The National Interest (USA): why Brazil and Argentina chose Russia over Ukraine
The author of the TNI article is surprised to note the independent position of major players on Ukraine – Brazil and Argentina. He believes that these countries actually preferred Russia to Ukraine for a number of reasons. At the same time, Western intimidation does not affect them.
One of the strangest aspects of the Ukrainian crisis was the behavior of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and his Argentine counterpart Alberto Fernandez. Both leaders visited Russia and met with Vladimir Putin shortly before the start of the special operation in Ukraine on February 24. These visits were not part of any efforts to prevent it, which many already considered quite likely in conditions when Russian troops directly approached Ukraine.
Despite the growing tensions, both Bolsonaro and Fernandez engaged in routine, long-planned state visits, which are the "cream" of normal high-level diplomacy. The kind of diplomacy that is aimed at strengthening political and trade ties and which gives leaders the opportunity to play on the international arena in the hope of once again "shining" as full-fledged statesmen in their native capitals.
Going on the road
Argentine Fernandez visited Russia on February 2-3. His decision was widely criticized, while local and American commentators noted that he made this trip in the midst of Russia's military buildup on the border with Ukraine, as well as at a time when Argentina was completing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on renegotiating the terms of payment of debt to this influential global financial institution. in the amount of $44 billion. The opinion was expressed that, given the great weight that the United States has in the IMF and the importance of the Ukrainian issue for Washington, a trip by Fernandez to Moscow would be a careless step on his part, but the president himself dismissed this argument.
The Russians gave him a pompous reception with all the proper honors and ceremonies, and he was honored with a private meeting with Putin. The most noticeable feature of the visit was that nothing was said during it. While the world's attention was focused on the simmering Ukrainian crisis, Fernandez apparently did not mention it at all in his negotiations. He thanked Russia for providing the Sputnik V vaccine from COVID-19 (which caused controversy in Argentina, given that deliveries were made later than promised, and the vaccine itself did not receive approval from the World Health Organization).
Putin proposed Argentina as an "entry point" for Russia's interaction with Latin America. And even when Argentina's debt deal with the IMF was awaiting final approval in Washington, Fernandez took the opportunity of the visit to say that Argentina needed to "stop being so dependent on the Fund and the United States." He also stated that "his country should open up to other world players, among which, as it seems to him, Russia occupies an important place."
Bolsonaro's visit came on February 15, when the Ukrainian crisis escalated even more. The Brazilian president said that Brazil does not take sides, but that "it seems to me that President Putin is a man of peace." He noted the many areas of cooperation between Brazil and Russia, such as defense, oil and gas and agriculture, and said that he "stands in solidarity" with Putin.
The US government unofficially opposed this visit (a fact confirmed by Brazilian Vice President Hamilton Murao). After the trip, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki sharply criticized Bolsonara as "being on the other side of the barricade from the world community." Bolsonaro brushed off all criticism, even saying that, perhaps, even by coincidence, after this meeting with him, Putin announced the withdrawal of some troops, which the Brazilian president called a "broad gesture."
Russia launches a special operation — and what's next?
The Russian military special operation, which began shortly after the two visits mentioned, brought both South American governments out of balance. A few days before the operation, Fernandez refused to directly criticize Russia or Putin, simply saying that he hoped that the Ukrainian crisis could be resolved through "peaceful dialogue and a political solution without the use of force." After the start of the special operation, Argentina maintained an awkward silence, but on March 2 issued a statement saying that "no territorial acquisition by the use of force or threat of force can be recognized as legitimate." At a meeting of the Congress, Fernandez condemned the special operation and quite unexpectedly asked for a minute of silence "in memory of those who died during all wars and those whom we lost because of COVID-19."
Argentines were also waiting for a public statement on Ukraine from Cristina Kirchner, the former president and current vice president, who heads a strong faction in the ruling Peronist coalition. Strong to such an extent that he is actually a "shadow president". But in her typical manner, instead of coming out with a direct condemnation, Kirchner focused first on herself and then on the Argentine problems.
In her tweet, Kirchner noted that she supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine in 2014 (when Russia annexed Crimea). Then she said that "40 years after the events in the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) and 8 years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimean Peninsula, I want to refresh the memory of some people."
