The world will be divided into two blocs: Chinese-Russian and American-European, but the EU will lose (Rádio universum, Czech Republic)
Russia's military special operation in Ukraine will change the world completely, analyst Peter Robeyshek believes. In an interview with Rádio universum, he considers the disintegration of the world into two blocs: Chinese-Russian and European-American. As a result, the EU, which has the weakest position, will be the loser, the political scientist believes.
We have talked with Peter Robeyshek about important things concerning the further development of our society several times already. But society is developing not linearly, but by leaps and bounds, and therefore now we have met to discuss how Russia's military special operation in Ukraine will change Europe and the world. It seems as if life is divided into before and after. Is it so? What changes can we expect? We will talk about all this with political scientist, economist and analyst Associate Professor Petr Robejšek.
Rádio universum: Mr. Associate Professor, in one article you wrote: "If we want to understand international conflicts, we must distinguish political positions from interests. Positions are shouted at the whole world, but real actions are driven by national interests, which are not spoken out loud." Tell us, what interests do you think Russia is guided by now?
Peter Robeyshek: I think they are quite obvious. Moscow wants to expand its territorial space at the expense of Ukraine and more confidently control its geopolitical surroundings. Perhaps this is the main thing. Russia also wants to weaken Western influence in the immediate vicinity of itself and in Ukraine.
— What other interests, not a position, play a role in this conflict?
— There is, of course, a second side. We are talking, first of all, about the Western position. It hides something similar. So, under the slogan "Freedom to Ukraine!"there is an interest in new markets, influence on this territory in the immediate vicinity of Russia and to ensure raw materials supplies. In addition, the desire to find a new task for the two associations, the EU and NATO, plays a role here, because all associations live and stay afloat only because they perform some new functions. Thus, the possible integration or preparation for Ukraine's entry into these associations correspond to the interests of the West.
Lord Palmerston, one of the most prominent figures in political history, the British prime minister of the Napoleonic Wars, said: "We have no permanent allies, we have no eternal enemies. Only our interests are unchangeable and eternal, and it is our duty to follow them." That is, interests have always existed. It's just that over time they take on certain forms, are expressed in specific policies, and sometimes lead to conflicts. This is the worst scenario, but there is nothing unusual in the history of world politics.
— We can say that you clearly see the situation. Nevertheless, I will ask if you were surprised by what happened?
— I was surprised that Vladimir Putin went so far. Yes, it surprised me. In general, motivation is connected, as I have already said, with national interests, and in the West these interests are structurally similar to Russian ones. They are lively, dynamic, full of energy, and the parties strive to implement them. Moreover, each of them expects that the risk will be justified and that the benefits will be tangible.
— Are Russia's relations with the West irrevocably and inevitably damaged?
- Of course not, although it seems different today. However, this is rather a superficial impression against the background of media and public unrest. In fact, the Palmerston principle is preserved, and it turns out that we do not have eternal enemies or eternal friends, but only unchangeable interests. If suddenly these interests change configuration, then I fully admit a coalition of the United States with Russia against China. It is quite possible. Now, as it seems, she is excluded, but this does not mean anything at all.
- Russia has been partially disconnected from the SWIFT payment system. Is this system irreplaceable for her?
- The main advantage of SWIFT is speed. Our civilization is painfully obsessed with speed, and this, it seems to me, is one of the main reasons why we are at a civilizational crossroads. That's the main thing for today. SWIFT makes it possible to quickly communicate, make transactions with foreign banks. When one of the countries is disconnected from SWIFT, the process takes place in several stages. At the first stage, its banks simply cannot communicate with others directly, and the isolated country is forced to use slower means, such as email, fax, and so on. This is the easiest option.
Another, tougher one, involves disconnecting it from the network of so-called correspondent banks. I understand that this is a bit difficult, but since the media presents everything very superficially, it will probably be important for our listeners to hear it. I will explain who are called correspondent banks. For example, a French customer to whom a Russian buyer owes money for delivery receives a payment from his French bank, and the Russian bank did not necessarily send this money. These two banks, i.e. correspondent banks, settle accounts with each other at the end of the month. That is, this system again speeds up the process.
