Foreign Policy (USA): the cold war on two fronts is beyond America's strength
The Ukrainian crisis gave Biden "leverage" to achieve peace, according to the authors of the FP article. Washington should take into account Moscow's concerns and "quietly and calmly" start working with it and with Kiev. At the same time, we should not forget about China. Otherwise, the United States risks sliding into the abyss of the Cold War on two fronts, the authors warn.
In the new world order, it is necessary to avoid simultaneous conflict with Russia and China.
A long time ago, when historical crises were taking place in the world, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, the world's only superpower did not put forward demands and ultimatums. In these cases, Secretary of State James Baker very subtly and unobtrusively used the levers of influence that the United States had. The United States, pursuing its strategy, was able to put itself in the place of others, tried to understand their interests, "red lines" and minimum requirements in order to find a reliable solution to the problem and settle differences.
Thus, thanks to skillful diplomacy, the administration of George H.W. Bush ended the Cold War without a single shot being fired, but with a bilateral treaty on reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. As a result, this led to an 85 percent reduction in the stocks of such weapons compared to the peak values of the Cold War. Whole classes of conventional weapons have disappeared in Europe, and Russia's former adversary has been treated as a partner.
But three decades later, Bush's "new world order" collapsed due to strategic shortsightedness, indiscriminate use of force and incomplete changes. Now everyone blames each other, but no matter who blames whom, the world needs a new world order in which there will be no previous erroneous efforts that laid the foundation for future conflicts, as was the case with the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919.
Such a mistake was the rash remark of American President Joe Biden, who said that Russian President Vladimir Putin "cannot remain in power" (earlier he impromptu called Putin a war criminal). This statement overshadowed Biden's strong speech in Poland, delivered in the spirit of Reagan. It could have ominous consequences if Moscow decides that it has nothing to lose. Is there really no chance that the United States will be able to negotiate with Putin to end the conflict?
Further, as the leaks of intelligence information about the alleged collusion between Russia and China show, the United States is trying to publicly shame Beijing for its refusal to condemn Putin and warn of serious consequences if he completely leans towards Russia. Blinken says China is "on the wrong side of history." But the United States wants to influence Beijing's choice by convicting him even before he provided material assistance to Russia. This is likely to provoke an angry rebuff, rather than a desire to cooperate.
A new cold war on two fronts will require much more military spending, and the world economy will be in a state of great uncertainty, which will negatively affect it. This will hinder the Biden administration's fundamental goal of rebuilding the United States. In this situation, it is highly desirable to conclude a long—term agreement on Ukraine, and then proceed to extensive and probably lengthy negotiations on conventional arms reduction with Moscow, and eventually with Beijing.
At the moment, the Biden administration is less focused on shaping a new era, and more on preparing for a repeat of the Cold War, and maybe worse, with Russia and China as opponents of the United States. This is Henry Kissinger's strategic triangle, but vice versa.
Given Russia's actions at the moment, there is no alternative to confrontation with Moscow and putting pressure on it. For the most part, the Biden administration, which reacted to the events, managed to put together a coalition of allies. But it seems that she is determined to achieve a complete defeat of Russia. However, given the fact that the US is in the habit of lifting sanctions, this will only lead to a frozen conflict between the West and Russia. By itself, the current situation is far from the scale of the first Cold War. Russia has become much smaller and weaker, and its share today is less than 2% of global GDP. (Even in 1990, when the West was significantly ahead of the Soviet bloc, it accounted for 9% of global GDP). But if you add China here, the picture will look very different.
China is a big variable that has an impact on Russia. So far, he is trying to reconcile the irreconcilable: his strategic partnership with Russia, his so-called principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and his economic interests in the United States and the EU, where Beijing has assets worth three trillion dollars and euros. China adheres to a kind of pro-Russian neutrality, although this position is untenable. And the elite of the Chinese Communist Party is probably debating whether Russia, which was a strategic asset just a few weeks ago, is becoming an increasingly heavy burden. China will soon be at a crossroads. He will either distance himself from Russia and limit the economic assistance provided to it, or he will lean in its direction and begin to defy the sanctions. The United States should encourage China by inclining it to the first point of view, and not threaten it publicly, which is why Beijing may well talk about being a victim.
As for relations with Russia, the situation here is much more complicated.
To achieve lasting peace, new agreements and arrangements on security issues between the United States, NATO, Russia and Ukraine are needed. This is an acute, but carefully avoided topic by everyone. Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky hints that he is ready for some kind of neutrality. If so, will the alliance annul the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, in which Ukraine and Georgia were promised membership? What counter-concessions will the United States and its allies expect from Putin?
Carrying out its failed diplomacy before the start of the Russian operation, the American leadership said that it offered Putin ways of escape, but he refused. However, there is no indication that they were talking about the Bucharest Declaration. But if we do not want consequences like after Versailles, we should not so easily reject Russia's interests. Will the United States want to have a hostile nuclear alliance on its border? In order to achieve a more permanent world, we must be able to put ourselves in the place of others in our strategy. Russia is fixated on strategic depth, wanting to have a buffer zone between itself and hostile forces, in this case, NATO. This is her centuries-old aspiration. The new Russian leader will certainly have exactly the same concerns. This does not mean that we should automatically recognize the legitimacy and validity of such aspirations. After all, Russia has demonstrated autocracy in relations with its neighbors much more often than neutrality. But her concerns need to be taken into account.
While the United States has not slipped into the abyss of the cold war on two fronts, the Biden administration should immediately seize the opportunities that have emerged in connection with this terrible conflict. He gave the United States and its allies the leverage to achieve lasting peace before we crossed the Rubicon.
The positive steps of the Biden administration will be a sign of approval of the peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. And if Ukraine agrees to neutrality, Washington should quietly and calmly start working with Moscow and Kiev to create a workable form of such neutrality that will ensure Ukraine's security without joining NATO. It is impossible to settle all Russian-Ukrainian differences with this, but it will be a giant first step that can lead to an agreement on the status of Crimea, as well as on the future of such mini-states as the DPR and the LPR.
The current indifferent approach only increases the chances of failure. A recent telephone conversation between National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and his Russian counterpart inspires optimism. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assisted in establishing channels of communication not only with Putin, but also with Beijing. But in the end, only the United States matters.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Baker and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft had to listen not only to Russia's alarming statements about German unification, but also to the complaints of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The Bush administration made a series of skillful assurances, found a balance of American, European and Soviet interests (for example, agreed to the presence of only German NATO troops in the former East Germany) and obtained from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev consent to the unification of Germany as part of NATO. From this, certain lessons can be learned about how to find a favorable balance of interests. The 2 +4 negotiation process (following the example of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program in 2003) can become a model for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, in which Moscow and Kiev will be at the center, and the rest (possibly permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) will support and facilitate the search for a mutually acceptable solution.
We are experiencing a turning point in history that requires bold leadership, foresight and consideration of new approaches. The experience of ending the Cold War and the skillful diplomacy of Baker and Scowcroft, which led to the unification of Germany and to assurances to Russia, should serve as an example for solving today's problems and using the rarest favorable opportunity.
Authors: Mathew Burrows, Robert A. Manning