If Argentina's reaction, at least at first, was marked by ambiguity and references to its own problems, then Brazil seemed to be close to supporting Russia. When Vice President Murao condemned Russia's actions, Bolsonaro said that he himself was "the only authority that can determine the official position on this crisis." "Only the president speaks here," he snapped. However, he did not voice his position. At the same time, on February 28, he said that Ukraine "entrusted the fate of the nation to a comedian" and defended Russia's recognition of the "republics" of Donbass.
Bolsonaro also raised the question of the need for Brazil to purchase Russian fertilizers for its huge agricultural sector, which could suffer "serious damage" without them. He stressed Brazil's neutrality, adding that "the issue of fertilizers is sacred to us." Since the president was clearly not going to criticize Russia, much less Putin personally, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was satisfied with the initial position calling for "negotiations leading to a diplomatic solution to the issue."
Bolsonaro's likely rival in this year's presidential race, Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva (Lula) and the Brazilian left do not go as far with a penchant for Russia as Bolsonaro, but definitely agree with his position of neutrality. Lula said: "The great powers must understand that we don't want to be anyone's enemy… We are not interested in a new Cold war." Former Foreign and Defense Minister Celso Amorim, who has never been friends with the United States, said that "condemning Russia would mean submitting to Washington's dictates."
The Ukrainian issue soon entered the agenda of international organizations, these inconvenient forums for both Argentina and Brazil, since voting is held there, and ambiguous positions are difficult to maintain for a long time. When a draft resolution condemning the special operation was submitted to the Organization of American States, both Argentina and Brazil opposed it. But instead of speaking on the merits, they simply argued that as a regional forum, the OAS is not a suitable platform for discussing this issue.
Currently, Argentina is not a member of the UN Security Council, and it did not have to take a definite position on Ukraine there. Brazil, a member of the Security Council, eventually voted in favor of a resolution demanding that Russia stop the special operation and calling for the immediate withdrawal of its troops. (Russia, as expected, vetoed this Security Council resolution). However, it became known that Brazil tried to soften the wording at the Security Council. As the scope of the Russian special operation became more and more clear, it became increasingly difficult to evade this issue when a general vote on the resolution was held at the United Nations General Assembly, Brazil and Argentina joined 139 other States that supported it.
All policies are local
How did these two important democracies in their region, and in the case of Brazil, a country that also claims a global role, end up in such an awkward and contradictory position? It seems that this was the result of a complex mixture of ideology, personal preferences and domestic politics. Bolsonaro seems to feel an affinity with Putin. Both used the public image of "macho". Both have authoritarian tendencies (although Bolsonaro operates in a much more restraining environment, since Brazil has a free press, legislative bodies, judicial system and civil society). And both adhere to a muddy mixture of nationalism and civilizational conservatism. A sign of an important ideological element of Bolsonaro's trip was the fact that the other stop during his visits was Hungary, where Viktor Orban rules, who adheres to his own kind of right-wing populism.
Obviously, Bolsonaro miscalculated the probability that Russia would indeed launch a special operation. He certainly did not want to give up the chance to appear as a player on the world stage, where he is poorly perceived by many colleagues. He doesn't have the connections with President Joe Biden that he had with President Donald Trump.
And in Europe, he is something of an outcast, given how little attention he pays to human rights, the environment and gender equality. He must be very annoyed by the fact that recently European leaders warmly welcomed Lulu and treated him almost like an acting head of state. The desire to appear as a global statesman is certainly reinforced by the fact that he and Lula will be competing against each other in the elections this October, and Lula is well ahead in the opinion polls.
While the Russian special operation has left Bolsonara on the wrong side of both international and domestic public opinion, Bolsonaru shows that as soon as he takes some position of his own, right or wrong, he tends to stick to it firmly, and often with increasing rage and hostility towards those who dare to abandon he is challenged. This was demonstrated by him in his response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which he first called a "small flu". He was not enthusiastic about vaccination (and indeed, he himself was not vaccinated), defended the benefits of chloroquine and opposed the mandatory wearing of medical masks. In the case of Ukraine, he took a position that amounted to gross denigration of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, and was in no hurry to abandon it.
