The New Yorker (USA): why John Mearsheimer blames the United States for the crisis in Ukraine
The West and, first of all, the United States are to blame for what is happening in Ukraine, American political scientist John Mearsheimer is sure. He calls on the United States to start working "tirelessly" to improve relations with Russia. Ukraine needs to do the same. She will be at "serious risk" if she turns her back on the Russians completely, warns Mearsheimer.
Political scientist John Mearsheimer is one of the most famous critics of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.Mearsheimer, probably best known for the book he co-authored with Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, is a supporter of the Great Powers' policy - the school of realistic international relations, which suggests that in a selfish attempt to preserve national security states in anticipation of opponents will act proactively. For many years, Mearsheimer argued that the United States, seeking to expand NATO to the east and establish friendly relations with Ukraine, increased the likelihood of war between nuclear powers and laid the foundation for Vladimir Putin's position towards Ukraine. So, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote that "the main part of the responsibility for this crisis is jointly borne by the United States and its European allies."
Because of the current military special operation in Ukraine, some long-standing debates about the relationship between the United States and Russia have resumed. Although many critics of Putin claim that he will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in the former Soviet republics regardless of Western involvement, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the United States is to blame for provoking him. I recently talked to nimpo on the phone. During our conversation, the text of which was shortened and edited for clarity, we discussed whether it was possible to prevent the current military special operation, whether it makes sense to think of Russia as an imperial power and about Putin's ultimate plans for Ukraine.
– Looking at the current situation with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world has come to this?
– I think that all the problems in this case really began in April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, where a statement was then published stating that Ukraine and Georgia would join the alliance. At that time, the Russians made it clear in no uncertain terms that they considered this an existential threat, and they drew a line here. Nevertheless, over time, what has happened is that we have moved forward by including Ukraine in the West in order to turn it into a Western stronghold on the border with Russia. Of course, this includes something more than just the expansion of NATO. The expansion of NATO is the basis of the strategy, but it also provides for the expansion of the EU and the transformation of Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy. And, from Russia's point of view, this is an existential threat.
– You said that we are talking about "turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy." I don't really believe that America is "turning" countries into liberal democracies. And what if it is Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, who want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?
– If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, a NATO member and an EU member, the Russians will find it categorically unacceptable. If there had been no NATO enlargement and EU enlargement, and Ukraine had simply become a liberal democracy and was on friendly terms with the US and the West in a broader sense, it would probably have avoided trouble. It should be understood that there is a strategy in three directions: the expansion of the EU, the expansion of NATO and the transformation of Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.
– You constantly say "the transformation of Ukraine into a liberal democracy", and it seems that this is an issue that Ukrainians should solve. NATO can decide who it accepts, but in 2014 we saw that, apparently, many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. And, it seems, to tell them that they cannot be a liberal democracy is a kind of imperialism.
– This is not imperialism, this is the policy of the great powers. When you are a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay close attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and poke them in the eye, they will take revenge. The states of the Western Hemisphere are well aware of this in relation to the United States.
- In fact, the Monroe doctrine.
Certainly. There is not a single country in the Western Hemisphere that we would allow to ask a distant great Power to send troops into this country.
- True, but to say that America will not allow the countries of the Western Hemisphere, most of which are democracies, to decide what foreign policy they pursue (you can say whether it's good or bad), but this is imperialism, right? In fact, we are saying that we have some right to interfere, to somehow influence how democratic countries conduct their affairs.
– We have such a right, and in fact we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War because we were dissatisfied with their policies. This is how great powers behave.
- Of course, they overthrew us, but I wonder if we should behave like this. When we think about foreign policy, should we think about trying to create a world in which neither the US nor Russia would behave in this way?
– That's not how the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like this, you end up facing the disastrous policies that the US pursued during the unipolar period. We've been all over the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was on the Greater Middle East, and you know how it worked. Not very good.
– I think it would be difficult to say that America's policy in the Middle East over the last 75 years after the end of World War II or over the last 30 years after the end of the Cold War was to create liberal democracies in the Middle East.
– I think that this was the Bush doctrine in the unipolar period.
- In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right?
No - well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To begin with, the Bush doctrine basically was that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries like Syria, Iran and — eventually - Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. This was the basic philosophy of the Bush doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was designed not only to turn Iraq into a democratic country. We had a bigger plan.
– One can argue about how much the people who were at the head of the Bush administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into several democracies and really believed that this would happen. It seemed to me that there was not much enthusiasm about the transformation of Saudi Arabia into a democratic country.
