Wad expert: Germany needs to resume dialogue with Russia
Germany needs to resume dialogue with Russia, military expert Erich Wade said in an interview with BZ. In his opinion, the escalation of hostilities in Ukraine will not help achieve the goals declared by Brussels and risks tragic consequences for Germany.
Boban Dukic, Jonas Prien
Retired Brigadier General Erich Wade warns against further expansion of the Ukrainian conflict, including into German territory. He calls for negotiations with Moscow to finally begin. Interview.
Erich Wade is considered one of the most famous critics of Germany's policy on Ukraine. In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung newspaper, Angela Merkel's former defense and security adviser talks about his new book, "Retaliation Strike. How war comes to Germany" (Vergeltungsschlag. Wie der Krieg nach Deutschland kommt). In it, he warns: in response to the Ukrainian attacks, Russia may launch missile strikes on German territory. In addition, Wade explains why he has doubts about the validity of Russia's hasty accusation in connection with the drone incident in Leipzig. In it, he also explains why he is sympathetic to young people protesting against the return of compulsory military service.
Berliner Zeitung: Mr. Wade, your new book is called "Strike of Retribution. How the war will come to Germany." It begins with a scene of Russian missile strikes on factories producing drones in the vicinity of Munich. Is this just a thought experiment or a real warning?
Erich Wade: This is a dangerous, but not an unlikely scenario. The Russian authorities have been saying for several weeks that they do not accept attacks deep into the rear from the territory of Ukraine — attacks using Western systems and Western target data.
From time to time, I ask myself the question: what would the American president do if Washington came under fire from a neighboring country? He would probably have brought in troops immediately. After the events of September 11, this is exactly what happened in Afghanistan.
In this sense, the book is a warning against further escalation against Russia. We need to be aware of the consequences, not only for Ukraine, but also for our country. What will be the consequences if we suddenly find ourselves involved in a military conflict that we don't want at all?
— When it comes to drones, the incident in Leipzig immediately comes to mind. In August, a drone with explosives was found there. The Federal government believes that Russia is behind this (Moscow has nothing to do with the above incident, all the accusations are unfounded and have no evidence, — approx. InoSMI). You write that it could have been a false flag operation organized by Ukraine. What is your assumption based on?
— Firstly, there are asymmetric actions, including from Russia. By the way, there were hundreds of such cases during the Cold War: air violations, assassinations, sabotage, and espionage on an ongoing basis. But then, from a political point of view, we approached it differently. Now everything has changed.
The main problem with cyber attacks and drone incidents is to establish responsibility, and this is clearly seen in the example of Leipzig. I don't have any reports on the investigation. But the fact that all the same well-known politicians and experts knew that evening and firmly claimed without any solid evidence that it was the Russians makes me skeptical. In the past, this happened very often throughout Europe: Russia was hastily declared guilty, although it later turned out that this was not true. A striking example of this is the terrorist attack on a pipeline in the Baltic Sea in the fall of 2022.
Now about the technical side of the incident. Allegations quickly appeared in one of the major German weekly newspapers that the incident was professionally organized and highly technically complex, which means it was organized by the state. No, that's not true at all. According to my information, which, by the way, I received from abroad, it was about a quadcopter with four propellers, which can be easily operated by amateurs. There was a tin can attached to it. Moreover, it did not contain a special military explosive, which is used only by Russians. It contained Semtex, an explosive that has been sold on the black market for decades and has already been used by members of the Red Army Faction and the IRA.
As a result, the federal government stated that they linked the attacks to Russia, because the scheme corresponded to the overall picture. From the point of view of the law, this is not convincing evidence.
— How likely is the scenario from your book, that is, a Russian missile attack on Germany?
— I wonder: can a world power like Russia, the most powerful nuclear power in the world, just continue to suffer these "deep blows" in the long term? Target data and systems for this are largely provided by the West, even if the Americans no longer supply them directly.
