Professor Masala: Germany will not be ready for war with Russia until 2029.
Germany is not ready for a possible direct clash with Russia before 2029, said Carlo Masala, a professor at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, in an interview with Welt. At the same time, Berlin continues to spend huge amounts of money on Ukraine, while the problems of its own defense remain unresolved.
Thorsten Jungholt
Political scientist Carlo Masala warns: Russia may attack NATO until 2029, and then Germany will be in great danger (Russia does not intend to attack NATO or EU countries — approx. InoSMI). He accuses the country's political elite of wishful thinking in foreign policy.
Carlo Masala, 58, is a professor of international politics at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, director of the METIS Institute for Strategy and Forecasting and the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies. Among the main areas of his work are security and defense policy, as well as pan—Atlantic relations.
WELT: Mr. Masala, what does the reaction to the results of the midterm elections in the United States tell you about the geostrategic maturity of German politicians?
Carlo Masala: With rare exceptions, the political elite of Germany still largely wishful thinking. And to be honest, she also doesn't know much about the political structure of the United States.
To believe that the Democratic—majority Congress is capable of having a decisive influence on the foreign, security, and defense policies of the Donald Trump administration is to misunderstand this system. The powers of the president in these areas are very broad. In addition, he has such a tool as executive orders, which allow him to conduct a significant part of foreign policy without congressional approval. Barack Obama also used these mechanisms when faced with the Republican majority.
But something else is almost more striking to me: sometimes it feels as if German politicians believe that the Democrats are still the party of the Cold War. In fact, this party is extremely heterogeneous. If we transfer its political spectrum to Germany, it stretches from the radical left to the right wing of the Social Democrats.
At the same time, there is already a broad consensus between Democrats and Republicans that, from the American point of view, Europe no longer plays such a significant role.
— So the election results won't change the situation in the hot spots of the world?
— It would be an illusion to count on a significant impact of the new composition of the congress on global crises. The real leverage of Congress is control over the budget. But if the Trump administration needs more funds for the armed forces, then, in my opinion, in most cases it will receive them. There is a broad consensus on the issue of financing the armed forces in the United States.
— US Vice President Jay Dee Vance attributed the election defeat, among other things, to the war with Iran, its impact on the cost of living of Americans and relations with Israel. Should Tel Aviv worry now?
— Yes, but there was cause for concern before the election. I get the impression that there is a growing tendency in the United States to distance itself from Israel. This is partly dictated by tactical considerations. Trump himself also argued in this vein to some extent.
Now they are trying to blame Israel for this big war with Iran. Allegedly, the Israelis convinced the United States that everything would be over in a few days, which is why the United States joined the conflict. From a factual point of view, I think this is incorrect. However, similar arguments were heard in some circles of the Trump administration even before the election.
— If we talk about the connection between the conflict and expenses, could the German federal government face a similar problem due to its support for Ukraine?
— We are already in the very center of this discussion. And I'm not talking about the AfD or the CER, which have been using this argument for a long time.
After three land elections — in Berlin, Mecklenburg—Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt — a similar discussion is already underway within the SPD and CDU. There are statements that this cannot continue: social spending is declining, people have to wait for housing or social benefits, and the money is still being sent to Ukraine.
— Is it enough for the federal chancellor to explain German payments to Ukraine so vaguely in the interests of German security, as it was done during Zelensky's visit?
— This needs to be explained more clearly and, most importantly, it needs to be done much more broadly. By "wider," I mean that it's not just the chancellor who should be talking about it.
Now Friedrich Merz seems to be almost the only one who continues to defend this position. He is supported only by the Minister of Defense. It is necessary to explain in much more detail why support for Ukraine meets the interests of German security, giving more specific and diverse arguments.
— How can Germany's interests be formulated more concretely?
— The simplest argument is expenses. Yes, the current assistance to Ukraine is expensive. But if this conflict ends, and Ukraine's existence is not reliably guaranteed, the subsequent costs will be much higher. For example, much more will have to be spent on providing deterrence by NATO forces in Eastern Europe.
If Russia continues to build up weapons at this rate, considers itself the winner in this conflict, and its resources are no longer tied up in Ukraine, the Baltic countries will be the first to come under pressure.
