Global satellite operators pose information security risks
The emergence of new threats and risks, directly or indirectly related to the emergence of multi-satellite low-orbit groupings and the escalation of the problem of oversaturation of near-Earth orbits with objects of artificial origin, today exists in three self-sufficient dimensions:
- energy (information) interference with ground and orbital means of maintaining strategic stability and international security, including nuclear deterrence;
- giving multi-satellite groupings of small and ultra-small spacecraft (MCA, SMCA) poorly controlled properties of artificial intelligence;
- ensuring the safety of launches of traditional space objects and their return from orbit (daily space activities) in connection with the real probability of collision with the ICA (SMCA).
American and British satellite swarms
First of all, we should focus on US launches in the interests of creating multi-satellite groupings in low orbits. The leading place here, of course, is occupied by the launches of the American Starlink spacecraft of SpaceX. Over the past two years, more than 30 such launches have been carried out. As a result, the grouping of ICA workers in orbit in January 2022 was brought to 2,000 vehicles.
At the moment, SpaceX is forming a first-generation grouping of two components.
The first is 4408 MKA, placed in layers at altitudes of 540, 550, 560 and 570 km. Each layer contains from four to 72 orbital planes, in each of which from 520 to 1584 vehicles.
The second part of the first-generation Starlink grouping will contain 7518 MCAS in three layers at altitudes of 336, 341 and 346 km. Together with the first part, which is being filled out today, it should number 11,926 devices.
The second generation grouping will be much more numerous. In October 2019, SpaceX submitted an application to the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for the launch of 30 thousand. ICA orbits in the altitude range from 328 to 614 km . In August 2020, the company asked to make changes to its application related to the possibility of launching its satellites in large groups (up to 500 MKA) using a promising super-heavy-class Starship launch vehicle.
The United Kingdom is also taking the leading positions in the number of ICA launched into space thanks to OneWeb satellites, having deployed about 450 such vehicles in low polar orbits in 2020-2021 by February 2022. It is planned that by the end of 2022 the OneWeb network of 648 MCAS will be completed and the company will start providing Internet services globally.
Rules of orbital motion
Although the volume of near-Earth space is very large, individual satellite systems have very important functions, occupying the corresponding heights and inclinations for many years. This increases the congestion of orbits, requiring active control to keep the spacecraft in the required orbit, while the technology of effective automatic collision avoidance is still under development.
There is a need for increased awareness of the space situation using operator data, as well as widely used ground-based optical-electronic and radar surveillance. Contacts with satellite operators should also be strengthened.
Upon completion of the deployment, the Starlink grouping will include as many satellites as there are debris tracked today. At the same time, its total mass will be equal to the mass of all objects currently in orbit: more than 9,800 tons, of which at least 3,000 tons in low orbits. In addition, the Starlink ICS will be placed in fairly narrow orbital layers, which will create an unprecedented workload, since about one and a half thousand ICS are already in orbit (as of mid-2021).
Features of orbital traffic
Multi-satellite low-orbit groupings consist of mass-produced ICS with several backup systems. Which allows for short update cycles and rapid expansion of capabilities, assuming the disposal of a significant amount of equipment put into space.
Thus, SpaceX will actively withdraw its satellites from orbit after their service life. At any moment, approximately 10% of the grouping will go out of orbit. If other companies do the same, thousands of satellites coming down from orbit will slowly pass through the same congested space, creating a high risk of collision there.
In addition, each megagroup, as a result of satellites being taken out of orbit, will produce a significant amount of small particles that may exceed the natural forms of high-altitude atmospheric deposition of aluminum, especially if the ICA groupings are deployed in their full composition.
National regulatory authorities (such as, for example, the US FCC) assign orbital layers to megagroups in the order of receipt of applications without any regard for other countries. This is actually a monopoly occupation of the operationally most important orbital layers, many of which are used in the interests of maintaining strategic stability and international security (strategic intelligence, special communications). And this, by the way, is in clear contradiction with the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
However, Starlink and Oneweb are private companies. They request and obtain licenses from their national regulator, which at the early stages of the planning process sends to the International Telecommunication Union only a general description of the megagroup, including the frequencies it will use. There are no binding international rules on other aspects of the creation of multi-satellite low-orbit groupings.
Finally, we should mention the threats that megagroups are already creating for astronomy and night sky observation. Two years ago, astronomers insisted on reducing the number and brightness of the Starlink ICA. The International Astronomical Union (IAU), together with the National Science Foundation (USA), held seminars in July 2020 and 2021 (SATCON1 and SATCON2) to reduce the negative impact of multi-satellite groupings on astronomical observations and the state of the night sky.