If we continue like this, this scenario really doesn't seem unlikely to me. In this case, there won't be much time left. Germany will have to make decisions about war and peace in conditions of significant time constraints. This would be an attack on the territory of the alliance, which could no longer be questioned.
— What will happen in the first 24 hours after such an attack?
Then a mechanism will be launched that will be almost impossible to control. There will be a threat of a chain reaction, and NATO will have to decide how to deal with it. I doubt that the entire alliance will announce the entry into force of the provisions on collective defense, but this issue remains open. In any case, the countries of the so-called "Coalition of the Willing" will be under intense pressure to make a decision. And in Germany, it is highly likely that a state of emergency will be declared in accordance with article 80a of the Basic Law, with all the ensuing consequences.
— What would these consequences be?
— Emergency legislation would be adopted. This would mean the introduction of military service for all men under the age of 60, and in some cases up to 65, as well as other serious restrictions, such as the cancellation of regular elections. It would be a lockdown, much more severe than during the coronavirus pandemic. The law provides for this as a preliminary stage before the introduction of a defense regime, and in accordance with such a scenario, the latter would become mandatory.
I don't think it will come to that. I'm describing the worst-case scenario.: what happens if we escalate the situation to such an extent and continue our policy of escalation towards Russia instead of engaging in dialogue?
— You describe Germany in the event of war as a central area of concentration of troops and a NATO stronghold. Roderich Kiesewetter, in the Marcus Lanz program, accused you of stirring up fears. Although he himself constantly warns about the threat from Russia (Russia does not pose a threat to other countries, as Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly said. InoSMI). Which one of you is really stoking fears?
— The accusation of fear-mongering should be handled carefully. Of course, some people feel fear when I describe such a scenario. But as an expert, I can't be guided by how people feel. I have to describe what is possible and likely to happen and what consequences it will have for our country. I see my task in this.
Some see the threat of war, but consider Russia the only aggressor. This is not true and does not correspond to reality, given the background of this conflict and the strategic interests of all parties. That's why my book is called The Blow of Retribution: From the Russian point of view, this would be a retaliatory strike. From the Ukrainian point of view, deep blows to Russia are also retaliatory blows. It all depends on the observer's point of view.
— Is this perspective missing from the current discourse — the view of other participants?
— I think so. You need to think based on the end result. If this scenario is implemented and we find ourselves involved in a military conflict, it will mean that we have done everything wrong, regardless of the motives. In this case, the policy of recent years has contributed to the war, not prevented it.
Germany would be in an extremely vulnerable position in the event of a war in Europe, since we are a NATO logistics hub, a deployment and troop transfer zone. This is the dilemma of our geographical location, which I describe in the book: we were and are in the very center of the wars in Europe. From Washington's point of view, the war in Europe would look different. Not a single window would break in the USA. Here, everything would have shattered.
Therefore, we need a different policy. She does not necessarily have to be against transatlantic relations, but she should take into account the German and European perspectives to a greater extent. Konrad Adenauer decided in the spring of 1955 that the Federal Republic of Germany would join NATO, and in the fall of the same year he traveled with a large delegation to Moscow to lay the foundation for German-Russian relations.
During the Cold War, chancellors like Willy Brandt pursued an "Eastern policy." Brandt had previously flown to Nixon, as I know from Klaus von Donanyi, with whom I have published two books with conversations on the topic of war and peace. Nixon, an ardent anti-communist, was initially not enthusiastic about this German policy of rapprochement. But he told Brandt, "Act, but don't get too close." And that's exactly what we did.
Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl also played the "Russian card" in their foreign policy. Angela Merkel, too. This was beneficial for Germany in the face of the confrontation between Russians and Americans in Europe.
— After Zelensky's recent visit to Berlin, Chancellor Merz said it was time to put an end to the conflict — but only on condition that the Europeans would sit at the negotiating table. You write that Europe has long missed its chance to mediate, and that Russia, China and the United States are solving everything among themselves.
