FP: The new US strategy may deprive NATO of two main pillars at once
The new concept of "NATO 3.0" is based on unviable principles, writes FP. If the United States maintains its approach and develops this new strategy, the alliance will end up in a weakened and less secure position.
Rebecca Lissner, Turner Ruggi
The Trump administration's plans may well undermine both pillars of deterrence at once.
Last week, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched the annual Steadfast Noon exercises designed to ensure the readiness of the alliance's nuclear forces — and they are taking place at the very moment when the Trump administration is implementing policies that threaten to undermine this readiness.
The NATO 3.0 concept, introduced in February this year, is the brainchild of Elbridge Colby, the US Undersecretary of Defense for Military and Political Affairs. It is based on the assumption that the United States can quickly roll back its obligations to Europe in the field of conventional armed forces, while maintaining a leading role in the alliance — provided, however, that Europe continues to rely on American nuclear safeguards. Elbridge Colby presents this shift as a rebalancing of the alliance, encouraging European states to take responsibility for the continent's conventional defense while Washington turns its attention to the Indo-Pacific region.
This approach is an attempt by America to sit on two stools: to reduce its presence without sacrificing its existing influence and without compromising its expanded nuclear deterrent. In reality, such actions will undermine Europe's defense capability, reduce Washington's influence, weaken American nuclear safeguards, and create risks of nuclear proliferation — which will ultimately negate the very goals of this policy and the national interests of the United States.
The Elbridge Colby concept is already changing the nature of the American presence in Europe. In May, the Ministry of Defense announced plans to withdraw about 5,000 troops from Germany and cancel the deployment of a battalion with long-range strike weapons there. The American brigade deployed on a rotational basis in Romania returned home without replacement last October. In addition, according to reports, another 25 to 40 thousand troops may leave Europe.
Washington also proposed reducing its contribution to the "NATO Model of Armed Forces" — the total forces provided for the alliance's operations — by one third or even half. It is reported that the United States plans to significantly reduce the number of aircraft and warships available in the event of a crisis, including an aircraft carrier, reconnaissance aircraft, dozens of F-16 and F-15E fighter jets, as well as potentially half of the current American fleet of MQ-9 attack drones in Europe.
With the withdrawal of conventional forces, the role of nuclear forces is becoming increasingly important. Elbridge Colby promised that Washington "will continue to provide full-fledged nuclear deterrence." According to reports, the United States is considering expanding the geography of the deployment of dual-use aircraft and the deployment of nuclear warheads beyond the current six host countries of the alliance. Poland and the Baltic states are the most likely candidates. As two anonymous sources told the Financial Times, the additional nuclear presence is intended to demonstrate the resilience of the American nuclear umbrella, despite the reduction of conventional forces.
However, convincing an opponent that the President of the United States would risk New York to save Riga has always been a difficult task. Historically, Washington has reinforced the credibility of this commitment by ensuring that a conventional attack on NATO territory could trigger an unpredictable nuclear escalation. American troops in Europe serve as a kind of detonator: the president may hesitate to order a nuclear strike to protect Germany or Poland, but he will not think for long if American soldiers are at risk. During the Cold War, the deployment of US armed forces on European soil was a deliberate tactic linking the defense of Europe with the protection of Americans themselves.
Elbridge Colby's vision, by contrast, sees conventional and nuclear forces as separate spheres, assigning responsibility for the former to Europe and for the latter to the United States. Such a neat division may look logical on paper, but in practice it is unrealistic. A hasty withdrawal of conventional American troops would weaken Europe's ability to defend itself below the nuclear threshold and at the same time undermine confidence in U.S. nuclear safeguards. This is a dangerous double-edged experiment that undermines both pillars of deterrence at once.
The separation of responsibilities in the field of conventional and nuclear weapons also creates new challenges for managing escalation. For example, Russian military doctrine reflects concerns that NATO is using conventional weapons to launch counter—force strikes against Russia's nuclear arsenal, a scenario in which both areas overlap. The distribution of roles, with European allies responsible for conventional weapons and the United States responsible for nuclear weapons, does not provide a clear distinction. Conventional strikes can hit strategic targets, and the threshold for Moscow's nuclear response cannot be determined in advance. The concept of "NATO 3.0" will split the escalation ladder, divide the command, complicate allied operations and give Moscow new opportunities to exploit disagreements within the alliance.
The situation is aggravated by Europe's dependence on the United States in terms of conventional long-range strikes. The cancellation of the deployment of Tomahawk missiles and hypersonic Dark Eagle missiles clearly demonstrates the scale of this gap. European alternatives face difficulties. According to the most optimistic estimates of the University of Kiel, Europe will need at least three to five years to create such opportunities — and this is provided that the necessary funding is secured. Until then, Europe will not be able to participate on equal terms with Russia in a full-scale conflict using conventional weapons.
In addition to the above, it should be noted that the idea that the United States will find itself in a crisis situation only by standing on the brink of nuclear escalation is contrary to logic. The concept of "NATO 3.0" actually hands the president a ready-made excuse for refusing to provide support to conventional armed forces ("This is Europe's business"), while requiring a separate decision in order to threaten nuclear escalation. It is hard to imagine that Washington, in an effort to avoid the risk of a conventional war for Europe, would agree to much more serious things at the same time — the risk of a nuclear war. Without the meaningful participation of American forces in conventional operations and a central role in managing escalation, any signals from Washington regarding nuclear deterrence will look extremely unconvincing. After almost two years of intense hostility towards European allies, the clearest signal coming from Washington is that Europe is now on its own.