– Well, I think that the reference point to Saudi Arabia is the easiest option from your point of view. And from the point of view of America, this was the most difficult case, because Saudi Arabia has a lot of leverage over us because of oil, and this, of course, is not democracy. But the Bush doctrine, if you look at what we were saying at the time, was based on the conviction that we could democratize the Greater Middle East. It may not happen overnight, but it will happen in the long run.
– It can be said that my point of view will be that people are judged not by words, but by deeds, and, whatever is said in Bush's ornate speeches, it does not seem to me that the policy of the United States has ever in its modern history been to try to ensure the creation of liberal democracies in everything the world.
– There is a big difference between how the United States acted in the unipolar period and how they acted throughout their history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its history in a broader sense, but the unipolar period was an exceptional era. I believe that during the unipolar period we were actively determined to spread democracy.
As for Ukraine, it is very important to understand that until 2014 we did not consider the expansion of NATO and the expansion of the EU a policy aimed at deterring Russia. Until February 22, 2014, no one seriously thought that Russia posed a threat. The expansion of NATO, the enlargement of the EU and the transformation of Ukraine, Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies - all this was aimed at creating a huge zone of peace that spread throughout Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. This policy was not aimed at deterring Russia. What happened was that this serious crisis broke out, and we had to put the blame on others, and, of course, we never intended to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. That's why we came up with this story that Russia is prone to aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a great Russia, or maybe even in recreating the Soviet Union.
- Let's turn to that time and to the annexation of Crimea. I read an old article in which you wrote: "According to the prevailing opinion in the West, the Ukrainian crisis can be almost entirely attributed to Russian aggression. They claim that Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to revive the Soviet empire, and eventually he can claim the rest of Ukraine, as well as other Eastern European countries." And then you say: "But this idea is wrong." Is there anything that has happened in the last couple of weeks that makes you think that this representation was closer to the truth than one might think?
- I think I was right. I think there is obvious evidence that until February 22, 2014, we did not consider him an aggressor. This is the story we made up to blame him. In my opinion, the West, especially the USA, bears the main responsibility for this catastrophe. But no American politician — and no one anywhere in the American foreign policy establishment - will want to admit this sequence of arguments, and they will say that the Russians are to blame.
– Do you mean because the Russians committed the annexation and launched a military special operation?
- Yes.
– I am interested in this article because you say that the idea that Putin may eventually launch a military special operation in the rest of Ukraine, as well as in other Eastern European countries, is incorrect. Considering that now he seems to be claiming the rest of Ukraine, do you think, looking back, that this argument is perhaps more true, even if we didn't know about it then?
- It is difficult to say whether he is going to claim the rest of Ukraine, because - I don't want to cling to the little things here, but — this implies that he wants the whole of Ukraine, and then he will deal with the Baltic states, and his goal is to create a great Russia or revive the Soviet Union. At the moment I don't see any evidence that this is the case. Looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, it's hard to say exactly what he's up to.
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– One could think of imperial possessions in which a kind of nominal ruler was put on the throne, even if what was happening there was actually controlled by the country itself, right?
– It confuses me that you use the word "imperial". I do not know anyone who would talk about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is the policy of the great powers, and the Russians need a regime in Kiev that is ready to meet Russian interests. Ultimately, it may turn out that the Russians will be willing to put up with a neutral Ukraine, and that Moscow will not need to exercise any special control over the government in Kiev. Perhaps they just want the regime to be neutral, not pro-American.
– You said that no one talks about it as imperialism, and Putin in his speeches explicitly, specifically talks about the "territory of the former Russian Empire", the loss of which he regrets. So it looks like he's talking about it.
– I think this is not true, because, in my opinion, you quote the first half of the statement, as most people in the West do. He said: "Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart." And then he added: "And the one who wants to restore it to its former form has no head."
– He also says that Ukraine is, in fact, a fictional country, although he seems to be conducting a military special operation in it, isn't it?
- Okay, but put these two things together and tell me what it means. I just don't really understand. He really believes that this is a fictional country. I would tell him that all countries are made up. Anyone who studies nationalism can say that. We come up with these concepts of national identity. They are filled with all sorts of myths. So he is right about Ukraine, just as he is right about the United States or Germany.
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In my opinion, he is not going to recreate the Soviet Union or try to build a great Russia, that he is not interested in integrating Ukraine into Russia. It is very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is very aggressive and is the main culprit of this crisis in Ukraine. At the heart of the argument, which was invented by the foreign policy establishment of the United States and the West as a whole, is the assertion that it is interested in creating a great Russia or restoring the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he finishes his actions in Ukraine, he will take on the Baltic states. He is not going to "take on" the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic States are members of NATO and —
- Is that good?
— no.