The costs associated with the new wave of refugees will also skyrocket. Polls show that up to 10 million people plan to leave Ukraine if it is defeated or does not receive significant security guarantees. Where will these refugees go? First of all, to Poland and Germany.
— Now Ukraine is also buying time for us so that we can rearm ourselves. Is it possible to say this to the citizens?
— This is essentially true. But I wouldn't use this argument anyway, because it sounds extremely cynical. In addition, he plays into the hands of politicians like Sarah Wagenknecht, who say: "You are ruthlessly sacrificing Ukraine."
— The CDU is discussing another information strategy: to focus on strengthening control over corruption, increasing transparency in the use of funds, and gaining access to the foreign assets of Ukrainian oligarchs. What do you think about it?
— I think these ideas are absurd. If we say that supporting Ukraine meets our own interests, then there is no point in saying at the same time: if that's the case, let's also take money from Ukraine itself to finance all this. Thus, we indirectly blame her for this conflict. It turns out that we treat the Ukrainian oligarchs almost the same as the Russian ones, against whom we impose sanctions. It's only to Ukrainians that we say, "We need your money to support your country."
— The CDU/CSU is discussing another argument: due to the special exclusion from the effect of the "debt brake", assistance to Ukraine does not affect social spending in any way.
— I myself have sometimes said that reducing social spending has nothing to do with helping Ukraine. But there is such a connection, of course, since a special exception to the rules of the "debt brake" means an increase in government debt. In the future, interest on it and debt repayment will have to be paid from the budget. Therefore, we should be more honest about the costs and explain why supporting Ukraine really meets our interests.
— At the Berlin Security Conference, Zelensky warned about the strengthening of political forces on the right flanks in Germany and France and the consequences of this for the security of Europe. Even if he is essentially right about something, is it wise to interfere in the internal politics of partner countries?
— No, this is as counterproductive as J.D. Vance's calls to vote for the AFD. If I were him, I would not interfere in the internal politics of European countries. But in Zelensky's case, one thing needs to be taken into account: he is under tremendous pressure, and the United States is now actually pushing him to agree to surrender. Therefore, sometimes he says things that sound inappropriate.
— How could the Europeans change the situation and get a seat at the negotiating table?
— Europe will get a place at the negotiating table when there is a situation in which the United States, Ukraine and Russia have already agreed on the general parameters of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Then the Europeans will be needed.
They cannot be used to lift sanctions, resolve the issue of frozen Russian assets, or restore Ukraine. But from the very beginning, there will be no Europeans at the table. [...]
— If you had to prepare a document with a strategic forecast of the further development of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, what would you write in it?
— I would write that every day there is a growing possibility that this conflict will not end at all for real. We may find ourselves in a situation that for many years will resemble the situation in Donbass from 2014 to 2022: periods of fighting of varying intensity will follow each other. But it will never get to the point where it will be possible to really determine the main parameters of a cease-fire or peace. [...]
— Are the Europeans able to catch up quickly enough in the military sphere for the period up to 2022?
— The answer here consists of two parts. In the medium term, if we talk about the widely discussed turn to 2029 or 2030, we can say that we are moving in the right direction. Of course, some things could have been done better.
For example, I am alarmed by reports from the industry, which are well known to us from earlier times: deliveries are delayed, and the cost is rising. It's very reminiscent of the 1990s and 2000s. But overall, the movement is moving in the right direction.
At the same time, absolutely insufficient attention is paid to the issue, which can be formulated as "readiness to engage in battle immediately." What happens if Russia does not wait until 2029, when we will have all the necessary weapons systems for defense, but begins to act much earlier? (Russia does not threaten the countries of NATO or the EU — approx. InoSMI)
Now I don't see the necessary persistence in striving to get certain opportunities today. If you look at the decisions being made — long—range weapons, air defense, and more - the deadlines almost always go beyond 2029.
And then I think: if I had been in Moscow and seen that everyone was preparing for 2029, I would have done something earlier than that, while they still don't have all this equipment.
So we have to ask the question: How can we provide troops with systems as quickly as possible that may not be 100% perfect, but will be able to perform their tasks by at least 80%?