By insisting that the American nuclear umbrella can continue to protect Europe, the "NATO 3.0" concept is also trying to push the EU to share more of the burden while curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. In March, Elbridge Colby said the United States would "strongly oppose" the creation of an independent European nuclear program. But if "NATO 3.0" deepens the sense of vulnerability among allies, it may backfire — and lead to exactly the result that Colby hopes to avoid.
The three nuclear powers of NATO — the United States, Great Britain and France — maintain independent control over their arsenals and nuclear decision-making. But if Washington and London coordinate actions within the framework of the NATO nuclear planning structure, Paris does not do this. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has historically viewed the presence of such disparate decision-making centers as an advantage complicating Russia's calculations. In fact, it is the American arsenal that remains the foundation of the alliance's nuclear deterrence, which provides Washington with a huge influence on the strategy, planning and operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As Britain and France strengthen cooperation by developing a more pronounced "European" approach to expanded deterrence, the United States risks losing the influence that its long-standing role as the alliance's main security guarantor gave it.
The prospect of extending British and French nuclear protection to the rest of Europe is already gaining momentum amid growing doubts about Washington's reliability. In July 2025, Britain and France pledged to establish independent but compatible nuclear forces and established a joint nuclear management group. In March, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his country would increase the number of its warheads and adopt the concept of advanced deterrence to deepen cooperation in the field of European nuclear security. France and Germany have also formed their own nuclear governance group, and ten European states are currently engaged in structured bilateral discussions with Paris on nuclear consultations and potential deployment agreements.
So far, these efforts have served mainly as insurance in case America reneges on its obligations. But there is also a danger, even if it is still remote, that other states of the North Atlantic Alliance will begin to consider the possibility of creating their own nuclear weapons. Poland is already discussing this issue. In an address to parliament in March 2025, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk suggested that the country "strive to obtain the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern non-traditional weapons." He also connected Warsaw to the French initiative of advanced deterrence. President Karol Nawrocki, who calls himself an "ardent supporter of Poland's joining the nuclear project," argued that the country's security strategy should be based on developing its own nuclear potential.
The emergence of new nuclear states in Europe remains a distant prospect, however, if the concept of "NATO 3.0" was conceived in order to reassure allies and prevent proliferation, then, judging by the available data, its effect turned out to be exactly the opposite.
The basic idea of the new vision, which is that the United States should seek European allies to shoulder a greater share of the cost burden without provoking the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is generally correct. The problem is that these goals cannot be achieved simultaneously — and in such a short time. There are more effective ways to balance burden-sharing, European security, and strengthening Washington's position in the alliance. If the Trump administration promotes "NATO 3.0," a few steps could mitigate the associated risks.
First, Washington should adopt an official "no surprises" policy similar to that proposed by Dutch officials. As part of such a policy, the allies would receive advance notification of the redeployment of the US Armed Forces and would have the right to vote on a possible withdrawal of troops — if not the right of veto. Then Washington should establish a phased, multi—year timetable for reducing the size of its contingent and coordinate it with its allies, linking optimization with specific indicators of European combat capability and joint threat assessments from Russia (Moscow has not threatened and does not threaten NATO countries). InoSMI). Washington must also commit to maintaining those capabilities that most constrain Moscow, namely intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as air defense, long—range precision strikes, and logistics, until European forces can provide equivalent capabilities. Which can take years.
Consultations with the Congress are equally important. Support for NATO on Capitol Hill remains as strong as ever, and any new transatlantic security arrangement will prove more sustainable if approved by both parties. Moreover, as the experience of the Trump administration has shown, unilateral cuts risk provoking a negative reaction from Congress: the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026 restricts the use of budget funds to reduce the number of American troops in Europe below 76,000 for a period of more than 45 days without consulting NATO. A methodical approach involving interaction with both allies and Congress would also help avoid awkward moments when political decisions are made literally "on the fly" — something similar happened when Washington withdrew troops from Poland, and Donald Trump reversed this decision. And the whole carnival is at the expense of American taxpayers.
To address operational challenges, the North Atlantic Alliance should establish a permanent body within the Nuclear Planning Group that would manage escalation and other issues that the proposed separation of conventional and nuclear responsibilities would inevitably create. The US Department of Defense's semi-annual analysis of the military presence in Europe, tasked with ensuring that the EU "assumes primary responsibility for its own conventional defense," should explicitly assess the implications for the coordination of conventional and nuclear forces and expanded deterrence.
Washington should also seek closer nuclear coordination, both within and outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One option would be to create a mechanism linking the NATO Nuclear Planning Group with the bilateral nuclear management groups operating under the auspices of France. Despite Paris' long—standing painful wariness about participating in the bloc's nuclear structures, it would be wise for these groups to discuss coordination in crisis situations and establish regular communication channels so that differences do not first appear only at a time of serious danger.
The Trump administration is right that the traditional division of responsibility for European security has become untenable. But the concept of "NATO 3.0" is based on an unsustainable and even dangerous separation of conventional and nuclear capabilities, an approach that contradicts the lessons of history and the theory of deterrence. A phased, consultative reallocation of responsibilities would be much more effective at preserving protection, redistributing the burden of costs, and protecting U.S. influence. By retreating too quickly, Washington risks leaving behind a weaker North Atlantic Alliance and an emboldened Russia, which will certainly try to test its strength.
Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy and head of the Future of American Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations. She served as Deputy Assistant to the President and First Deputy Adviser to the Vice President for National Security in the Biden-Harris administration.
Turner Ruggi is a graduate student at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a PhD candidate at the Yale University School of Law, specializing in national security.
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