SpaceX responded by adding darkening devices to the satellites, which reduced their visibility to the naked eye, but left them bright for telescopes. At the beginning of February 2022, the Center of the International Astronomical Union (IAU) was established to protect the dark and calm sky from interference created by multi-satellite groupings. This was an example of coordination of efforts to find solutions aimed at combining the efforts of astronomers, satellite operators, regulators and the general public to solve this complex problem.
In the longer term, additional measures could be implemented to limit or mitigate the effects of physical and energy interference to traditional space systems created by megagroups, along with reducing the risk of collisions in orbits and the formation of space debris.
Potential threats
In the foreseeable future, the emergence and development of multi-satellite groups of the ICA in the field of low orbits will not create direct threats to the military security of the Russian Federation.
Indirect threats are more real. The development of multi-satellite non-geostationary communication systems (space Internet) OneWeb and StarLink will lead to an oversupply of offers on the global telecommunications market. Given the high cost of these projects, the competitive advantages will clearly not be in favor of domestic companies and operators, even with state support.
In addition to the aggravation of the international struggle for frequencies (since there are also geostationary satellites), the StarLink and OneWeb projects will also compete with terrestrial communication networks, since the domestic Rostelecom has its own interests in introducing the Internet in remote areas of Russia.
For countries where special attention is paid to national issues, primarily information security, future global satellite operators pose real threats and risks. It is not for nothing that in Russia these operators do not receive the required permits, without which it is prohibited to import satellite equipment into the country. The FSB of Russia has warned that the new satellite Internet poses security threats, including as a means of controlling information flows. Although this is by no means the only component of such a threat to Russia.
The FSB fears that StarLink and OneWeb will become monopolists in providing Internet access in remote regions of Russia. The implementation of such foreign systems will make the activities of Russian telecom operators unprofitable, especially in remote and sparsely populated areas, and the organization of telecommunications by traditional means will be very costly. This will put a number of Russian regions in complete dependence on other countries.
Therefore, the only effective way to counter the threats arising from the deployment of global satellite communication systems to provide broadband and Internet access, especially in the Arctic and the Far North, is to limit their use on the territory of the Russian Federation and the development of competitive domestic communication systems with similar functionality.
Invalid scenarios
The first component of this threat is the ground user terminal. At its core, it is an absolutely autonomous space communication station with the withdrawal of citizens from national control in their activities on the World Wide Web (the ability to access financial transactions is invisible to the state, including for the financing of terrorism, communications for any purpose, etc.).
On the other hand, having allowed the operation of this service on the territory of Russia, we will have to somehow adjust our legislative framework to its work. The United States, of course, will be able to control the global information network.
The second component of the threat, although not so significant, is the scenario when the space Internet becomes uncontested, and in a few years we will come to the disconnection of terrestrial Internet lines. Here it will be possible to isolate a single country from the World Wide Web by simply disconnecting. Again, only the United States will have such an opportunity exclusively.
The third component is technological. We are giving the monopoly to the Americans again.
There is also a fourth, perhaps the most important component of the threat to the information security of the space Internet. This is SkyNet and the global military telecommunications network built on it. Various kinds of artificial intelligence systems, including combat robots, flying and floating unmanned vehicles, are very sensitive both to the amount of data transmitted and the range of action limited by the distance to the ground operator who controls them. The security of SkyNet channels will be provided by encryption controlled only by the United States.
Intelligence and diplomacy
Another component of the indirect threat of multi-satellite orbital groupings will be associated with the possibility of implementing technologies based on them for operational monitoring systems (reconnaissance and surveillance) of land, sea, air and, possibly, space-based facilities.
At the same time, the efficiency of providing information services can be ensured only if all its orbital and ground components are united by a single communication and data transmission network, including using inter-satellite channels.
Currently, the main direction of the development of such technologies is the implementation of a multi-satellite grouping as a multi-agent system - a set of interacting intelligent agents, whose roles are the orbital, ground and air node elements of the network.
From here we can see the threat associated with the rapid development of multi-satellite remote sensing, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, including those used for commercial purposes: this is the threat of the emergence of existing integrated space information and telecommunication networks of multi-domain command and control, the stability of which in the conditions of software, hardware and other impacts will be extremely high.
The emergence of multi-satellite low-orbit groupings has raised a number of exciting issues for the world community related to daily activities both in space and on Earth.
Mikhail Khodarenok
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok - ex-head of the 1st direction group of the 1st Directorate of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel.