Finally, the most important thing that economists like with a small degree of pathos, but it is completely wrong to call an "atomic bomb". The point is that state X is excluded from any banking relations, that is, even transactions with third parties that could accidentally touch Russia are prohibited. This "accidentally touching" leads to the fact that banks turn off everything in this direction just in case. Then this or that country gets into real isolation. The problem can be circumvented, but it takes a lot of time and is generally very difficult.
— You are a political scientist, as well as an economist. Your forecast: will Russia go bankrupt so much that in the end it will have nothing left but to beg for mercy?
— If you don't think about it, I would say yes to you, because I know that many people, without hesitation, show sympathy for those who are weaker and have been attacked. But I proceed from the facts, and I cannot afford such a thing. That's not why I was invited. I am engaged in collecting and evaluating facts. And if you look at the Russian economy today, it is relatively mature, healthy and stable. The Russian economy has characteristics that even some Western countries cannot boast of. For example, income tax is 13%; business regulation is quite low; public debt is about 20% of GDP. All these are very good indicators that characterize the Russian economy from a statistical point of view very positively.
The only thing that can immediately and truly harm Russia is the complete cessation of exports of raw materials, that is, oil and gas. Then Russia will have serious problems, but it should be added here, since I rely on the facts, that the West will also have problems. Both for us and for everyone. The interconnections in world trade in this sense have a stabilizing effect. Yes, perhaps that's the right word.
— Is it possible to understand from Russia's economic steps that it was preparing for such a development of events, that it was preparing for a possible disconnection from SWIFT and such large-scale sanctions?
— I think that's what all the leaders on both sides do. This is generally the main content of their work, that is, to prepare for difficult moments. And even more so in a situation where such a risky and provocative operation is planned. Of course, it is necessary to prepare for this. By the way, Russia's preparation has been simplified by the fact that the West has been trying to influence Russian politics for a long time with the help of sanctions that were introduced in connection with the Crimea.
That is, the Russians had to act willy-nilly, and since they did not want to change their policy, since it corresponds to their ideas about national interests, they took into account all these things. Thus, Russia has diversified its gold and foreign exchange reserves: there were fewer dollars and more yuan, euros, and the gold reserve was increased to about a quarter of the total reserve. That's what gives hints, but in general this is a separate conversation.
I will only briefly describe one of the options. Perhaps Russia plans to introduce or try to introduce a standard for its currency that would simplify its position as an isolated or partially isolated entity in international politics and economics. Thus, as I have already said, governments on both sides — this is completely normal - are obliged to take care to prepare for a "black day".
— You said that no sanctions can harm only Russia without harming globalization. In addition, there is no such sanction against Russia that would not help China. It turns out that China is the winner right now?
— This is always the case in international relations. Such triangles are formed there often, and it even happens that the participants in them change places. We need to understand this, but, most importantly, those generations who were lucky enough to live for many years without a real war. They grew up in a world that, in a sense, discourages and deprives them of the ability to cope with the kind of stress that we are facing today. In international politics, conflicts are normal, they are part of not only interpersonal relations, but also, of course, relations between states. There is nothing unusual in such triangles, and at the same time they are unstable. All this also needs to be understood.
Here again we can recall Palmerston, who said that promiscuity in friendship is very common in international politics. Characteristically, weak states always forgive weaknesses and miscalculations to their strong partners, because they hope that they will still fulfill their obligations and help them. I don't want to hint at anything, but the situation we are seeing in Ukraine is an example of Ukraine expecting more from the West, but now it still can't quarrel with it. It is ok. This is the physics of power, and you just have to put up with it. We are moving into an era when it will be impossible to do without understanding this. I remember being criticized for many years for being a realistic politician and analyst. This has always been true, but today it is doubly true.
