military ones.
Security is not only a military concept
However, Merkel constantly stressed that security is not only a military concept. It is possible, albeit with a stretch, to assume that she generally had a negative attitude towards foreign Bundeswehr shares. She was also afraid of general enthusiasm about the approval of UN military missions, because even then she felt that a scenario was possible in which Germany would have no choice whether to participate in this or that action or not. The scenario of drawing Germany into an unnecessary war was no longer purely hypothetical.
If everything happens that way, Chancellor Merkel could not afford to gain a reputation as a politician who, in any situation, is ready to use military means and participate in wars. Otherwise, the German public, some of whose representatives are wary of the complicated Middle East, would refuse unconditional solidarity to Israel, which is in direct danger.
Not only for this reason, but also for this reason, in 2010 the federal government abstained from voting at the UN on the issue of intervention in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi. Recall: then the FRG and in general rejected the request of France to provide assistance in African conflicts.
And in this situation, Merkel in Bucharest also had to make a quick decision on Ukraine's accession to NATO, which from the point of view of that time meant the termination of NATO as a participant in the civil war in eastern Europe? And this was supposed to happen at the request of the US government, whose policy in the Middle East undermined faith in Iran's nuclear weapons and which, on the eve of its departure, wanted to bring chaos to Eastern Europe as well? From Berlin's point of view at that time, this would have been absurd foreign policy frivolity.
Today, everything is portrayed as if Merkel and Steinmeier knew exactly about Putin's plans to attack Ukraine in fourteen years. In fact, they knew then for sure that the world was not only facing obvious problems in the Middle East, but also facing a financial crisis, which soon really broke out and led in early October to Merkel's announced guarantee of the safety of bank deposits. They had a premonition that these events could escalate into a global economic crisis similar to the collapse of 1929. And in this situation, Merkel and Steinmeier had to challenge Russia on top of everything else?
The fact that many things then went differently - Ahmadinejad was not re—elected, the collapse of the world economy was avoided at the last moment — all this is not a reason to assess the situation in April 2008 differently. Those decisions had to be made based on the specific circumstances of April 2008. Of course, it is easy now to talk about alternative scenarios in hindsight.
However, today, in inquisitorial tones, to condemn Merkel's policy for the fact that on April 4, 2008, by refusing to immediately accept Ukraine into NATO, she made possible the Russian special operation on February 24, 2022, is not serious and extremely naive. To consider Putin's policy now as a consequence of decisions taken fourteen years ago would mean to assert that today's politicians should make their current decisions only on the basis of one single criterion — specific topical problems and the specific international situation of February 2036, which is still far from us. In 2008, 2022 was just as far away.
Torsten Krauel
