Foreign Policy (USA): Washington must respond to China's growing military presence in Latin America
Despite the success in establishing ties with Latin American countries, the United States is in danger: China is successfully increasing its presence in the region, including strengthening cooperation in the military sphere, writes Foreign Policy. In the event of an escalation of relations with Washington, Beijing may well take advantage of this.
The consequences of the Russian special operation in Ukraine are making themselves felt all over the world, including in Latin America and the Caribbean. Last week, during a meeting with Colombian President Ivan Duque, American President Joe Biden praised Colombia for condemning Vladimir Putin's actions and announced that Colombia would become a major non-NATO ally for the United States. This means that Washington has one more Latin American partner in the fight against Russian influence in the world, especially against the background of strengthening Russia's relations with authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. But the United States and its partners in Latin America and the Caribbean have another long-term strategic threat: China's growing presence in the region, which, in particular, affects the military sphere.
Experts on Latin America often discuss Beijing's trade and investment in the region, and especially projects within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. According to the Congressional Research Service, 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries have joined this initiative, among them Argentina, which has the largest economy among the countries of this group and signed the corresponding agreement later than all. However, while attention is focused mainly on China's economic and trade relations with the region, an alarming trend that is observed around the world and may be repeated in Latin America and the Caribbean is being overlooked: China often uses seemingly harmless commercial interests for military purposes.
In recent decades, the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) has been strengthening military relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Chinese top military leadership has made more than 200 visits to this region, during which meetings with colleagues were held. China has established a high-level defense forum with the Latin American and Caribbean Community (CELAC) and provides vocational training to military personnel from Latin America and the Caribbean. The Chinese People's Liberation Army is also sending its military to the countries of this region to undergo special training in fighting in the jungle. China has sold weapons, planes, tanks and other military equipment to various Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia, and has helped its partners develop satellites and ground control systems. The PLA Navy has visited various ports in the region, some of which are located near the United States, for example, in Cuba.
Probably, relations in the military sphere will develop even more, as China is trying in every way to project its power on a global scale. For example, according to the joint plan of China and CELAC for 2022-2024, the defense forum will continue to deepen cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation and violent extremism. In addition, current trends such as the switching of Nicaragua's diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China and the upcoming elections in countries that are key US security partners in the region — in Colombia and Brazil, where left-wing candidates are leading in polls - portend a more active participation of Beijing.
As its influence in the region grows, China can use military ties as a trump card and put pressure on the United States and its allies. Perhaps he will threaten to send troops or increase the number of personnel or equipment in countries that are closer to the American border. Even before the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that Moscow could "neither confirm nor exclude" the deployment of equipment and troops in Venezuela and Cuba in the event of an escalation of tensions with the United States over Ukraine. Just a few weeks ago, a Russian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov visited Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba and signed a number of cooperation agreements. It is unlikely that anything can prevent China from borrowing this tactic from Russia if tensions increase in relations with the United States and its allies over Taiwan or the South China Sea. The Russian doctrine has long linked the policy towards Europe with the need to balance the US forces in Latin America.
Recent events in the Middle East and Africa hint that China may use its economic ties with Latin American and Caribbean countries and try to develop its military potential in this region. China allegedly tried to build a secret military facility in the UAE port and reportedly wants to establish a military base in Equatorial Guinea.
In recent years, China has become the largest trading partner of the UAE and the largest consumer of Persian Gulf oil. Unsurprisingly, Chinese logistics conglomerate Cosco built and now operates a commercial container terminal at Khalifa Port, 80 kilometers north of Abu Dhabi, to provide these trade links. But in November last year, The Wall Street Journal, citing the US intelligence services, reported that a place was discovered in the port where construction work was carried out, probably for military purposes. Apparently, the UAE government was unaware of the military purpose of the facility and its construction has been suspended for the time being. The UAE denied having any plans or agreements to host a Chinese military facility, and the Chinese Embassy in Washington did not comment on this issue.
In December 2021, The Journal reported that China was trying for the first time to establish a permanent military presence in the Atlantic Ocean, probably in Equatorial Guinea. It could be about the deep-water port of Bata in the Gulf of Guinea, which was designed and built by two Chinese state-owned companies, China Communications Construction Co. and China Road and Bridge Corp. Speaking to Congress in April 2021, General Stephen Townsend, the head of the US Africa Command, said that the "greatest threat" from China would be the construction of a port in the Atlantic Ocean, "in which it would be possible to rearm and repair warships." The Minister of the Oil Industry and the Ambassador of Equatorial Guinea to the United States did not respond to theJournal's questions.
