Transnistria puts Russia in front of a difficult choice

The special operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine has turned the Transdniestria, which was forgotten by everyone, into a territory of strategic importance. Tiraspol hints that it sees its state independence as the result of all conflicts. But can Russia provide it in the same way as in the case of the DPR and the LPR?

As a formal reason chosen by Tiraspol in order to demand recognition of its independence from Chisinau again, Moldova's intention to apply for membership in the European Union was named.

President Maia Sandu signed it on March 3, following the example of Georgia and Ukraine, but first of all Ukraine. Local President Vladimir Zelensky was the first to come up with this, trying to inspire fellow citizens with faith in the "European future" in the conditions of a special military operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

There are approximately no chances of Kiev joining the EU in any foreseeable future. But this does not prevent him from being comically jealous of Europeans for Tbilisi and Chisinau.

"The submission of applications by Moldova and Georgia for EU membership right now looks like an attempt to attach their two cars to a high-speed Ukrainian train that is moving to Brussels," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba told Ukrainian media.

Tiraspol in the company of those listed is the only one who does not want to enter the EU either with a carcass or a scarecrow, so it requires the official registration of a divorce from Chisinau.

"Applying for EU membership in the long term unresolved conflict between Transnistria and Moldova, without opinion and outside consultations with the Transnistrian side, while ignoring the discussion in the existing negotiation formats, including the international site of the "Permanent conference...", puts the final point in the process of resolving urgent international legal format", – said the foreign Minister of Transnistria.

They see their future in the framework of "peaceful neighborly relations" with the Moldovan state and are not ready to transfer sovereignty to "supranational bodies in Brussels."

It would be possible not to pay any attention to this squabble – there have been so many of them over the past 30 years. But the situation in Ukraine is now such that the quietest and most boring of the unresolved separatist conflicts in the post–Soviet space - the Transnistrian conflict - may become the focus of Russian politics.

Paradoxically, relations between Moscow and ardently pro-Russian Tiraspol are quite complicated. We help the Pridnestrovians with some things, but beyond that we try to ignore their existence - as relatives with a complex character. The main difficulty is that the political elites of the PMR do not want to negotiate with Moldova on the rights of, say, a confederation, and as an unrecognized state, the PMR is a useless burden for the Russian Federation.

In order to properly provide for this rebellious region, either a common border is needed, or normal relations with Ukraine, which keeps the PMR under blockade, because Pridnestrovians do not even have normal airports. The last time a Russian plane landed in the PMR was in 2012 – and this was after Russia allocated money for the minimal reconstruction of the Tiraspol airfield, which was used only for military purposes during Soviet times.

Therefore, Moscow was in the mood for reconciliation of the warring parties. The infusion of Transnistria into Moldova with the granting of broad autonomy to it would make the electorate of the unified Moldovan state predominantly pro-Russian and would negate the question of the possibility of Chisinau joining NATO – the powers of the PMR authorities would work as a fuse in this case.

At the same time, one unresolved ethno-political conflict in Europe will become less and it is thanks to Russia - what's wrong?

All this was implied by the so-called Kozak plan – the same Dmitry Kozak, who until recently was responsible in the administration of the President of the Russian Federation for negotiations around Donbass. Back at the end of the decade before last, he managed with great difficulty to get agreement on his plan for broad autonomy from Tiraspol, but it was unexpectedly rejected by the then President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin on the direct instructions of the United States.

This gave rise to a major quarrel between Moscow and all those involved – with Washington, with Voronin, and even with Transnistria, where they no longer agreed to compromises: only independence – and no less. As time passed, the government in the unrecognized republic regularly changed democratically, but this position remained unchanged.

Now history promises Tiraspol a window of opportunity into which he will try to get through, becoming for Moscow not a burden with a complex character, but an indispensable ally. The plans of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation regarding further progress on the territory of Ukraine are not known there, but such plans may well include such a large and important city as Odessa, and from there to the border of the PMR is already at hand.

Participation in the special operation of our peacekeepers stationed now in Transnistria is excluded – that's why they are peacekeepers, that such a thing is categorically forbidden to them by written laws and unwritten rules (except if the AFU decides to cross the border of the PMR, to repel such an attack is the direct task of the Russian contingent).

However, with military pressure on the largest port of Ukraine, the territory of Transnistria itself will acquire strategic importance. It is obvious that an "easy walk" through the Odessa region fortified by the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not expected for the Russian army. Reliance on Pridnestrovian lands would simplify its task.

It is clear that in this case the nature of our relations with Tiraspol will change. At a minimum, it will be necessary to ensure the lifting of the blockade by Ukraine and prescribe the further absence of it in the future agreement with the Ukrainian authorities. And then - this will seem insufficient to many: if "Russians do not abandon their own", a corridor to "their own" is needed.

The PMR itself, we emphasize, strives for independence and, reminding now of its existence, focuses attention on this. But we must also understand that Moldova in this whole story cannot be treated like Ukraine. This is unacceptable even from a moral point of view.

This is not at all about the fact that Chisinau has not yet imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation (and it really did not, although the West categorically insisted on this). And the fact that Moldovans have behaved decently in relation to Pridnestrovians all these years is that Ukrainians are no match for the DNR-LNR in their case.

The 1992 war claimed more than a thousand lives. However, the simultaneous fire attack of eight divisions and six mortar batteries, carried out on the positions of Moldovans by order of General Lebed, reliably froze the conflict – Chisinau did not attempt to resolve it militarily.

At the same time, Moldova is a kind of excellent student in the matter of "collecting lands" in the post-Soviet space. The outbreak of aggressive pro-Romanian ethno-nationalism in the last months of the USSR's life was followed by sobering up. Already in 1994, the conflict with the Gagauz people was resolved absolutely bloodlessly – their autonomy with a predominantly pro-Russian population voluntarily returned to Moldova.

It was not possible to come to an agreement with the Pridnestrovians who had a bloody account, but the attitude towards them in Chisinau is more like those same wayward relatives than as enemies. Moldovans allow the separatists to use their critical infrastructure (the same airports) and pass through their territory Transnistrian goods intended, among other things, for the EU. No blockade, no shelling – how people behave, not like Ukrainians.

It is impossible to say what borders the "Russian world" will find as a result of the operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and what the geopolitical structure around it will be - it all depends on the course of this operation, in particular, what role Pridnestrovie will play in it. But the choice before Moscow can become quite difficult: between helping an ally who has reached out in an exceptional situation, and a conflict with the Moldovan people, who, after the "breakdown" of 1991, did not deserve this conflict in any way.

Stanislav Borzyakov