Ukraine and the analysis of Indian neutrality
New Delhi's approach to conflicts – especially involving its partners – is still determined by the 1957 axiom of Jawaharlal Nehru, writes The Hindu. The author explains in detail the subtleties of India's national interests and states that the United States does not seem to understand these nuances.
In 1957, a year after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru explained to Parliament why India had not taken a condemnatory position. "A lot of things happen in the world from year to year and from day to day that we strongly dislike. We do not condemn them, because when you try to solve a problem, there is little sense from condemnation and insults." Nehru's axiom defines India's approach to conflicts – especially involving partners – to this day. Whether it is the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) or Afghanistan (1979) or the American invasion of Iraq (2003), India more or less adheres to this line. Her response to the Russian special operation in Ukraine – condemning the deaths of civilians without counter–accusations and refusing to vote at the UN - is not fundamentally different from the historical cautious neutrality.
And India is far from the only one. South Africa, another major democracy, also abstained in the UN vote against Russia. And the United Arab Emirates, a close ally of the United States in the Persian Gulf, where thousands of American troops are stationed, too. Israel, the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East, condemned the Russian operation, but did not support sanctions, and refused to send defense systems to Ukraine. NATO ally Turkey did the same – and even acts as an intermediary between Ukraine and Russia. However, none of these countries has been subjected to pressure and criticism from the West – unlike India. US President Joe Biden called her position "pretty shaky." And his deputy national security adviser for International Economics, Dalip Singh, who recently visited New Delhi, threatened India with "consequences" if it conducts trade with Russia bypassing US sanctions. Why such a selective approach?
Analysis of causes
In general, there are three reasons – political, economic and strategic. Politically, the West is carefully building an ideology that President Vladimir Putin's special operation in Ukraine is an attack on the entire "free world", in the words of President Joe Biden. This legend will seem unconvincing if the West's attempt to punish the Russians is not supported by the world's largest democracy (India). Economically, anti-Russian sanctions were imposed mainly by Western countries. They were supported by only three Asian countries – Japan, South Korea and Singapore. China, the world's second economy, will not comply with US sanctions. If India continues to trade with Russia bypassing payment restrictions, it will inevitably soften the blow from sanctions on the Russian economy.
Strategically, this is the most important global crisis since the Cold War. Over the past half century, India has strengthened its strategic partnership with the United States and the West in general, but at the same time has maintained warm relations with Russia. Until recently, this balance was not in doubt. But with the Russian operation in Ukraine and the almost complete breakdown of relations between Moscow and the West, countries like India faced a difficult choice of whom to support. Against the background of its newfound partnership with the United States, for which New Delhi is a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region, many expected that India would give up strategic autonomy and take a pro–Western position. However, this did not happen.
How does India see the conflict
All these arguments are valid from the point of view of the West, but he misses India's position. And there are serious differences here. The world order is changing rapidly. If the war with Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were the first signs of this shift, then the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, when the country, after a twenty-year struggle with Islamists, remained at the mercy of the Taliban ("The Taliban is a terrorist organization banned in Russia, – Approx. InoSMI), and the Russian operation in Ukraine – on the contrary, the most acute symptoms of a new global disorder. India sees three great powers and several medium powers in the world. The United States remains the greatest, but its influence on global geopolitics is steadily declining. China, on the other hand, is growing rapidly and seeks, as Rush Doshi argues in his book The Long Party, to weaken America's power and oust it from the global order. Russia is a wounded bear with imperial nostalgia. Economically, it is weak, but it remains a superpower in terms of territory and military power. If we refrain from moral judgments, then two of these three are partners of India, and one is a competitor. Therefore, the question before India, the middle power, is: why should it choose a side in the confrontation between its two partners that has unfolded in Europe, which will only strengthen its competitor. Therefore, neutrality is the best of the obviously bad options.
Moreover, countries shape their foreign policy based on their own national interests, and not only on moral obligations. In 1999, NATO under the leadership of the United States bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days, believing that this campaign would serve the interests of the American leadership after the end of the Cold War. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq because they wanted to change the Front Asia. In the same way, they destroyed another state – Libya. Now the United States is trying to punish Russia not so much because of moral obligations (because they themselves act selectively at best), but because the crisis in Ukraine has opened up opportunities for the United States to weaken Russia, its main rival in Europe. But India's national interests do not coincide with this line. India does not benefit from a weakened and isolated Russia. On the contrary, India needs Moscow not only for defense and energy purchases, but also for geopolitical reasons. India is a power equally continental and maritime. And if close ties with the United States, Japan and Australia are important for its maritime security and interests, then ties with Russia, Iran and Central Asia are important for its continental one, especially in light of the shameful withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan.
The tragedy of Ukraine
Finally, the West is by no means an innocent bystander in the entire Ukrainian crisis. Ukraine was promised membership in NATO back in 2008, but it was never given. However, the promise alone brought down Russian security calculations, and Moscow began to act decisively, annexing Crimea and supporting militants in the Donbass. The United States supplied Kiev with money and weapons, but did not take any serious measures to strengthen Russia's deterrence. If Putin's troops entered the territory of Ukraine, it was only because he decided that NATO would not defend the country outside the alliance. Even though the Ukrainian resistance has prevented Russia from achieving its original goals, Moscow may be able to convince Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky to accept neutrality. In addition, the territories subject to it may expand. And this is the tragedy of Ukraine. The West not only failed to contain Putin, but also pushed Russia even more into the arms of China with its limited response to the fighting. What should India do – aggravate these embraces by supporting the anti-Russian line of the West, or cooperate with Moscow on its own terms and give Russia the opportunity to diversify relations with Asia? India chose the latter.
India offers assistance in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
India is not a satellite of any of the superpowers (besides, even the satellites did not unanimously support the sanctions). It is not part of any alliance system (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quartet is not an alliance). Like any other country, India reserves the right to pursue a policy of pragmatic realism and national interests. And she believes that neutrality, strategic autonomy and open channels with both sides are in her best interests. This does not mean that India supports the conflict. That's not so. But the United States, India's most important strategic partner, does not seem to understand these nuances. At least, this conclusion suggests itself from Washington's statements.
Author: Stanley Johny