These two developments are part of an alarming trend in which China is trying to go beyond the original goals of its infrastructure projects, including those implemented under the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. The Chinese military, officials, lawmakers and analysts often avoid the term "military base abroad" because it carries the historical meaning of European colonialism, so they prefer "strategic strongholds" for their ships' access and resupply. When the People's Liberation Army of China established its first naval base in Djibouti in 2017, it called it a "logistics point", and the declared goal was to conduct peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations. But now the PLA is building a large pier there that could withstand an aircraft carrier. The PLA Navy could also use port projects in Pakistan and Sri Lanka to access its ships.
On the other side of the Atlantic, in Latin America and the Caribbean, China has laid the commercial foundations for a similar strategy. Over the past 20 years, Chinese companies have implemented or are planning to implement 150 infrastructure logistics projects, including dozens of port facilities or their extensions.
"Among them are seven port projects of Hutchison Port Holdings, based in China, in Mexico, three in Panama, three in the Bahamas and one in Buenos Aires, in Argentina," Evan Ellis, a lecturer at the US Military College, told the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission last year. Alice also said that Chinese firms are involved in the construction of ports in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Jamaica and "there is potential for China's progress in ports in other regions," including El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Guyana.
All these ports are located around sea routes and critical points for world trade and military operations, and especially for port operations around the Panama Canal, the Caribbean, and potential "polar logistics" facilities in Ushuaia (Argentina), which is located next to the Strait of Magellan and is the closest departure point to Antarctica. It is likely that these ports will have a "dual" purpose, that is, the Chinese Navy may request access to them in the near future.
If the strategic rivalry between the United States and China escalates into a more acute conflict, China may take advantage of the strategic position of these ports to prevent the access of U.S. commercial and military vessels to the western hemisphere. Recently, China has used its commercial might to take revenge on Australia for demanding to investigate the origin of COVID-19, India for territorial disputes, and Lithuania for developing ties with Taiwan. Economic ties between China and Latin America would allow the same tactics to be applied in this region.
As sovereign States, Latin American and Caribbean countries have the right to interact with any other country in a number of areas: trade, military-technical cooperation and many others. Some may say that Chinese military involvement in the region, although it poses a threat to US national security, ultimately benefits the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, as it allows them to get potentially cheaper options in terms of military equipment and military training compared to higher-quality, but expensive alternatives that can to offer the United States and its Western partners. These countries may even try to pit superpowers against each other in order to gain the greatest benefits in trade, investment and security. However, the danger lies in the opacity of agreements with China. As in the case of the UAE, governments are often unaware of the potential use of commercial projects approved by them for the development of military power. This should serve as a lesson to the Governments of Latin America and the Caribbean. They should make sure that the agreements they are going to conclude with their Chinese counterparts do not contain hidden provisions that could unnecessarily jeopardize the sovereignty of their countries.
But governments should also assess how expanded military-technical cooperation with China will affect their long-term cooperation with the United States and other Western partners. Many Latin American and Caribbean countries often work with the US military to counter regional threats such as transnational criminal organizations, cyber attacks and natural disasters related to climate change. They also participate in a number of annual military exercises conducted by the US Southern Command (one of us, Leland Lazarus, works with him). Large-scale military exercises with the PLA and the Chinese Navy will allow Beijing to get better acquainted with the military doctrine of Latin American and Caribbean countries and improve the interaction of regional armed forces.
American officials are also rightly concerned that the PLA and hacker groups supported by the Chinese government may use cooperation with partners from Latin America and the Caribbean to spy on US representatives and steal important data related to American military technologies, plans and tactics. In December 2021, a group of Chinese hackers were accused of hacking and spying on 29 countries, 17 of which are from the Latin American region. If at some point the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean decide to interact with the Chinese military, the United States will have no choice but to limit security cooperation with them in order to protect its national security and intellectual property.
The best thing the US can do to counter China's growing trade and military influence in the region is to bet on becoming the most reliable regional partner. This means helping to build regional capacities and domestic institutions that will help avoid the most destructive elements of China's involvement; continue to develop infrastructure financing initiatives by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; strengthen security cooperation to compete with China's efforts; and support regional military industries and small defense industrial bases to there was an alternative to Chinese arms sales.
The US, as well as its allies and partners, must act quickly to keep up with Chinese military involvement in the region. China's military involvement in other parts of the world provides a road map of where it can accomplish similar things in Latin America. It's just a matter of time.
Leland Lazarus, Ryan C. Berg
Leland Lazarus is a special assistant and speechwriter to General Laura Richardson, the combat commander of the US Southern Command. Previously, he worked in the US Diplomatic Service in China and the Caribbean. Prior to working for the US government, he was an associate producer of the Chinese channel ChinaCentralTelevision and received a Fulbright scholarship in Panama. His articles and comments are cited in the podcast Sinica, SupChina, TEDx, The Diplomat, and theNationalInterest.
Ryan Berg (RyanC. Berg) is a senior researcher at the American program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he also heads the "Future of Venezuela" initiative.
