Sweden should not behave in such a way that Russia has a reason to believe that it intends to join NATO, thereby preparing for war. You can not give false hopes to the United States. This is written by former Swedish ambassadors in Moscow and Washington, concerned about the country's course in the field of security policy.
How do we ensure the safety of Sweden? It is necessary to reduce the tension between the big powers. But this requires a fair and predictable policies in the field of security. And with this, we are now doing badly, according to Sven Hirdman and Rolf Ekeus
The most terrible threat to our security is a new war of major powers, which can break out in Europe and result in a Russian attack on Sweden. But if there is no war or provocation, it is unlikely that Russia will attack our country. And here's why.
1.Sweden does not represent a strategic goal for Russia, our lands do not play any role in its policy of uniting the nation, and it has no historical territorial claims to us.
2. An attack by Russia on Sweden - a state that has not been part of any alliance for 200 years - would undermine the established security policy order in Europe and lead to a powerful response, primarily from the EU and NATO.
3. The losses associated with a military attack on Sweden are many times greater than the potential benefits for Russia. Russia will be even more economically and politically isolated. You will not find anyone in Russia who is interested in such aggressive plans or supports them.
4. Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is strange that the non-communist Russian Federation, which lives according to the laws of the market economy and is governed by President Vladimir Putin, seems to frighten Sweden more than the dictatorship of the USSR under the leadership of Joseph Stalin and his successors, who took over half of Europe.
In the current situation, an attack by Russia on Finland is highly unlikely. Russia is unlikely to attack the Baltic states and Poland, because they are protected by NATO membership and alliance troops stationed on their territories. It is completely implausible to assume that Russia will deliberately attack Western European states, unless it is in very serious danger. For the Russian leadership, this would be a suicidal decision, and the Russian people would not support it.
It can be noted that the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Pyotr Pavel, stated in an interview with TASS in November that NATO did not see Russia violating the borders of the Baltic states. The argument that Russia's military conflicts with Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 indicate an aggressive Russian policy that could affect Western Europe also does not stand up to criticism. These conflicts grew out of ethnic and other contradictions: previously they were interwoven into the state structure of the USSR, and after its collapse they came to the surface. They cannot be considered a precedent on the basis of which it is possible to predict Russia's behavior towards Western European countries, as is often said during the Swedish defense debate.
The major changes that have attracted the attention of the outside world, not least Russia, relate to the consistent reforms of Swedish security policy that have been taking place since the early 1990s. They imply that we are gradually abandoning the principle of non-alignment with alliances, which we have adhered to for 200 years-since 1812, when Karl XIV Johan's doctrine indicated that Sweden should stay away from the conflicts of major powers. They touched on our policy, which was in force from the end of the XIX century to 1991 and consisted in the desire to remain neutral even in the event of war in the surrounding regions. This is the position we held during both World Wars. However, although we continue to declare that we will not join any military alliances, since 1991 we have been gradually linking ourselves more closely with NATO and the United States.
Because of these changes in security and defense policy, Sweden has found itself in a vulnerable position, while the outside world, including Russia, can now conclude that in the event of a military conflict in Northern Europe, Sweden will side with the United States, allowing Americans to conduct military activities on Swedish territory.
So for Sweden, the really important question is what we can do to reduce the likelihood of a superpower conflict in Europe, which we ourselves can suffer from.
And we can do a lot: of course, we must continue to build up all-round total defense, focused primarily on the long-term defense of the country, and not on participating in US and NATO military operations outside of Sweden. Together with Finland, we must try to prevent the military presence of foreign States on our larger common territory, turning it into a low-voltage zone separating the superpowers. The Finnish strategic doctrine states that Finland will not allow " its territory to be used for hostile purposes against other States." Sweden should make the same commitment.
Cooperation between other Scandinavian States should continue to be strengthened. There is a lively debate in Norway about whether the country has become too dependent on American great-power interests and whether it should instead better strengthen cooperation with other Scandinavian states.
The only real threat to Sweden's security is the conflict of superpowers in Europe and nearby regions. No matter how much we build up weapons, we cannot guarantee that we will not be drawn into such a conflict. Membership in NATO or a military alliance with the United States will not help us in this either, because in this case we will turn into one of the goals. What needs to be done is to throw all our foreign policy and diplomatic forces at trying to reduce tensions between the superpowers, and therefore the risk of a conflict that will affect us as well. To do this, we need to review Sweden's security policy, taking into account the experience gained from the two World Wars and the Cold War, as well as the results of an analysis of our practical interests.
Without belittling the importance of the right values, we must admit that it is impossible to build a country's security policy on them alone. In different cultures, values and historical experience differ, which means that the interests of different countries are different. If this is not understood, politics becomes unrealistic.
In addition, it is very important for a small nation to conduct an honest and predictable security policy. Finland, Switzerland and Austria can serve as a good example, but Sweden is not so good. The Swedish people themselves, the neighboring countries, and the superpowers are now not quite sure what kind of policy our country will pursue if we find ourselves in a crisis situation. And it is very harmful for us.
Sweden should not behave in such a way that Russia has a reason to believe that we intend to join NATO, thereby preparing for war. Nor should we inspire such hope in the United States.
Sven Hirdman, former Ambassador to Moscow and Deputy Minister of Defense; Rolf Ekéus, former Ambassador to Washington and High Commissioner for National Minorities
