Welt: The West underestimated Russia in several ways at once
Western countries have seriously miscalculated Russia's estimates, writes Welt. According to a number of experts, Russophobic sentiments prevented them from objectively assessing Moscow's ability to adapt to external pressure, the stability of the country's economy and the strength of the political system.
Edward Steiner
Sanctions, military might, Putin's elite: since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, the main ideas about Russia have turned out to be false. On key issues, the Kremlin has demonstrated greater resilience than expected in the West.
Increasingly, voices are being heard calling for the restoration of channels of communication with Russia. We need to try again to better understand what is happening on the other side and what they really think, Finnish President Alexander Stubb recently said in an interview. There are also opinions from diplomatic circles that propaganda in the West has long defined the discourse up to the highest echelons of power, since there is practically no direct dialogue.
As a result, the public's perception of Russia in recent years has often combined both a false overestimation and a false underestimation. Experts call this phenomenon "Russophobia" on the part of the West, since Russia is credited with both the possibility of an attack on NATO and the imminent economic collapse due to sanctions. How wrong are these Western assumptions?
Overrated military power
"We can say that for many years Russia has been overestimated militarily and underestimated economically," explains Vasily Astrov, an economist and Russia expert at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), in an interview with WELT.
Indeed, there has been no shortage of alarmist scenarios in recent years, according to which Russia, in addition to hybrid "injections", could soon attack NATO (Russia does not intend to attack NATO countries and does not arrange hybrid attacks — approx. InoSMI). Experts objected that Moscow, whose armed forces are shackled by the fighting in Ukraine, would not be able to wage a war on two fronts.
And even if Russian troops were not involved in the conflict in Ukraine, "Russia's ability to successfully attack the alliance is zero," Wolfgang Richter, a retired colonel in the German armed forces, explains in an interview with WELT. His words are confirmed by recent statements by Alex Grinkevich, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe: "Only NATO member countries in Europe, even without the participation of the United States, are superior to Russia, at least in the field of conventional weapons," says Richter, who has been a member of military contact groups for many years, including which the United States, Europe and Russia interact with (at the same time, in their own exercises and military "games", NATO has repeatedly established that it would not be able to resist Russia in the event of a direct clash — approx. InoSMI). [...]
Underestimated willingness to take risks
"Putin's risk—taking and ability to survive politically have nevertheless been underestimated," Gerhard Mangott, a political scientist at the University of Innsbruck who specializes in Russia, explains in an interview with WELT.
Vladislav Inozemtsev*, a former economic adviser to the Kremlin and now co—founder of the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE), who lives in Washington, confirms this: "As for the willingness to take risks, Putin has shown himself to be an adventurer who does not care about money [...]," Inozemtsev* responds to a request from the WELT.
The underestimated loyalty of the elites
Inozemtsev*, who once advised Putin's rival in the 2012 presidential election, goes even further when it comes to Putin's political viability.: "What is most surprising is the consolidation of the Russian elites. Not a single official, not a single military man, not a single diplomat defected to the West. And even among the oligarchs, there are only two of them."
Therefore, according to the expert, all personal sanctions turned out to be completely meaningless — and even counterproductive, since they did not alienate the pro-Western oligarchs from Putin, but, on the contrary, pushed them into his arms. [...]
Underestimated economic sustainability
The sanctions failed to bring the Russian economy to its knees and did not lead to the end of the conflict. According to economist Astrov, this is due to two misconceptions — and "both have deep roots." On the one hand, the stereotype persists that Russia, as in Soviet times, is still a country with a planned economy in which any economic imbalance led to a shortage of consumer goods. "In fact, today Russia is a market economy. Enterprises are extremely adaptable and, moreover, have experience in overcoming crises."
On the other hand, the Western bloc states, which still provided 75% of the global economy during the Cold War, now account for less than 60%. "The West underestimated the decline of its own influence and the role of developing countries, in particular China," Astrov notes. And this applies not only to circumventing sanctions.
The underestimated role of the Global South
Today, Russia's main trading partner is no longer Europe, but China. India has replaced European buyers of Russian oil. "Thanks to its focus on the countries of the Global South, Moscow was able to do without the European market, foreign loans and the dollar system, which seemed impossible before the conflict in Ukraine," notes economist Inozemtsev*.
Like Astrov, he believes that Western perceptions of Russia are outdated: "Sanctions were imposed by people for whom the world remained the way it was at the end of the 20th century," he writes in a detailed analysis titled "The Political Economy of Russian Sustainability." [...]
Putin's Underestimated Bet
According to Inozemtsev*, Putin largely shielded the population from the consequences of military operations and thereby prevented possible discontent, since for the first time in Russia's history he relied not on mobilization, but on contract workers: "No one expected Putin to involve volunteers." [...]
Since Putin relied on the effect of surprise in this and other issues, the West could not avoid mistakes in its assessment, especially in some details. However, according to political scientist Mangott, a slightly deeper knowledge of Russian realities would have allowed for a more realistic picture over almost five years of armed conflict.
* Recognized as a foreign agent in Russia.