— You said that weak states by their nature have to forgive a lot to the stronger ones. Does this apply to relations between China and Russia? Will China now take Russia on a leash?
- It seems so now. In these crisis days, when it is still unclear what the sanctions regime will actually be, of course, this is understandable. But there are still a lot of things unfolding behind the scenes, and they have not yet found distinct forms. In fact, I would say that it is the Chinese who are winning now. They are virtuosos of lies, masters of tactics and diplomatic games, and now they are stronger and therefore can afford some manifestations of generosity. They keep a little aloof, but nevertheless play with everyone.
On the other hand, the Chinese realize that Russia is a more profitable geostrategic and geo-economic partner for them in the fight against the United States than anyone else. Therefore, if we talk about tactics, then, most likely, they will not play the game that they could. They won't do it.
— Do you mean that during the period of economic sanctions, China will save the Russian economy?
- Perhaps you did not express yourself quite accurately. But China, of course, can do something to mitigate the isolation. We talked about SWIFT, and the last, as I said, "nuclear", a means (when any communication is prohibited, even with third parties of a financial nature) can be circumvented, for example, with the help of Chinese banks. Let's say one of them says: "Okay, we accept the risk of being disconnected by America and losing our banking license in the USA, losing business there, but we will become an intermediary for Russia's trade with the world." And "Chinese bank" means "Chinese government". Here is one of the possible options for the Chinese that can ease the situation of Russia. Or they may receive some of the raw materials that Russia will not be able to sell for some reason: either the West will not want to buy it, or Russia will not want to sell it. It can be sold to China. Not all and not in the same volumes, but nevertheless.
— Can we say now that the decline of globalization has begun? Do sanctions mark the beginning of the end, or is it already the end of globalization?
— This conflict, in general, is really an element of the end of globalization. Globalization, as my loyal listeners know, ends not soon, but right now. It ended before Ukraine and will end after Ukraine. This is a phenomenon of the historical pendulum. There's just nothing you can do about it. And it was the convulsive, sometimes even malicious attempts to keep globalization afloat and artificially revive it — by the way, the conflict in Ukraine also belongs to such attempts — that led, among other things, to the current difficult situation in which we all found ourselves. Globalization is ending, and those who benefit most from it do not want to put up with it, but they will have to.
— What will it mean for us, for Europe? I mean the end of globalization, as you have just predicted it.
— The end of globalization for Europe means that after it, the world — I hope I'm right, and I think I'm right — will be divided into two trade blocs: Chinese-Russian, Asian, and American-European. And those who will be the losers, in my opinion, will be the European Union. He found himself in a weak position because, although he tried to realize his great-power ambitious dreams, he did not do it consistently enough. Europe was underworking, and most importantly, it lacked the patriotism of Europeans. As a result, she turned out to be the weakest and most vulnerable player.
Below the level of these two large trading blocks, the national state will gain importance. We're going to have to take care of ourselves more again, and we've already started doing that. In this sense, the Czech government is among the most reasonable, although still, in my opinion, it is not doing enough. There is a lot to be done in the future. We will not have exotic fruits at any time and various other nonsense that is being brought to us from the other side of the world. If we try, we will still be able to provide our country and our people with a decent level of well-being. But to do this, we need to behave sensibly, and we need to be a little lucky. We will have to take much more care of ourselves, and we will not be able to rely on others, but at the same time, others will not be able to limit us much, and this also has its advantages.
— You said that nation-states will become important. And then I thought about Germany and its relations with Russia. How will relations between Russia and Germany change?
- Nothing. Most of the politics, not only German-Russian, is the telling of fairy tales, but only some of them have a good ending and only some are true. Now we are witnessing this process, and it proceeds especially vividly: poses, loud words and even insults that do not really reflect the interdependence of those who attack each other. Although relations between Russia and Germany are riddled with interdependence. Russia and Germany are closely linked in a geopolitical sense. Whether we like it or not, it's true. Good or bad comments are powerless against economic statistics. Speeches in parliament or anywhere else are also powerless. The words sound, the water flows, and the main thing remains the main thing. Germany and Russia have a lot to give each other.