– You say that he is not going to attack them partly because they are part of NATO, but they should not be members of this alliance.
- Yes, but these are two completely different problems. I don't quite understand why you are combining them. Whether I think they should be members of NATO does not depend on whether they are members of this alliance. They are part of NATO. They have a guarantee under Article 5 — that's the only thing that matters. Moreover, there were no signs that he was interested in seizing the Baltic states. Moreover, we have never seen anything that would indicate Ukraine in this context.
– It seems to me that if he wants to return something, it's the Russian Empire, which preceded the Soviet Union. Apparently, he is very critical of the Soviet Union, right?
- Well, I do not know whether it is critical or not.
– He spoke about this in his big article that he wrote last year, and in a recent speech he said that, in fact, the policy of the USSR is to blame for the fact that Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, were able to gain some independence.
– But he also said what I quoted to you earlier: "Whoever does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart." This is somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he's actually saying he regrets the collapse of the Soviet Union, right? That's what he says. And here we are talking about his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether you think this country is capable of doing this. You understand that this is a country that has a smaller GDP than Texas.
- Countries are constantly trying to do what they do not have enough opportunities for. You could say to me: "Who thinks that America will be able to quickly fix the work of the Iraqi energy system? We have all these problems in America, too." And you'd be right. But we still thought we could do it, and we tried to do it anyway, but failed, right? America failed to do what it wanted to do during the Vietnam War, which I'm sure you would call a reason not to participate in these various wars — and I would agree — but that doesn't mean we were right or rational about our capabilities.
– I'm talking about Russia's raw material potential — about what economic power it has. Military power is based on economic power. To create a truly powerful armed forces, an economic basis is needed. To go and take over countries like Ukraine and the Baltic States and revive the former Soviet Union or the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a huge army, and for this we would need an economic foundation, which modern Russia does not have anywhere near. There is no reason to fear that Russia will become a regional hegemon in Europe. Russia does not pose a serious threat to the United States. There is indeed a serious threat to us in the international system. We have an equal competitor. And this is China. Our policy in Eastern Europe reduces our ability to confront the most dangerous threat facing us today.
– What, in your opinion, should our policy in Ukraine be now, and what actions of ours can undermine our policy in China and cause your concern?
– To cope with China with "laser precision", we need to weaken our attention to Europe, this is the first. And secondly, we must work tirelessly to establish friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our coalition against China, ensuring the balance of power. If you live in a world where there are three great powers (China, Russia and the United States), and one of these great powers, China, is an equal competitor, then your task, if you are the United States, is to make sure that Russia is on your side. Instead, we pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese with our unreasonable policy in Eastern Europe. This is a violation of the balance of power policy.
– I came back and reread your article about the Israeli lobby published in the London Review of Books in 2006. You spoke about the Palestinian issue, and you said what I fully agree with, namely: "There is also a moral aspect here. Thanks to the lobby of the United States, they have become a de facto accomplice of the Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, which makes them complicit in crimes committed against the Palestinians." I was glad to read this, because I know that you consider yourself a tough, rude old man who does not talk about morality, but it seemed to me that you hinted that there is a moral aspect here. I am curious what you think (if you think) about the moral aspect of what is happening in Ukraine right now.
– I think that almost every issue of international politics has a strategic and moral aspect. I think sometimes they coincide with each other. In other words, if you fought against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, you know the rest of the story. There are other cases when these arrows point in opposite directions, when doing what is right strategically is morally wrong. I think that if you enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union to fight Nazi Germany, this is a strategically wise policy, but it is morally wrong. But you do it because you don't have a choice for strategic reasons. In other words, I want to tell you, Isaac, that when it comes to a military conflict, strategic considerations prevail over moral ones. In an ideal world, it would be wonderful if Ukrainians could choose their own political system and their own foreign policy.
But this is not possible in the real world. Ukrainians are vitally interested in paying serious attention to what Russians want from them. They are at serious risk if they turn their backs on the Russians completely. If Russia considers that Ukraine poses an existential threat to it, since it is guided by the United States and its Western European allies and takes their side, it will cause huge damage to Ukraine. Of course, this is exactly what is happening now. Therefore, my opinion is that a strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to end its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to meet the Russians halfway and settle differences with them. If there had not been a decision to expand NATO to the east in order to include Ukraine in its composition, Crimea and Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and a military special operation would not have been carried out on its territory.
– Now this advice seems a little strange. Does Ukraine still have time, despite what is happening in this country, to somehow pacify Russia?
In my opinion, there is a high probability that Ukrainians will be able to work out some way of coexistence with Russians.
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Author: Isaac Chotiner
