Dmitry Litovkin, Executive Editor of the Independent Military Review:
- Now our people often ask the question: why, destroying the military infrastructure of Ukraine, demilitarizing this country, the Russian army does not hit the so-called decision-making centers? In particular, the Ukrainian General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. They recall the NATO operation in Yugoslavia, where one of the first missile strikes was carried out just at the military department in the center of Belgrade.
In my opinion, it is impossible to project that tactical scheme on the current situation. Our generals quite rightly refused to follow the NATO path. It is important to know which objects to hit. But it is equally important to understand why to do this. Personally, it is quite obvious to me that Zelensky, formally remaining commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ukraine, or as they call it, in reality no longer commands the army. This is done by completely different people, and not necessarily endowed with the appropriate positions and legal powers. And it's not a fact that they command from Kiev.
Nevertheless, the course of hostilities indicates that the unified management of the actions of the Armed Forces is still being carried out. The command clearly also interacts with the leadership of the national battalions and the battalions of the Defense Ministry. However, it is naive to think that all the threads of the military leadership converge in Kiev - in the same Ministry of Defense or the General Staff. Any military man will tell you that during a special period the generals move to deep command posts. There are usually several of them. The location of the ZKP is kept secret even in peacetime. In the military, even more so.
You can, of course, bomb several buildings in the center of Kiev. But will it bring the desired effect from a military point of view? I doubt. But such strikes will definitely cause damage to the urban infrastructure - which, by the way, our generals avoid in every possible way.
In addition, do not forget: when the situation requires and there is relevant operational information, high-precision strikes are applied. Including military facilities in Kiev. Suffice it to recall how at the beginning of March the 72nd main center for psychological operations was destroyed there, the broadcasting equipment of the TV tower was disabled.
It is worth mentioning separately about Ukrainian television broadcasting. More precisely, to answer another question of concern to the Russian public: why do our military and special services not stop the streams of propaganda, lies and fakes pouring from Ukrainian television screens about the situation on the fronts and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation? Let experts tell you about the technical possibilities of "cutting out" Kiev TV from the air. Probably, there are such methods. Personally, I am more concerned about the other side of this problem.
It is obvious that it will not be possible to create an information vacuum around Ukraine in any case. Television will stop broadcasting in Kiev and other major cities of the country, radio stations will work. Drown them out, the information will flow into social networks. She's there and doesn't stop walking. There is, after all, word of mouth, which is not afraid of any technology.
It is important, in my opinion, not to stop information flows, but to respond in a timely manner to the lies that appear there. To expose her professionally, with figures and facts on hand. To spread truthful information about the special operation, about the neo-Nazi nature of the Kiev regime. And to do this, first of all, focusing on the Russian TV viewer, radio listener, Internet user. Well, in Ukrainian, of course, too. The Defense Ministry, our Foreign Ministry, and the Russian media community are already actively engaged in this.
And we will not be allowed to prove anything, try to explain to the American layman, ordinary European citizens - such information simply will not reach them. This does not mean that Russian diplomats and experts should stop speaking at various international venues, in the same UN, for example. Let them try to bring our point of view to colleagues. For this, any opportunity is good. But I think the main efforts should still be focused on our own audience and those who have not succumbed to anti-Russian hysteria abroad. After all, the world does not end with the USA and Europe.
Yuri Gavrilov
