The National Interest (USA): What is the true lesson of Ukraine for Taiwan?
TNI writes that Russia was pushed to conduct a special operation in the Donbass by the expansionist policy of the United States and NATO in Europe. The author of the article points out that Washington is doing the same thing around Taiwan. His aggressive policy in the Far East may force China to defend its interests, following the example of Russia.
If Vladimir Putin launched a special operation in Ukraine after he came to the conclusion that the West does not take into account Moscow's strategic interests, then Beijing may well attack Taiwan if it eventually comes to the conclusion that its previous agreements with Washington on the Taiwan problem are no longer valid.
Over the past few weeks, many comments have speculated about the possible consequences of Russia's military special operation in Ukraine for Taiwan. They focus on the possibility that Beijing interprets Washington's decision not to intervene directly in support of Ukraine militarily as a green light for its attack on Taiwan. Analysts make many comparisons between Ukraine and Taiwan, most of which are incorrect, if only because Ukraine is a sovereign country, and Taiwan is not recognized as such by most countries of the world. Yes, the plight of Kiev should remind Taipei of the need to strengthen its self-defense. But Beijing, apparently, is not going to attack Taiwan in the near future, mainly because it is not looking for an opportunity to do so — it is looking for reasons not to do so. The most important lesson of the Ukrainian crisis regarding Taiwan is not intended for Beijing or Taipei, but for Washington. We are talking about the inadmissibility of ignoring history and putting the blame on others.
One of the reasons why President Vladimir Putin launched a special operation in Ukraine was his conclusion that over the past two decades, the United States and its European allies have ignored Russia's security concerns and its perception of the threats arising from this, especially in connection with the expansion of NATO. Many experts rejected Putin's views, denying guarantees given to Russia in the 1990s that the United States would not expand NATO, and disagreeing with Putin's statements that NATO expansion and Ukraine's admission into it could pose any threat to Russia. These experts called other factors of Putin's behavior decisive, including his megalomania, contempt for democracy and Russian revanchism. The rigidity of Putin's special operation in Ukraine overshadowed many of these arguments. But the issue of NATO expansion is not a problem that can be simply brushed aside and forgotten.
Last week, researcher Stephen Walt wrote that "although Russia's current actions can be considered illegitimate, at the same time it can be assumed that a different content of US policy over the past few decades would make them less likely." Indeed, the American diplomat George F. Kennan (George Frost Kennan is an American diplomat, political scientist and historian. He is best known as the "architect of the Cold War", the ideological father of the "containment policy" and the Truman doctrine - Approx. InoSMI.) — a prominent expert on Russia and father of a policy of "containment" — in 1997 loudly predicted that the expansion of NATO "will be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war" because it would "inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian society... will bring the atmosphere of the cold war in the relations between East and West, and shall send to the Russian foreign policy in the direction that America is clearly not like". (Note that this prediction was made even before Putin became the leader of Russia). That's exactly what happened.
Nevertheless, Washington is not at all inclined to admit that its support for NATO expansion over the past twenty-five years has contributed to the emergence of the situation we are facing today. Instead, Putin's decision to launch a special operation in Ukraine is explained by Washington, allegedly inherent in Russia's "imperialism" and "expansionism" and (or) Putin's inherent viciousness and irrationality. There was nothing in such explanations that could not escalate, but on the contrary, negate Moscow's inevitable determination to return Ukraine as part of the Russian sphere of influence, if not the Russian state.
Even such a US policy did not rule out the possibility that Moscow and Putin personally could be ready to perceive Ukraine as sovereign and independent for a long time, as long as the West would not drag it into the sphere of influence of the United States. But as the gradual expansion of NATO took place over time, and the question of Ukraine's potential inclusion in the alliance began to be actively raised, irritation and antagonism on the part of Putin also grew. The removal of the pro-Russian president in Ukraine in 2014 caused Putin such rejection that prompted him to annex the Ukrainian province of Crimea to Russia. Ultimately, Putin was not satisfied with the claims that Ukraine does not yet meet the criteria of NATO and probably will not be considered an adequate candidate for membership in the alliance for several years. In his opinion, only guarantees that it will never become a member of NATO could dispel fears that Kiev may join a hostile military bloc and bring it closer to the border with Russia.
It may well be that even Ukrainian neutrality is unacceptable for Russia in the long term, and that attempts to include Ukraine in Moscow's sphere of influence were inevitable. However, there is no doubt that Moscow's approaches were partly caused by Russia's perception of US and NATO policy towards Ukraine, especially Moscow's suspicions that Washington was determined not to allow Kiev to fall under Russia's exclusive influence.