By the way, in my opinion, American policy on the Ukrainian issue, and indeed on Europe, is determined precisely by the fact that the United States, for obvious reasons, is not satisfied with Russia's rapprochement with Germany. Perhaps it worries them even much more than Europe as a whole, because Europe has not realized its dream of power. For the United States, such a prospect is also unacceptable, and they would do and are doing everything to ensure that this dream does not come true. Again, this is a natural, normal course of political struggle.
I would like those listeners who are still in doubt to realize that, starting from moral categories in politics, it is very difficult to understand what is happening. We look from a moral point of view, but the participants in the events we are talking about and observing, logically, and often by their nature, act immorally. So words only shake the air, and things continue to be done. Germany and Russia have a lot to give each other, but now there will be some cooling in their relations. No wonder it was the Germans who resisted the disconnection of Russia from SWIFT the longest. Of course, their interests are involved in the case, and they have the most painful blow.
— You said that politics is storytelling. Does this mean that Germany's restrictions on Russia, which we have seen in the past, were in some sense a representation for voters or for other states?
- Partly yes. But, perhaps, not for other states, because in the highest echelons of politics everyone understands everything. But for voters and the media - yes, and, first of all, because, unfortunately, people have stopped being interested in politics, that is, to really understand it. They look at politics as a detective, and think something like: "There must be a murderer at the end and only one culprit." But that's not how it works. With this approach, voters literally provoke politicians to tell them fairy tales.
In addition, political transactions are very difficult. I have already mentioned this briefly when I talked about SWIFT in general terms. That is, a statement: "We will disconnect it from SWIFT," can mean everything and nothing. You need to know under what conditions and what it will lead to, how it can be circumvented, how it can be handled? All these things are too complicated to make hasty conclusions based on what was said in the evening TV news. For those who are inclined to such conclusions, I would advise not to watch the news at all, since ordinary people cannot influence the processes in any way, but maybe they will be less afraid when they stop swallowing superficially illuminated information.
— The fact that nation-states will become important was also confirmed by German Finance Minister Christian Lindner, who said that in the current decade Germany will have one of the most effective and most powerful armies in Europe. Last year, the Ministry of Defense had 46.9 billion euros, and now defense spending will increase by one hundred billion euros, that is, it will grow three times. Is it good? Or is Germany's active armament always a reason to be wary?
— In this case, I will again advise, as they say, to divide the words of politicians into two. But even after that, you should not trust them too much. It's not necessarily that they always lie. It's just that a lot of time passes from the moment of political utterance to the moment of realization of the plan. A politician, they say something like that, may be very serious, but whether he was right, whether the plans are being implemented, we will find out only in ten years. Such things are not done in a year or two.
It should be understood that if this plan is still implemented, then Germany will have about the same army as at the end of the communist era, when it was one of the most effective and best armed armies in Europe. Probably, Lindner wants to eventually create just such an army. But personally, I doubt that something like this is possible. I can't tell you anything more right now. On the one hand, I see the irony of history here, but on the other, this is a really long process, and a lot can change over time. His statement is explained by concern and chagrin over what is happening in Russia and Ukraine, but this still does not mean that the plan will be implemented and that it can be implemented at all. After all, a hundred billion will be missing somewhere. And people are having a particularly difficult time right now, and they will ask: "Is it really necessary?" So let's see if it succeeds.
- A hundred billion will be missed. But in any case, there will not be enough money, and nevertheless, do you think that circumstances will lead to the fact that Germany will stop defending its energy agenda and the "Green Course" in Europe in general?