The importance of Russian (and, accordingly, Belarusian) fertilizers mentioned by Bolsonar is by no means fictitious. Most of Brazil's fertilizers come from other countries, and Russia and Belarus are the largest players in the world fertilizer markets. And in political terms, Brazilian agribusiness was the main source of financial and political support for Bolsonaro. Undoubtedly, without Russian fertilizers, world prices will rise.
Nevertheless, Brazil, with its highly efficient export-oriented agricultural sector, is in a much better position than many other countries. By making this issue part of his political agenda, Bolsonaro violated Brazil's long-standing desire to be taken seriously as a major international force. Essentially stating that Brazil, because of its dependence on fertilizers, cannot take an independent position on a global issue of acute importance, Bolsonaro is acting especially embarrassingly for a country that has long been proud of its skillful diplomacy.
If the Brazilian Bolsonaro firmly takes some position of his own and remains on it even after it turned out to be unviable, then the Argentine Fernandez tends to turn to the wind like a weather vane. At the same time, domestic political considerations are always much more important for him than long-term foreign policy goals. The internal context for Fernandez is his forced need to negotiate and implement a plan to repay Argentina's debt to the IMF, an organization to which a significant part of Argentine society and especially his own Peronists are hostile. Given that the IMF is viewed in Argentina almost as an analogue of the United States, the visit to Putin was for Fernandez a way to strengthen his position among the left and demonstrate his independence from Washington.
In addition, even before the trip, it was assumed that Fernandez could use it to find additional alternative financing, such as a loan from Russia in the form of its special drawing rights to the IMF to strengthen Argentina's reserves. It seems that nothing came of it, and no announcements were made about it. Fernandez's next stop was China, and although the Chinese made no effort to shoulder the burden of lending to Argentina, several more or less plausible statements were made about possible investments, primarily about Chinese financing for the construction of a third reactor at the Atucha nuclear power plant near Buenos Aires.
After Russia launched a special operation, hesitation became commonplace for Fernandez: at first he was silent for a long time, then weak statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed. The fact that Argentines listened to the statements of Vice President Kirchner no less, if not more, than to the rare words of Fernandez, only indicated his weak political position.
Only on March 1, Fernandez himself publicly condemned the special operation, although he did not mention Putin by name. When, in the end, Argentina, along with the overwhelming majority of countries, voted to condemn Russia at the United Nations General Assembly, Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero tried to say that this vote "does not mean joining NATO or renouncing neutrality. The only guideline that Argentina adheres to is a guideline for the interests of Argentines."
The behavior of Argentina and Brazil in the face of Russia's actions was inconsistent, with short-term domestic political benefits always coming to the fore. This does not mean that the political calculations of each of these countries will inevitably lead it to a rapid and close rapprochement with Ukraine, the United States and NATO. It is easy to understand why some countries refused to break with Moscow. China, for example, is playing a long game, striving for an even more powerful global position. Staying close to Russia is part of his strategy.
India has a long-standing relationship with Russia, a major supplier of weapons. Although Delhi has begun to diversify its foreign policy orientations, including strengthening ties with the United States, it does not want to break the existing relations with its current partners. Israel, which under other circumstances could loudly support Ukraine, is also being cautious, because it needs to maintain good business relations with Russia, which allow it to regulate the conflict with Russian forces when it attacks Iranian or Hezbollah targets in Syria. In Latin America, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela have been counting on Russia's support for years.
Despite Bolsonaro's statements regarding fertilizers, it is difficult to view the position of Brazil or Argentina as anything more than a political pose mixed with amateurish improvisation. The verdict that will be handed down to their leaders in world capitals will be the same as they and their predecessors have repeatedly received: these are just not serious people. For Brazil, which is looking to its future when it joins the great world powers, and for Argentina, which remembers the past when it seemed that it was about to join the ranks of rich and influential countries, their actions in the Ukrainian crisis should be marked as another missed opportunity among many that they missed earlier.
Author: Richard Sanders is a senior researcher at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. Previously, he held the position of Senior officer of the Diplomatic Service of the US Department of State, from 1997 to 1999 he worked as an assistant for Argentina, and from 2013 to 2016 — Director of the Office for Brazil and the Southern Cone Countries.