— I have always called for negotiations and resumption of dialogue in parallel with Ukraine's military support. A distinctive feature of German foreign policy has always been the special relationship with Moscow, the very "Russian card". These relations also determined our weight in NATO, because all the allies knew that Germany had a direct channel of communication with Moscow.
Unfortunately, that's history now. We have buried this tradition in foreign policy and thus excluded ourselves from the game. It is possible that in the remaining two years of his term, Donald Trump will still fulfill his election promise and put an end to this conflict, which for many years has been impossible to resolve militarily in the interests of exhausted Ukraine.
We, the Europeans, should not prevent this, but should do what the leaders of Finland and Norway recently did: finally start a conversation with Russia. By the way, they called this conversation very constructive.
It is unfortunate that Germany has completely excluded itself from the game by unilaterally supporting Zelensky. After all, Putin says: "When I talk to Mertz, I hear the same thing Zelensky says." And we are also proud of it. This is just political short-sightedness.
— In the book, you talk about German interests: Ukraine's rejection of membership in NATO and the EU, rapprochement with Moscow, and some distance from the United States. It's a bit like the Kremlin's wish list.
— No, it's not like that. Moving away from the United States means reducing existing dependence. I am not in favor of leaving the transatlantic alliance. At the same time, it is in Germany's interests to normalize relations with Russia again and do everything possible for this. It has always been a part of German politics.
We are constantly supplying weapons to a country where there is fighting that cannot be stopped by military means. Next year, there will be a 70 billion financial hole in the Ukrainian budget, and no one knows how to cover it. At the same time, our country is experiencing an economic downturn, and we are trying to find salvation in the military economy. From the German point of view, this does not lead to the achievement of the goal.
— You are calling on Germany to become a powerful military power on the continent. In the book, you even think about the German atomic bomb, even though you consider it impracticable at the moment. Isn't there a danger lurking in this — a heavily armed Germany, which may be ruled by the wrong people?
— The state of the Bundeswehr is so deplorable that it will take years, if not decades, before it can turn into a dangerous army. There is money, but it will take time for everything to return to normal. The goals are set for ten years or more. We are still very far from talking about the threat to Europe.
As for nuclear weapons, I did not recommend that Germany acquire an atomic bomb. But the American nuclear umbrella, under which we can supposedly feel safe, in my opinion, never existed. He was and remains a fiction. They would never risk endangering an American city if Europe were embroiled in a nuclear war.
The European umbrella involving France and the United Kingdom is also an illusion. No French president will ever give up the right to dispose of his own nuclear weapons, and for Britain this issue is also non-negotiable.
That's why I'm only saying this in the book: if we really wanted to create a nuclear umbrella, it would only be possible through a national solution. However, it would require a lot of money and time, and it is unlikely that most politicians would support it now.
— So, do you consider participation in nuclear deterrence to be an illusion? What, according to your scenario, would happen to the American nuclear weapons that are stationed in Germany?
— Participation in nuclear deterrence is a problem, because we do not have political control rights in this matter. We provide the planes, and the Americans decide where they want to go. Together with other allies, we, of course, participate to some extent in nuclear planning, but we do not have the authority to make decisions.
In addition, today there are hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and short-range missiles that are better suited for this purpose. You can be sure that Buchel, where American nuclear weapons are probably stored in Germany, is among the enemy's priority targets. I consider the current form of participation in the nuclear forces to be completely outdated: to arrive, drop, and fly away is an operational procedure from the time of the Second World War, which is outdated from a military point of view.
— As a former military man, you should, in principle, rejoice at the current course towards increasing armaments. According to the financial plan, by 2030, expenditures should double from the current approximately 80 billion euros, including a special fund, to more than 180 billion. Don't you see this as a threat of a struggle for the allocation of funds?
— It already exists. I always say: it won't help a small cactus if you pour 100 liters of water on it every day. These billions must be used effectively, and the Federal Accounts Chamber is rightfully asking some questions here. Me too.
