Moscow should treat its "allies" very pragmatically
The coincidence in time (at least partially) of the conflicts in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kyrgyzstan does not necessarily mean that they are United by a single external anti-Russian plan. Each case is different. Although, of course, you can trace many common features.
The events in Belarus to the maximum extent repeat the scenarios of earlier events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Armenia. There is an overthrow (or attempt to overthrow) of a regime that is considered "Pro-Russian" (in fact, it only has a reputation as such), under the slogans of "fighting corruption" and "European choice". At the same time, the protesters have full support (moral and material) from the West. Many of the protesters ' claims to the current government are formally well-founded (first of all, about its corruption). The peculiarity of Belarus is also the irremovability of power for 26 years. At the same time, it is likely that Lukashenka really won the presidential election in August. But I did not get 80%, as was officially stated, but 50-60%. If real election results were made public, it would be much more difficult to organize protests. The "father" could not be worse than not only Putin, but also Zelensky.
For many years, the President of Belarus has pursued an openly anti-Russian domestic and foreign policy, so it was quite difficult for Moscow to choose a position in support of him. The main factor in this case, obviously, was the fact that the opposition has full support from the West. At the same time, by starting to violently suppress the protests, Lukashenko very quickly undermined relations with the US and the EU, which he tried to restore (and quite successfully) in recent years.
This greatly facilitated Moscow's actions. A unique feature of Belarus among all post-Soviet countries is that Moscow continues to seriously count on its complete or almost complete (with the preservation of formal elements of independence) absorption by Russia (obviously, in a scenario reminiscent of the German one). Most likely, Moscow will sharply increase pressure on Minsk in this direction, taking advantage of the fact that Lukashenka does not have space for political and economic maneuver.
The" third force", an alternative to both the West and Russia, for the leadership of Belarus could be China in this situation ("Ideal counterweight"," HBO", 04.10.19). Obviously, this is what Lukashenka has been counting on for a very long time: only China in its political rhetoric has never been subjected to the slightest criticism and has been called the most important strategic partner of Belarus.
However, this bet did not work (at least for the time being). Once again, a characteristic feature of Beijing's policy has emerged: it is very strong in strategy, but often frankly weak in tactics and is late in responding to a rapidly changing situation. In addition, the geographical factor obviously played a role – Russia is located between China and Belarus. China did not dare to act literally "over Russia's head" against its interests, especially in the context of the growing conflict with the United States. Apparently, Beijing has decided to simply maintain its economic position in Belarus, including transit within the framework of the "one belt, one road" project, leaving Moscow to solve political problems.
The West found itself in a rather difficult situation. He does not dare to declare tikhanovskaya the President of Belarus, because it is quite obvious that She did not win the election (most likely she won 25-40% of the vote). Even the US itself, and even more so its allies, do not want a repeat of the Venezuelan scenario: by recognizing Guaido as "President", who could not hold this position from any point of view, they put themselves in an idiotic position and lost the ability to influence the situation in Venezuela.
Moreover, the West does not want a complete break even with Lukashenka himself, knowing full well that they are turning him into a puppet of the Kremlin. But the West cannot ignore its actions against the opposition. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the US is too busy with internal problems and is not ready to pay much attention to events in Belarus, and the EU's influence is very limited, and Europe does not have complete internal unity.
All this allows Moscow to confidently own the initiative in the Belarusian direction. Nevertheless, if Lukashenka has even the slightest opportunity to return to the "multi-vector" policy, he will do it without fail. Since, of course, it is not a friend or ally of Russia.
Kyrgyzstan has largely become the political equivalent of Ukraine. From a formal point of view, these countries are the most democratic in the post – Soviet space (Kyrgyzstan – in Central Asia, Ukraine-in the European part). In fact, both countries have developed criminal and oligarchic regimes, and regular changes of power are the results of criminal "showdowns", and not"democratic expression of the will of citizens".
These processes are even more grotesque in Kyrgyzstan because of the much smaller complex state power than in Ukraine. The foreign policy orientation of various political forces in Kyrgyzstan (Pro-Russian, Pro-Chinese, Pro-Western) is purely formal, since in reality all political forces are only representatives of commercial interests (with a strong criminal bias) of the clans and groups behind them.
In the economic sphere, Kyrgyzstan is already almost completely dependent on China, while being a member of the Eurasian Union. In the military and political sphere, Moscow retains a decisive influence on Bishkek. The influence of the West on the situation in Kyrgyzstan is very limited for the reasons mentioned above – local political specifics, as well as due to the General geographical remoteness and isolation of the country. Another coup in this country will not fundamentally change the described situation, but will certainly contribute to the progressive degradation of the state and society of Kyrgyzstan. In the foreseeable future, this may lead to a complete collapse of its statehood, which will create serious problems for its neighbors and for Russia.
The change of power in Armenia in 2018 took place almost completely according to the scenario described above, which was worked out earlier in Georgia and Ukraine. However, unlike Tbilisi and Kiev, Yerevan, being a member of the Eurasian Union and the CSTO, was not ready to make a complete break with Moscow. However, the pressure on Russian business in Armenia has increased even more, anti-Russian propaganda in the Armenian media and the Internet has become even more active, and rallies under anti-Russian slogans have become the norm. This led to a marked deterioration in relations between Yerevan and Moscow.