All this echoes the situation around Taiwan. The response to Washington's support for NATO expansion in Europe was the strengthening of Beijing's policy towards Taipei around the same time period. The post-Soviet independence and democratic development of Ukraine coincided with the democratization of Taiwan and the "rise" of China, which eventually led to tactical and rhetorical shifts in the "One China" policy that Washington had previously pursued. For example, US approaches to the Taiwan problem have begun to include American ideas that any decision regarding the long-term future of the island must receive the consent of the people of Taiwan. This clearly reflected the situation with Ukraine, because according to Washington, Beijing, like Moscow, sees democracy as a hidden threat to its strategic preferences. The United States gradually expanded the content and scope of its "unofficial" relations with Taiwan and promoted Taiwan's participation in multilateral organizations and international affairs. This process was as gradual as the well-known "tranches" of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. And just as NATO was moving towards the inclusion of Ukraine in the sphere of influence of the United States, relations between the United States and Taiwan were gradually moving towards a strategic alignment of the balance of power not in favor of Beijing. And this was confirmed by recent congressional testimony from a senior Biden administration official who described Taiwan as "our strategic asset that is crucial to protecting vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region" - an opinion that is increasingly being reflected in Congress.
Beijing perceived this as an aggressive invasion by the United States into a vital, geographically close and historically and strategically valuable region for China. In many ways the same way Moscow views Ukraine. Chinese leaders regularly make sharp statements and warn Washington about the possible consequences of such a policy, just as Putin has warned Washington for decades about the consequences of NATO expansion. Nevertheless, Washington just as regularly denies that any significant changes have taken place in its "One China" policy, and instead attributes the increase in tensions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to Beijing's exceptionally aggressive and uncompromising behavior, expansionist ambitions and (or) Xi Jinping's personal desire to achieve unification with Taiwan.
And just as the expansion of NATO has gradually changed the strategic situation that Russia is facing in Europe, Washington and Taipei have essentially moved away from the previous recognition of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait - with Taipei's withdrawal from the "One China" concept and Washington's tacit support for this withdrawal. Just as Moscow tolerated an independent Ukraine for thirty years, until it was embedded in the US/NATO sphere of influence directed against Russia, Beijing also tolerated Taiwan's separate existence from the mainland for forty years, because Washington recognized Beijing as "the only legitimate government of China" and outwardly rejected the "one China, one Taiwan" policy. However, Beijing now believes that Washington is de facto shifting towards just such a policy, thereby encroaching on China's security and sovereignty - just as NATO expansion has increased Russia's concerns about its security.
One of the paradoxes is that NATO's move to the east, fueling the Russian perception of the threat and Moscow's determination to respond by force, apparently partly fueled the very threat from which Moscow was going to defend itself. Similarly, America's intensification of its support for Taiwan undermines Beijing's confidence in preserving the concept of "One China" and pushes it to consider military action to guarantee it. All this increases the danger to Taiwan, which this concept seems to be designed to negate or reduce. Some observers believe that since it was Russia's lack of Western security guarantees around Ukraine that pushed Putin to decide on a special operation, Washington should anticipate similar decisions by Beijing by providing Taiwan with clear security guarantees. It is about the US putting aside its long-standing policy of "strategic uncertainty" in favor of "strategic clarity." But if the mere possibility of NATO's security guarantees for Ukraine has become one of the most important catalysts of Putin's special operation, the US statement on Taiwan's security guarantees will also provoke a Chinese attack rather than deter it.
The long-term consequences of all this are obvious. Whatever the role of Washington's ignoring Russia's concerns about NATO expansion in the special operation launched by Putin, it is possible that Beijing at some uncertain moment may feel equally forced to use force against Taiwan if the United States continues to ignore China's concerns about their dilution of the concept of "One China" and deny its responsibility for tensions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If Vladimir Putin launched a special operation in Ukraine after he came to the conclusion that the West does not take into account Moscow's strategic interests, then Beijing may well attack Taiwan if it eventually comes to the conclusion that its previous agreements with Washington on the Taiwan problem are no longer valid.
If that happens, America will probably be as shocked and outraged by Beijing as it is by Moscow today. But this should not be a complete surprise for the United States. If Washington wants to prevent a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, it should think about how to get ahead of Beijing's strategic decision that the use of force is its only effective tool.
Author: Paul Heer is an honorary researcher at The National Interest Center and a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Issues. From 2007 to 2015, he served as the senior U.S. National Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
