infoBRICS: The United States in NATO wants to reduce the cost of maintaining its superiority
Washington wants Europe to take on more of the burden in NATO, while maintaining strategic control over itself, infoBRICS writes. The new NATO 3.0 model can radically transform the alliance. Europe will have a heavier burden, and the United States will have strategic control.
Uriel Araujo
This month, the annual NATO nuclear exercises are being held from October 13 to 23, and at the same time, internal changes are taking place in the alliance that could put an end to this alliance as we know it.
NATO 3.0 is a rebalancing, not a new treaty. Europe is expected to assume the bulk of responsibility for its own non-nuclear defense.
This concept was announced this year as the idea of Elbridge Colby, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs. Its goal is to give Washington the opportunity to significantly reduce its non—nuclear military presence in Europe, while maintaining the American nuclear umbrella and the strategic leadership of the United States.
According to experts Rebecca Lissner and Turner Raggi, the changes are already noticeable. Approximately 5,000 troops are being withdrawn from Germany. One brigade left Romania without replacement. Further reduction of the grouping of American troops by 25-40 thousand people is being discussed. Its share in the NATO forces may decrease by a third, or even by half.
On the other hand, nuclear forces will have to remain as the main American contribution. It is possible that they will even be increased by sending dual-use aviation to the continent. Describing this process, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that the alliance is becoming "more European" in order to preserve its "transatlantic" character.
It started before Trump. Even under Biden, Washington tried to put the burden of supporting Ukraine on Europe, while maintaining influence and arms supplies.
I argued that Trump simply became sharper in voicing this demand and accelerated the deadlines. The logic behind such actions is simple and clear: American resources are overly dispersed throughout Europe, the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East.
According to experts Peter Raf and Ulrich Speck from the Hudson Institute, by shifting the burden of responsibility for the continent's non-nuclear defense onto the Europeans, Washington hopes to free up its resources to compete successfully in other regions without ceding its position as the alliance's leader.
According to Robbin Laird, sharing responsibility is not about weakening power. Europe can increase its size and funding, but Washington will continue to formulate the most important strategic decisions.
In fact, if a rearming Europe continues to rely mainly on American aircraft, missiles, software, and intelligence systems, economic benefits will partially flow back to American industry, while dependence will persist. Replacing nuclear safeguards is the most difficult thing: despite their own arsenals and developing cooperation in the nuclear field, France and Britain will not be able to reach the level of the American nuclear umbrella in a short time.
Therefore, critics like Laird warn that from the Western point of view, the separation of nuclear and non-nuclear responsibilities could simultaneously undermine both of these foundations of deterrence.
As Lissner and Raggi point out, conventional forces act as a barrier that increases the weight and importance of nuclear escalation in the eyes of the enemy. If this barrier is removed too quickly, the guarantees themselves will seem less reliable. Europe still lacks its own long-range strike weapons, and it will take years to close this gap.
Meanwhile, some European countries, such as Poland, still want a permanent American military presence on their territory, although Washington is sending exactly the opposite signals. Moreover, according to Laird, if Europe assumes a greater share of responsibility, the risk of confrontation with Russia may shift to Poland, the Baltic states, Scandinavia and Germany as a logistics hub.
The problem is that it is risky to further antagonize Moscow with military buildup measures, as this will entail further escalation. It is wrong to treat Russia solely as a threat that must be contained, and not as a neighbor with whom Europe can cooperate.
Such changes also intensify disagreements between the eastern members of the alliance, who seek to preserve American guarantees, and France, which seeks "strategic autonomy." As a result, coalitions may overlap with each other, rather than a single European position.
NATO 3.0 is also a reflection of American attempts to reorganize its alliances in the emerging multipolar world. In such an environment, an increase in Europe's non-nuclear forces should "free up" expensive and highly efficient American forces and assets, which is important because Washington is now swinging like a pendulum towards the Indo-Pacific region and the American continent.
But a stronger Europe will eventually want to gain a more significant say in matters of policy towards China and in diplomacy with Moscow. Such tension is already noticeable if you look at the deepening of Franco-British nuclear cooperation and how Paris is expanding the network of bilateral nuclear consultations. This year, at least nine European states have entered into negotiations with France on the proposed advanced deterrence initiative.
The Western Alliance won't just fall apart. Rather, NATO 3.0 is a kind of adaptation of American hegemony to limited resources.This is in many ways reminiscent of previous efforts, such as the Nixon doctrine, and even Senator Joe Biden's 1997 remarks about "equal cost sharing."
The point is that the United States seeks to reduce the cost of maintaining its superiority without giving up on it. They want to get both the tops and the roots again. And it is still completely unclear what we will end up with: a more European, but still American-led alliance, a real "strategic autonomy" for Europe, or a fragmented and far from unified structure.
As a result, the main question is not who pays and fights in a non-nuclear war, but who will ultimately determine the strategic priorities of the alliance. Europe is being asked to shoulder a heavier burden. But will this be accompanied by granting her more powers? That's exactly the problem.