At the same time, the conflict over Nagorno – Karabakh remained unresolved and had no peaceful solution, since the positions of the parties remained opposite and mutually exclusive ("Nagorno-Karabakh-the powder keg of Transcaucasia", "HVO", 15.02.19). Therefore, it was only a matter of time before the war over the disputed region resumed. Even the previous leaders of Armenia made a number of mistakes in the field of military construction, and the current leadership of the country turned out to be completely incompetent in this area. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has for many years invested very heavily in the development of its armed forces and strengthened its military-political Alliance with Turkey.
In recent years, Moscow and Ankara have been playing a geopolitical "big game" in the middle East. Their relations are outwardly very friendly, but in fact there is a fierce rivalry between them (sometimes on the verge of war), which is especially evident in Syria and a little less clearly in Libya ("Consequences of the overthrow of tyrants", "HBO", 09.07.20). As part of this" big game", Turkish President Erdogan decided to open another front, striking at Russia in its sphere of influence, that is, in Transcaucasia. Turkey did not just encourage Azerbaijan to attack Karabakh, but, obviously, directly directs the actions of the Azerbaijani army. In addition, Turkey has provided Azerbaijan with a unique military resource-Syrian fighters who are used as cannon fodder, and the losses do not matter to anyone except the relatives of the militants themselves. Together with the use by the Azerbaijani army of previously purchased modern military equipment (Russian, Turkish, Israeli), this has had a very strong effect in the form of a gradual collapse of the Armenian defense in the NKR with the prospect of a complete transition of this region under Azerbaijani control in the very near future.
Moscow found itself in a very difficult situation. It is completely dissatisfied with Turkey's direct military invasion of Transcaucasia and the appearance of Syrian militants in this region, against whom Russia has been fighting for five years. However, Moscow is not ready to make a complete break with Ankara at the moment. Moreover, it is not ready to fight directly on the side of Armenia, while incurring serious human and material losses, especially in light of the deterioration of relations with Yerevan.
Therefore, Moscow has officially declared that it will fulfill its allied obligations to Yerevan within the framework of the CSTO if Armenia itself becomes the object of aggression. Nagorno-Karabakh is legally part of Azerbaijan, and its independence is not recognized by anyone, including Yerevan (the latter, to put it mildly, is surprising). Accordingly, at this stage, Moscow has no grounds for direct intervention in the conflict.
The West takes a more Pro-Armenian position on the level of rhetoric, but everything is limited to rhetoric. Thus, Armenia completely repeats the fate of Georgia and Ukraine: NATO did not provide any assistance to these two countries in the wars against Russia, and Armenia did not receive any assistance in the war against Azerbaijan and Turkey. The latter, as you know, is itself a member of NATO. But it is clear that in the Caucasus, Ankara acts completely independently of Brussels and Washington. As in the cases of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, the situation is aggravated by the presidential elections in the United States, because of which Washington cannot pay serious attention to events in the Caucasus.
Events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Armenia show a steady trend. As a result of the Pro-Western "Maidan", people who are "ideologically stable" and completely incompetent in the sphere of state and economic management come to power. In addition, the country goes through a war in which it suffers a heavy defeat with the loss of territories. The country does not receive any real help from the West during these wars (as well as in the economic sphere), but paradoxically after that it becomes even more tied to the West, becoming its complete puppet.
Over time, this attachment to the West may become overtly clinical, as the Republic of Korea is a Prime example. Its leadership is quite competent, the development of this country in the last half – century is perhaps the biggest "success story" in the world for the entire post-war period. Today, it has the most powerful economic and military potential. The South Korean economy is based on a real high-tech industry, not on the service sector and financial "soap bubbles", as the economies of most Western countries.
At the same time, the political weight of the Republic of Korea does not correspond to its economic and military potential. Seoul is terrified of losing its Alliance with Washington, voluntarily retaining the role of an American puppet. Although there is not the slightest practical need for this for a long time. On the contrary, it is Washington that is the main obstacle for Seoul – both in maintaining an adequate dialogue with Pyongyang on the further development of inter-Korean relations, and in increasing the country's role in the international arena in General. But, alas, pure psychology is already at work here. Or even psychiatry.
Armenia, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, has not yet completed this path. It has not completely broken with Russia, and the military defeat now suffers not from it. It will be almost impossible for the Armenians to recover what has already been lost, and they must try to keep what is left. This can be done only and exclusively with the support of Russia in the political and military fields. To do this, it is necessary to stop playing "multi – vector" games, in particular, to suppress anti-Russian propaganda inside the country. It is necessary to officially recognize the Russian affiliation of Crimea, the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without all this, Russia doesn't owe Armenia anything.
Exactly the same applies to Belarus and our other "allies". It is time for Russia to radically revise its foreign policy ("Russia needs to forget about friendship with the West", "HBO", 07.08.20). The old policy, when we owe everyone and everything, but we don't owe anyone and nothing, should be a thing of the past forever.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin-Deputy Director of the Institute of political and military analysis.