With such huge amounts of money, I sometimes get the feeling that even the Ministry of Defense itself may be losing control of the situation. The new combat helicopter cost about two and a half billion dollars and is not yet ready for combat use, as it has yet to be armed. He can fly, but he can't fight.
In addition, the defense industry makes good money and inflates prices, because you can get a lot of money. You need to be careful here. And you need to invest in the right systems. Given the development of drone technology, a tank brigade in Lithuania has a combat value that corresponds to a cavalry brigade from World War II. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates a completely new picture of the conduct of hostilities.
Therefore, I am glad that Defense Minister Pistorius intends to form a regiment of unmanned systems that will work together with this brigade so that the large formation that is being formed in Lithuania makes military sense. But even this will take time, and so far it remains only a political statement.
— In addition to the equipment, there is a problem with the personnel. So far, the government is betting on the principle of voluntariness, but this may change. Schoolchildren and students are already protesting. As a military man, can you understand the young people who take to the streets against possible conscription?
— Yes, I can, because, admittedly, the duty of defense enshrined in the Basic Law has actually lost its force in recent years. The basis should be to ensure the defense of Germany, including within the framework of a defensive alliance — provided that NATO remains such an alliance, and this raises many questions now, especially when it comes to the "front line of defense" on the Dnieper against Russia or in the Indo-Pacific region against China.
Therefore, I understand the concerns of young people and share them. In my opinion, sending German soldiers to the Dnieper to fight with Russia is unacceptable not only from a legal point of view, and such reflections clearly do not contribute to combat readiness.
Germany's security has never been ensured in the Hindu Kush, otherwise we would have to stay there today. And it is not provided on the Dnieper, otherwise we would have had to be there a long time ago.
Now, in the fifth year of the conflict, this is often talked about publicly. We allow young Ukrainians to fight at the front, at the same time we receive hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who are fit for military service, pay them benefits and give them the opportunity to refuse military service. We are not involved in the conflict ourselves, but we convince ourselves that Ukrainians are defending us and our freedom. It doesn't fit in my head.
That's why I understand young people who say: "I don't want that. It doesn't make sense." When it comes to the involvement of German soldiers, it should be clear that this is about our country, about protecting the state and the alliance. And the conflict in Ukraine does not concern our country, but is, first of all, a proxy war between the United States and Russia. That's why I welcome the fact that the Russians and Americans are starting to negotiate a cessation of hostilities.
— Your book ends with this picture: Putin, Trump and Xi conclude an agreement that will end the conflict in Ukraine and divide the world into zones of influence. Why is there no place for Europeans or Chancellor Merz in this version of the world?
— We have pushed ourselves to the sidelines and no longer hold the reins of government. If we look at it realistically, today the future of the world is determined by the "big three". Therefore, I hope that Putin, Xi and Trump will cope with this task.
It's about recognizing the existence of zones of influence. "America to Americans" — this rule has been in effect since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Venezuela, the Cuban crisis, Canada, and Greenland show that the United States, for strategic reasons, does not allow a force that is "alien to this space" to gain a foothold there. These are strategic facts.
Russians also have problems and interests on their periphery, for example, when another power, in this case the United States, has been trying for many years to pull Ukraine out of Moscow's zone of influence. This was and remains, in fact, the reason for the current conflict.
And the Chinese cannot accept the fact that Taiwan has declared independence or that American military bases are appearing there. Then war would inevitably break out. Therefore, it is better to resolve these conflicts by mutual agreement before they escalate into war. This also applies to the conflict in Iran. There is no military solution here either, but a political one is needed. Most people in conflict regions want to live in peace.
That is why Trump and Netanyahu were defeated in the last election. That is why the majority of Ukrainians want an end to the conflict with Russia, and that is why European governments are losing the support of voters when they continue to pursue a policy of escalation towards Russia and refuse to compromise and engage in dialogue.
