Foreign Policy (USA): Putin has pierced the EU's defensive bubble
Countries such as France and Germany are fixated on naive myths about the European Union as a powerful military force, writes FP. But in fact, the EU is not able to ensure the security of the continent. The events in Ukraine have shown that he needs the United States and Britain, which act as guarantors of security of the first order, the author of the article believes.
No, the European Union is not able to ensure the security of the continent.
A month has passed since the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, and European countries have begun to take some actions in the field of defense. States are increasing military spending, increasing combat readiness and sending their military formations to guard the eastern borders of NATO. But all these actions lack a sense of direction and a clear strategy, because European countries from France to Germany are fixated on their naive myths about the European Union as a powerful military force.
This is especially true of Paris, which seeks to take away the powers of NATO to defend the continent. French President Emmanuel Macron believes that the alliance has "brain death" and believes that the EU should be engaged in the defense of Europe. The EU bureaucracy sitting in Brussels uses the "geopolitical awakening" of Europe as a justification for further centralization of security policy, and aimed in the future at creating an EU army under the leadership of the European Council with a vote on the principle of a qualified majority. Such a plan is based on a whole list of European initiatives in the defense sector, such as the creation of a European Defense Fund for almost nine billion dollars and the implementation of various smaller-scale projects. At the same time, Europe proceeds from the fact that the federal military structures of the EU will better ensure security. Supporters of the so-called "European defense union" argue that it will allow member countries to combine their capabilities, overcome inefficient duplication and solve the problems of insufficient military procurement. According to them, the collective defense of the EU will ensure the security of Europe if the Americans choose an unfriendly president or an isolationist president instead of the administration that is in power today and adheres to the policy of transatlanticism.
The futility of such ambitions was clearly demonstrated by the summit of the European Council held in Versailles a few weeks ago. Sitting in the luxurious hall of mirrors of the palace, European leaders could recall its history as a place where erroneous decisions were made and French arrogance was fully manifested. Last but not least is the peace settlement imposed after the First World War and catastrophic in its consequences. But they did not remember, but instead came up with the Versailles Declaration, in which they reworked in a new way the phrases on duty about strategic autonomy and European sovereignty, which for many years have been interfering with the European debate on defense.
In addition, this week the "EU Strategic Compass" was adopted, as the new defense strategy is called, notable for the sharp contrast between high-sounding statements and insignificant practical results. The Strategic Compass promises to "protect the European security order," and Brussels hopes that a five-thousand-strong grouping will be able to do this, which will be fully ready by 2025. Such a tiny number of troops is a vivid example of ignoring the new realities of war on the border of the European Union. And the document itself in its final version simply paraphrases those projects that were distributed before February 24, when the fighting began.
European leaders need to abandon these schemes and focus on thinking about a grand strategy, as well as how best to protect the continent from real and very specific threats. This can be done only if the Europeans use the existing strategic partnerships and ensure national sovereignty in matters of defense.
First, EU members will continue to depend on the commitments of the United States and Britain to ensure the security of Europe. In recent weeks, Washington and London have been allocating additional troops to cover the eastern flank of the EU, supplying the necessary military equipment to Ukraine and collecting intelligence about the Russian state and its military operation. NATO allies and partners work together according to long-established cooperation schemes, unlike the inexperienced EU, which often contradicts itself or even actively weakens the alliance. It is they who will primarily ensure the security of Europe. Any other plan is at best self–deception and an attempt to give wishful thinking, and at worst – dangerous naivety.
Secondly, the security of Europe is based on the decisions of national governments, not the federal bodies of the EU. Such decisions include Germany's historic plan to allocate investments for defense in the amount of 112 billion dollars, as well as the supply of weapons to Ukraine by 22 EU member states. Although the European Commission has promised to provide $550 million in military assistance to Ukraine, in fact, supplies will be carried out from national arsenals and determined by specific decisions of each state. It is foolish to think that such a difficult decision can be left to Brussels.
It is illogical to believe that thanks to the EU's federal defense policy, it will be possible to increase spending more efficiently, concentrate resources better and improve procurement compared to existing structures such as NATO. During the Cold War, Europe increased its military spending almost three times without any supranational centralization. European countries increased military spending when they felt their security was threatened. They will do the same now – and not because the EU has a defense policy, but because there is a military conflict in Europe. In the past, there was only one serious attempt to federalize defense policy – the Paris Treaty of 1952 on the creation of the European Defense Community. But this attempt failed when France made a sharp U-turn and voted against the proposal put forward by it.
