The Economist (UK): why does Russia enjoy some support in Africa and the Middle East
Being under the influence of tough sanctions, Russia will probably want to increase activity in Africa, writes The Economist. Three years ago, Putin said that Russia has something to offer to "African friends", but is it so? According to the author of the article, now many African countries are facing a difficult choice.
But the countries of the region will try to avoid choosing between it and the West
In 2019, at the first Russia-Africa summit, Vladimir Putin hosted 43 African leaders - more than the number of participants in similar events in the UK or France. At the Sochi summit, the Russian president criticized the West for imposing "political or other conditions" on African countries, referring to accusations about human rights. "We have something to offer our African friends," Vladimir Putin said.
The summit emphasized Russia's increasingly decisive approach to Africa. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and the West imposed sanctions, it stepped up activities to sell weapons, extract resources and support unstable regimes. Now that Russia is under the influence of much tougher sanctions, it may wish to increase its activity on the continent. But do African governments think it still has something to offer them?
The March 2 vote at the UN General Assembly on a resolution condemning Russia's launch of a special operation in Ukraine suggests that many are trying to hedge their bets. Of the 54 African countries, 28 supported the resolution, but 17 abstained, and eight did not show up. Eritrea, along with Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Syria voted against.
It is not known whether this vote reflects the views of ordinary Africans. The results of surveys conducted by mobile phones last week in six African states for The Economist by the American analytical company Premise indicate that the ambiguity of the position of governments is reflected in public opinion. In Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, many considered Russia the most guilty of carrying out the special operation. But in Mali and Ivory Coast, NATO was most often called the guilty party.
The UN vote partly reflects the historical ties between Russia and the ruling parties, especially in southern Africa. Many representatives of the regional elite studied in the Soviet Union, some of them have fond memories of their time there. The liberation parties, which still rule Angola, Mozambique (whose flag depicts a Kalashnikov assault rifle), Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, saw the Soviet Union as an ally in their struggle to end white rule and consider Russia its successor. All the abstainers, too, although Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union.
This nostalgia is inextricably linked with hidden anti-Western views. Muriti Mutiga of the International Crisis Group, an analytical center in Brussels, notes "outrage" in the Horn of Africa about "how the United States behaved during the unipolar world order." The military invasion of Libya by NATO countries in 2011, which ignored the African Union, angered leaders such as Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, another abstainer. The ensuing chaos, which spread to the Sahel, led to the separation of the governments there.
But Africa's relations with Russia are mostly not connected with history or ideology, but with personal interests. This is especially true for countries that resort to the help of mercenaries from the Wagner group, supported by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a friend of Putin. According to rough estimates, there are two thousand fighters from the Wagner group in the Central African Republic (CAR), who do not allow the rebels to overthrow President Faustin-Archange Touadera (Faustin-Archange Touadéra) allegedly in exchange for gold and diamonds. He is too dependent on them to change his political course.
The junta that has ruled in Mali since last year's coup has also turned to Wagner's group. There are about 800 mercenaries working there, says French President Emmanuel Macron, who is withdrawing French troops partly because of the Russians. According to Paul Stronski of the Carnegie Endowment, due to the special operation in Ukraine, Europe's attention to the Sahel will weaken even more, leaving a "relatively open door" for the Wagner group. He adds that Russia will consider the battle for influence in the Sahel part of a broader struggle with Western enemies, which is an echo of the mediated conflicts of the Cold War.
Another African country that is very dependent on Russia is Guinea. This is already a "collateral victim" of the special operation, complains Amadou Bah from the NGO Action Mines Guinée. "Rusal, a major Russian aluminum producer with three mines in Guinea, has stopped the operation of its alumina plant in Ukraine, which processes bauxite mined in Guinea. The Guinean junta recently suspended the work of the honorary consul in Ukraine, apparently to please Vladimir Putin.
On February 24, the influential Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, had a friendly conversation with Russian officials. Russia has been seeking a military presence in Port Sudan on the Red Sea for a long time. But in the coming months, Sudanese dissatisfied with high bread prices may resume protests against the Russian-backed junta.
Russia is trying to expand its influence beyond the borders of several states with unstable regimes. It is the largest arms exporter to Africa. Since 2014, its trade with the continent has increased, although it still accounts for only 2% of Africa's trade in goods with the rest of the world. Firms associated with the Kremlin have created a trade association focused on Africa. A subsidiary of VEB Bank (under sanctions) owns shares of Afreximbank Development Bank.
For most countries, Russia is just one player out of many. Like many African leaders, Angolan President João Lourenço has been trying to create a "portfolio of foreign policy interests" since 2017, notes Ricardo Soares de Oliveira from Oxford University. Angola sells its oil to China, participates in the IMF program and produces diamonds together with the Russian mining company Alrosa. "Historically, we have developed relations with all these countries. I do not consider this a serious problem," the Angolan cabinet says.
Ethiopia, which did not vote at the UN, is in a similar situation. Russia is its largest supplier of weapons. At the UN, Russia has blocked efforts to contain the Ethiopian government in a civil war against rebels from its northern Tigray region. And Gazprombank has shown interest in the project in the eastern Somali region of Ethiopia. However, "I'm not sure that we need [Russia] more than the West," says an Ethiopian official.
Changeable Bay again
The pursuit of self-interest and the policy of waiting prevail in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) shocked America by abstaining at a meeting of the UN Security Council on February 25. Three days later, the Arab League statement about the special operation did not even mention Russia. Although the Governments of these countries voted in favor of the General Assembly's proposal, officials of Egypt and other Gulf countries claim that it is none of their business: they have no official alliances with either side.
One of the reasons is oil. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve OPEC+, an alliance of producers, the largest of which are it and Russia. Another factor is the weapon. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the region. But President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi sought to diversify, including by buying Russian fighter jets.
The Gulf States are counting on American protection. But now they think there are holes in his protective umbrella. Diplomats hope that maintaining neutrality towards Ukraine will serve as a signal for America. "If we can't count on you, you can't count on us," one of them put it.
Western countries are less likely to punish African countries for abstaining. They know that all states have interests. "It is very unlikely that African countries will be forced to choose sides," says Professor Folashadé Soulé, also from Oxford.
But if Russian firms try in every possible way to "find dollars", they will become less attractive for Africans. "I don't think the government of Sudan needs rubles," the lawyer says. In large transactions in the field of energy or mining, auxiliary Western firms often participate, which may not want to attract Russians, at least because of reputational risks. If the West stops buying Russian hydrocarbons, it may also cause a domino effect among African buyers.
The next Russia-Africa summit will be held later this year in Ethiopia. The VIP list of its participants will show how many "African friends" Vladimir Putin still has. It is quite possible that there will be fewer than 43 of them.
