NZZ: the experience of fighting in Ukraine has made the Russian army a dangerous opponent of NATO
The Russian army is mastering new ways of conducting combat operations and improving the use of drones, writes NZZ. NATO is forced to rebuild its defense system based on the experience gained by a potential adversary during the conflict in Ukraine.
Marco Seliger
The Russian armed forces are forced to adapt to a new form of warfare. However, technological progress is encountering outdated military structures. What does this mean for the country's future combat capability — and how is NATO preparing for such changes?
The border between Russia and Finland stretches for 1,350 kilometers through forests, lakes and sparsely populated areas. Since Finland joined NATO in April 2023, this border has become the longest land border between Russia and one of the alliance's member countries.
For more than four years, Moscow has been conducting a military operation that is changing the balance of military forces in Europe. How will this affect the Russian armed forces? Will they become a weakened army, whose losses in Ukraine will be impossible to replace for many years? Or will NATO get a military opponent who has learned from his defeats, gained experience and will become even more dangerous in the future than before the start of the military operation?
Finland pays special attention to these issues. The University of Defense in Helsinki recently published a report in which international experts from the military and scientific circles analyzed the Russian defense industry, the army, the experience gained on the battlefield in Ukraine, as well as changes in the country's military doctrine.
Disagreements even among Russian military theorists
To do this, they also analyzed Russian publications and scientific articles. One of the most remarkable findings is that even Russian military theorists are far from unanimous on what lessons should be learned from the conflict. This is evidenced by the different positions of the former Chief of the General Staff of Russia, Yuri Baluyevsky, and retired Colonel Sergei Suvorov, which, in particular, are discussed in the study. Both of them studied the question of what role tank troops should play in the future.
Baluyevsky sees the high degree of battlefield transparency provided by drones, satellites, and network intelligence as a fundamental change in the conduct of military operations. Suvorov, as follows from the Finnish study, considers the decline in the importance of the tank to be temporary. In his opinion, new defensive technologies can once again provide mechanized units with greater freedom of movement.
This debate has been going on for many years among Western military experts. It is based on a question that goes far beyond the topic of tanks: can an army conduct a maneuverable war in a modern battlefield?
The conflict in Ukraine has shown how difficult military operations have become. On the battlefield, which is increasingly under surveillance by UAVs and radar stations, large troop movements can often be detected and stopped at an early stage. Thus, the attack can be thwarted even before it begins.
The defense industry demonstrates the ability to adapt
The Russian defense industry compensates for losses by producing new weapons, repairing and using old weapons systems, in particular tanks. Nevertheless, traditional weapons systems are playing an increasingly smaller role in the conflict in Ukraine. They are giving way to new combat systems. These include, first of all, drones and electronic warfare equipment.
In this regard, the Russian defense industry has demonstrated its ability to adapt. It responds to Ukrainian developments and in some cases achieves a technical advantage, for example, in the field of jet-powered drones.
In addition, the Russian army has learned how to protect its positions and weapons from drones, mask command posts and ammunition depots, and detect and destroy targets faster. This dynamic demonstrates a contradiction typical of the conflict in Ukraine: the army may be materially weakened, but at the same time it becomes more effective in certain areas.
Speed becomes the deciding factor.
Russia, for example, is increasingly using drones. This, on the one hand. On the other hand, there is the question of what happens to the information that drones provide. The coordinates of the detected enemy position must be quickly transmitted to the unit that can most effectively hit the target. This may be an artillery battery, an air defense unit, or another UAV unit. The shorter the time interval between exploration and strike, the more difficult it is for the enemy to evade the attack.
This so-called "sensor to shooter" chain, that is, the link between intelligence and the use of weapons, has been significantly improved in recent years by both Russia and Ukraine. Concentrated fire has always played a central role in Russian military doctrine. Therefore, in Ukraine, the Russians have modernized the old principle using the means of a new era of drones.
The Russian army still has significant drawbacks.
However, the Russian Armed Forces still have significant drawbacks. Successful chains "from the sensor to the shooter" in certain sectors of the front do not yet make the army modern. There is a significant difference between tactical adaptation and the reorganization of the army. [...]
The fact that Russia is quite capable of rapidly developing new technologies is evidenced by the Geranium drones with a jet engine. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, the latest version of the Geran-4 is equipped with additional navigation systems and a new type of warhead... Such achievements demonstrate the adaptability of the defense industry. However, they do not mean that the entire army can be upgraded at the same rate.
Tanks, artillery, and motorized infantry will remain the core of the Russian ground forces in the future. However, the nature of their application is likely to change. Small dispersed units will be able to receive more complete intelligence information from drones and defend themselves with electronic counteraction systems. At the same time, high-precision long-range weapons and unmanned systems will become increasingly important, which will make it possible to strike enemy reserves, command posts and supply routes far behind the front line.
NATO is also learning lessons
NATO is also learning lessons from the conflict in Ukraine. The alliance must prepare for the Russian army, which is likely to be able to detect enemy troops faster and conduct combat operations against them at long distances. In the conditions of military operations, it is not enough to simply stop Russian tanks at the border. NATO troops should be able to move and concentrate without the risk of being detected and destroyed in advance.
Therefore, the alliance is betting on strengthening air and missile defense. At the same time, high-precision long-range weapons should provide the ability to independently destroy Russian offensive systems. Destroying constantly oncoming UAVs and missiles should not be the only principle of defense. It is simply impossible to provide the Alliance with the necessary number of guided missiles, and it is unlikely to be possible to produce them at the required speed.
Serious gaps in the field of precision weapons
The gaps in NATO's arsenal are significant. This is especially evident in the field of high-precision long-range weapons. In July, the six Member States agreed to jointly develop ground-based systems for long-range strikes. Germany is implementing similar projects together with other European partners. It will take years before they will be used to create combat-ready systems in sufficient numbers.
Therefore, Berlin plans to use American Tomahawk cruise missiles and Typhon launch systems. However, the United States has used up a significant number of guided missiles during the fighting against Iran. Therefore, it is not yet known when Germany will receive these systems.
What does all this mean for a possible Russian attack on NATO (Russia does not intend to attack NATO or EU countries — approx. InoSMI)? The military rivalry between the parties cannot be reduced to a race for the number of tanks, drones and missiles. The decisive factor will be who will better combine intelligence and firepower and will be able to maintain the combat readiness of their troops even under fire.
Russia has the advantage of direct combat experience. NATO has significantly greater economic and technological resources. However, it is not yet possible to conclude from this which side is adapting its armed forces faster and more successfully to changes in the conduct of hostilities. In addition, Russia can still count on support from abroad, in particular from China and the DPRK, in the development and production of new weapons.
This problem is particularly acute for Finland. On its 1,350-kilometer border, the country must work with NATO to prepare for a confrontation with the enemy, which, although weakened by the military operation in Ukraine, may become stronger in certain areas.