- I think she will have to go for it, and the "Green Course" from the very beginning from the financial, environmental, political and strategic-political points of view was hopeless. So much has already been said and written about this that there is no point in discussing it again. During the time that has passed since the proclamation of the course to the present day, the situation has deteriorated sharply and is not in favor of its implementation. I even think that somewhere in the back office of the German Chancellor's office in Berlin, someone is thinking about how to make sure that atomic energy is returned unnoticed. This is quite likely. The one who would have thought of it would have shown responsibility, since this issue will arise from the edge. Moreover, relations with Russia seem to be upset for a long time. Therefore, there will be an urgent need for what has not yet been established, namely, the supply of most of the electricity from renewable sources. But so far this task is not being fulfilled, and it will be even more difficult to solve this problem without such a developed industrial country as Germany, and, in fact, the whole of Europe, not facing even more serious problems than today.
Therefore, I think that the "Green Course" will remain a fairy tale. The only problem is that this fairy tale has accompanied the European Union since the end of communism. This tale has always been told only half, but half is enough to deprive Europe of the chance to become strong and united. Although theoretically it is possible. But precisely because something was always left out to us, we came to what we came to, that is, to a situation in which we are forced to ask questions: "Will the euro survive? Will European banks survive?" Open financial positions mean debts that Russians have left in European banks. What will happen to them? And what will happen to these European banks if the debts are not paid?
— How will you answer the questions that you asked yourself?
- These are my favorite questions.
— As you can see, I'm untying your hands.
— Does that suit you? I enjoy myself. And so. Taxpayers in Europe will have to pay. Another question arises: what kind of burden will fall on the shoulders of people after all the stresses and perturbations they have experienced in recent years? Moreover, these people already understand that their children will not live in the same prosperity as they do, and they will be glad if they keep the level they have now, but most likely they will not succeed. I mean, how willing will people be to invest in saving some banks in Europe again? Banks that don't seem to be theirs. The Germans will say: "We are saving French banks again." Although, in fact, German banks also have an open financial position in relation to Russia, that is, Russian entities also owe them. All this is like a detonator of a bomb planted under the patriotism of Europeans, for which Brussels is still fighting and which will not be formed in any way. The current situation will also not contribute to the growth of solidarity in Europe. It won't be easy. The euro will also have a hard time. Although in general this is a topic for a separate conversation.
- To put it bluntly, will Europe pay for Ukraine and mutual sanctions?
- Everyone will pay for it. In fact, the game of Russia and Ukraine, or rather Russia, America and the West, never promised to be a win-win for everyone. This is a classic political game, which can be described as follows: one of the players always wins more than the others. And there is no certainty which of them will be the winner, and whether anyone will win at all. On the path of historical balancing for decades, probably everyone will lose.
Therefore, I consider what happened between Russia and Ukraine, first of all, as a failure of analytical, real policy, the policy of those who know what it has always said. Henry Kissinger was right that politics is always a search for balance. Here both sides failed. I see literally elementary gross mistakes, the inability to understand the opponent, convey my own thoughts to him and come to a reasonable compromise. It's as if this art has left politics, and that's why, I think, we found ourselves in such a tragic situation.
— Is there a way back?
- Definitely not a straight line, although, of course, there is a way back. People have always been able to cope with the mess that either they themselves or someone else made. If people didn't know how to do this, we would have died out long ago. There will always be a way, but now we are only talking about which way we will go, who will stand on the bridge and how reasonable and inclined to compromise all participants in the process will be.
As I have already said, Russia's power ambitions are beyond doubt. The West harbors the same ambitions. This means that the parties should think about what they would like to get, and what they will have to give up in order not to leave the other side with a feeling of losing everything. They should both strive for balance and take part in its search. The balance is never eternal, but it is still better than the current situation, and based on the balance found, it will be possible to act further.
However, now the parties are clinging to each other in such a way that truly great leaders are needed, and maybe the Lord God himself, so that the situation is at least a little defused and events begin to develop in a more reasonable direction.
— I thank you for a rational assessment of the current situation. Thank you very much
- Please.
Martina Kotsianova