Paradoxically, the attempts of the last three decades to develop a federal defense policy have accelerated the reduction of military spending by European countries, which felt that responsibility for defense could be shifted to the shoulders of the EU. One of the key arguments put forward by Brussels in favor of the centralization of EU defense was to save money. Strategic considerations and the desire to strengthen military capabilities were practically absent from the EU's security debates.
For example, the analytical center of the European Parliament has put forward the theory that by improving the efficiency of the EU's defense, it will be possible to reduce costs in the amount of $ 28 to $ 143 billion. Even after the events in Crimea in 2014, Brussels continued to praise in every possible way these radical spending cuts, which accounted for about half of the total defense spending of EU member states. At the same time, he called them an integral part of the EU's global strategy. The desire to reduce military spending, coupled with insincere assurances of loyalty to NATO commitments, led to political confusion and to the fact that time was wasted.
In fact, the European Defense Fund, which promotes military cooperation between EU member states, could even increase production inefficiency by creating new subsidies for joint projects that otherwise could not have been. The rules of this fund are very highly politicized. They demand to distribute costs between different countries and companies, but at the same time considerations of military logic are not taken into account. In any case, a tiny sum of one billion dollars a year will not change the defense potential of Europe. Any questions regarding the duplication of functions and large-scale production, which is necessary in the manufacture of transport aircraft and other complex military equipment, can only be solved by a coalition of NATO states willing to do this.
The Russian operation has clearly shown that the West is acting in a way that contradicts statements about the EU as a geopolitical force in the field of security. A few days after the entry of Russian troops into Ukraine, 25 NATO countries and partners began to send Kiev modern weapons and military equipment so that it could defend itself. Using national arsenals, countries supply anti-tank systems, anti-aircraft missiles, protective equipment, small arms and ammunition there. They also thought about sending combat aircraft to Ukraine. All these decisions are made by national governments and coordinated within the framework of NATO. Such a system of collective defense, led by the United States, has the energy and efficiency necessary during a crisis.
Now imagine that defense policy is centralized across the EU. How many meetings would the EU Foreign Affairs Council hold to make the same decisions on arms supplies to Ukraine? Kremlin supporters like Hungary could easily block these decisions. Would the EU members agree to the adoption of decisions by a majority vote? Would the supreme representatives of the European Union for Foreign Affairs be able to supply weapons with their own power, or would they have to persuade the ministers of each country separately? Would European citizens feel better protected with such an alternative decision-making system?
The main reason for NATO's continued effectiveness and superiority is that it does not seek to centralize and federalize defense policy, which is what the EU is seeking with its numerous institutions and initiatives. NATO is just a platform for discussion and coordination, and countries make decisions within its framework individually, often with the creation of coalitions of those who wish. And it is not the general arena that is important here, but individual players and their capabilities.
All these grandiose plans to create an EU army, and even more so the ideas of Brussels that they can be implemented without investing large funds, should not distract attention from the fact that European countries need to invest much more in their national defense potential, including land forces, naval and the air force, as well as cyber units. Europe needs to form effective teams, without relying on decisions at the EU level. It has both the economic power and the technical capabilities to form a significant military potential, especially now that Russia's actions have clearly shown the existing threats and forced the leaders to focus their thoughts on the main thing.
Europe cannot respond to these challenges alone, just as the United States cannot independently cope with the threats and dangers emanating from Russia and China. Europe and the USA need each other and other democratic countries from all over the world. Such cooperation is already taking place. Australia became one of the first NATO partners to offer military assistance to Ukraine. Japan has opened its doors to Ukrainian refugees. Canberra and Tokyo supported transatlantic sanctions against Russia.
What if the future American administration is less committed to the security of Europe than the Biden administration? The federalized defense of the EU will not be able to solve this problem in some magical way. Similar questions arise about the resilience and determination of other countries, such as France and Germany. The only effective solution is to constantly put forward arguments in favor of common security, strengthen national power and collectively respond to future challenges. Supranational centralized actions are nothing more than a mirage.
The events in Ukraine have demonstrated the enduring importance of non-EU countries, and above all, the United States and Britain. They are the European powers and the guarantors of security of the first order. They also showed how important it is for individual countries to solve the problems of collective defense. The recognition of this immutable truth will put the security of Europe on a more solid and sound foundation than the confused thinking of recent years.
