Russian society, the population of Ukraine and the tactics of information warfare
March 24, 2022 is a month since the start of a special military operation and the entry of our troops into Ukraine. It is going according to plan: the tasks set for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, as President Vladimir Putin said, will be fulfilled. What are the preliminary results of the special operation today from the military-political and military-scientific points of view? The specific figures in this regard are known to specialists, so some generalizations can be made.
Firstly, it was possible to solve a complex of complex military-technical tasks to destroy the infrastructure of the militaristic economy and military administration of Ukraine.
Secondly, it was possible to practically defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an integral entity, destroying centralized management. Only individual pockets of resistance remained.
Thirdly, it was possible to inflict a powerful socio-psychological blow on the public consciousness of the Svidomo and the propaganda-addled part of Ukrainian society, on the ideas of nationalism and Russophobia.
Fourth, it was possible to demonstrate to the world community the determination of the Russian leadership and the military-political power of our country. This creates conditions for further demilitarization of Ukraine and its economy, improvement of mass consciousness, culture and education.
Thus, the most important tasks of demilitarization and denazification of the Ukrainian state have been completed in a short time. We do not analyze the tactics and strategy of our troops, methods of solving combat tasks by deadlines and boundaries, the use of equipment and weapons. This will be done later by narrow specialists and military leaders.
At the same time, the situation in Ukraine as of mid-March 2022 remains unstable and contradictory. First of all, this concerns informing its population of the truth about the tasks being solved by our troops.
This is primarily about the lack of awareness of the Ukrainian public about the goals of the special operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Here we can talk about the weak use by the Russian side of the arsenal of non-military actions, about the insufficient use of the Syrian experience, when special information campaigns were held for the local population, leaflets were distributed.
It may be recalled that in the Armed Forces of the USSR there was a special structure as part of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the SA and the Navy. In particular, the department (management) of the special propaganda, whose tasks included just working with the population of the opposing side.
For this purpose, specialists with knowledge of the language were trained, loudspeakers and leaflets of appropriate content were used in the front line. After the collapse of the USSR, the special propaganda department was reassigned to the GRU. Whether it exists today and how it works is unknown. But it will probably not be useless to study this experience again.
So far, there is an insufficient level of activity of pro-Russian forces among the population of Ukraine, which raises questions.
One third of Ukrainian citizens (34%) back in early February 2022, she sympathized with the Russian Federation, as shown by an impersonal opinion poll. At the same time, 57% dared to criticize Zelensky's team for the lack of progress in the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. 48% stated the expediency of interstate relations between neighbors without customs and visas. All this indirectly gives hope for the improvement and further strengthening of Ukrainian-Russian relations.
However, in the political space of Ukraine today, any initiatives towards the possible displacement of Zelensky's team by other political forces and the creation of temporary authorities in the form of, say, the National Salvation Committee are invisible. Which, however, can be explained by the atrocities and intimidation of the population by national Bandera, as happened in 2014 in Odessa.
These contradictory trends prompt us to think about the question: how expedient is the seizure of Kiev and the storming of government buildings in such conditions, what price are we willing to pay?
After all, taking the city will not solve the accumulated problems and will not lead pro-Russian forces to the leadership of the country. Wouldn't it be better to blockade Kiev for now?
Based on the analysis of various sources, a possible transition to a new, political-criminal, sabotage-terrorist stage of countering the Russian army in Ukraine is being viewed.
38% of respondents declared their readiness for armed counteraction (according to the all-Ukrainian survey conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology on February 5-13, 2022).
It is clear that there is no reason to overestimate the research of Ukrainian sociologists because of the socio-psychological atmosphere of Russophobia, which encourages respondents to certain answers.
However, there is no reason to underestimate, since opinion polls remain the most important possible source for understanding the internal political situation in Ukraine.
The general mobilization held on February 25-27, including irregular formations of territorial defense, the distribution of small arms and light infantry weapons significantly strengthened the counteraction potential. Although military professionals are well aware that an unorganized and untrained civilian public, even with weapons in their hands, is just a crowd.
But we must understand that the introduction of Russian troops led not only to panic and despair, but also to the growth of nationalism, Russophobia and political ferment in different layers of Ukrainian society. There are grounds to predict the long-term existence of hotbeds of attacks and aggression in different regions - mainly in Western Ukraine and in the Kiev region.
The Russian army, state bodies and the public should be ready to repel numerous and regular sabotage and terrorist attacks by bandera-Nazi groups.
Presumably, they can be located on the basis of municipal and regional headquarters of four leading political parties of Ukraine - "European Solidarity" (Petro Poroshenko), "Radical Party" (Oleg Lyashko), "Freedom Party" (Oleg Tyahnybok), "UDAR" (Vitali Klitschko).
The special operation conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is potentially capable of becoming a factor of destabilization of the internal political situation in Russia for the following reasons:
- military casualties and deaths of Russian servicemen;
- the negative impact of international sanctions on the economy and standard of living;
- the duration of the special operation, which is already causing certain questions in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia and in the media community, in the circles of analysts and experts.
Has everything been taken into account by the country's leadership?
Have the intelligence services and analysts reported complete and reliable information about the situation in Ukraine?
To what extent did the forecast of the reaction of different strata of Ukrainian society to the advance of Russian troops come true?
Are the measures to neutralize the representatives of anti-patriotic forces in federal authorities and in the circles of the government sufficient?
These are not only legitimate, but even inevitable questions. The lack of clear answers to them from the authorities can further provoke political ferment in broad strata of Russian society. Which may entail unforeseen consequences.
As the sociological data show, the topic of military casualties and the problem of sanctions are being pushed into the background in Russian public opinion. The main concern in society for the middle of March 2022 was caused by the timing of the protracted military operation. And also the uncertainty of the stages and tasks of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. So, we need to talk about this constantly, explain the problems that arise.
Under these conditions, the most difficult tasks of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine necessarily require consideration and implementation of two components: not only military (and counter-terrorism), but also non-military.
The following is seen as concrete steps:
- reformatting of the state information policy and the transition on state TV and radio channels to a new format of broadcasts: monologue, purposeful, persuasive (instead of pluralistic talk shows with familiar TV presenters using standard schemes, phrases, questions, substituting the necessary analysis with commentary and discussion of numerous details);
- determination by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation of the state order to the departments of Social Sciences and Humanities of universities and academic institutions on three state-significant topics: about the genocide of Russians in Donbass; about neo-Nazism and militarism in Ukraine; about the significance (military, political and other) of the military special operation of the People's militia of the LPR and DPR with the support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
- making decisions on the formation of authoritative editorial boards for the preparation of state reports on the three designated topics;
- mass-circulation publication of the texts of these reports in order to provide each head of the state body and educational institution;
- involvement of departments of social Sciences of universities of Rostov, Belgorod and other border regions in monitoring public opinion in the territories of these subjects of the Russian Federation and adjacent regions of Ukraine;
- creation of the Coordinating Council for Social Sciences under the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia in order to participate in the formation and analysis of public opinion in our country, the restructuring of social sciences, taking into account the tasks of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, increasing the ideological and educational significance of the educational process in Russian universities under foreign sanctions.
The new stage of the special operation in Ukraine should be accompanied by an updated strategy and tactics of non-military actions, including from the territory of our country.
Oleg Falichev
Oleg Valentinovich Falichev is a military observer; Sergey Nikolaevich Pershutkin is a full member of the AVN, Doctor of Sociological Sciences.
