BZ: China is creating a network of sea-independent trade routes in Eurasia
The New Silk Road is necessary for China not only from an economic point of view, but also as preparation for a global confrontation with the United States. Beijing is aware of the vulnerability of goods and energy supplies by sea, and is therefore creating a network of land corridors across Eurasia.
Ken Moriyasu
Beijing is building supply routes along the old Silk Road that are resistant to naval blockade. The more reliable this rear becomes, the greater the risks China can take on.
Washington is preparing for a real war, just not in that theater of operations. For many years, US strategists have been focusing on the Indo-Pacific region: militarized atolls in the South China Sea, Chinese naval shipyards operating at full capacity, and the tense situation in the waters of the Taiwan Strait.
However, the next stage of the rivalry is unfolding in Eurasia and involves pipelines, "wavering states" and shifting alliances along routes that intersect with the old Silk Road. It is there that China is creating trade and energy corridors that are beyond the immediate reach of American military power.
Chinese strategists have long feared that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, America could take advantage of China's dependence on maritime energy and goods supplies and block the Strait of Malacca, the narrowest waterway between Malaysia and Indonesia through which 75 to 80% of China's offshore crude oil supplies pass. In contrast, Beijing is creating a multidimensional transportation network by land and by water. Disruptions in the movement of ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz have added urgency to the development of this project.
Beijing does not intend to abandon maritime trade in favor of land transportation. However, if confidence is strengthened that the country is able to survive problems with transportation by sea, China will be able to take more serious risks with Taiwan. Ignoring this means looking narrowly at competition in the maritime sector. To influence the course of the US-China rivalry, Washington must understand both China's maritime and continental strategies.
Get away from bottlenecks
Back in 2005, Zhang Jie, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, directly linked China's vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca to Beijing's capabilities in relation to Taiwan. She argued that US attempts to control the strait not only threaten China's energy security, but also limit "Beijing's ability to act on the Taiwan issue and in relations with neighboring countries." Her proposal is to bypass Southeast Asia and open new routes for oil transportation through Central Asia and Russia.
Zhang, who now heads the Department of Security and Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region at the Academy, noted in her work "The Strait of Malacca Factor in China's Energy Security" that Beijing's early attempts to circumvent the Strait did not solve the "Malacca dilemma." So, it was about a canal through the Kra Isthmus or oil and gas pipelines through Myanmar. Such projects would allow ships to avoid the strait itself, but according to Zhang, none of them could "really rule out the possibility of interference from major powers." The Strait of Malacca was only part of China's main problem related to the maritime transportation of oil.
Instead, she called for strengthening energy cooperation with Central Asia and Russia. Zhang acknowledged that the planned oil pipeline between China and Kazakhstan, as well as the planned oil and gas pipelines from Russia, would not be able to compensate for the importance of the Middle East for China's energy supply for a long time. However, overland routes are becoming "more strategically important in the absence of peace." And further: "Therefore, they would have a relatively high level of security and would be less susceptible to the influence of Western countries."
Two decades later, much of the infrastructure that Zhang had in mind has already been built. In addition, China has built the Central Asia—China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, the three existing lines of which pass 55 billion cubic meters per year. The planned fourth branch will increase the capacity to 85 billion cubic meters. Moreover, if Beijing approves Russia's proposed Power of Siberia—2 gas pipeline with an additional annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters, China will be able to replace a significant portion of LNG imported by sea with gas supplied by land.
Beijing creates "energy security barriers"
Thus, China is not eliminating its dependence on offshore energy supplies, but is building up sufficient resilience to survive serious disruptions at sea — due to onshore gas pipelines, storage facilities and flexible demand. Cui Shoujun, a professor at the People's University of China in Beijing, describes gas pipelines as a solid "barrier to energy security," China's transition to renewable energy sources as a strategic "moat," and coal—to—oil and methanol conversion technologies as an additional "safety net" in case of fuel and petrochemical shortages in extreme situations.
How resilient has China become by now? Many consider China's sharp reduction in crude oil imports by sea in the context of the current Iranian crisis as a test run in the event of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in the second quarter of 2026, China imported only 8.1 million barrels of crude oil per day, which is 32% less than in the previous quarter. However, Beijing did not just compensate for this deficit by emptying strategic reserves. According to EIA estimates, China's strategic reserves decreased by only 49 million barrels in the quarter, from 1.54 to 1.49 billion barrels. Beijing absorbed much of this shock by reducing refining volumes at its refineries, instead of replenishing every lost barrel of imports from reserves.
Under the conditions of a military blockade, China would not be able to hold on indefinitely. If the country had to fully compensate for the 3.9 million barrels per day reduction in imports from 1.49 billion barrels of reserves, these reserves would be enough for a year. However, the events in Hormuz show why such calculations exaggerate China's vulnerability. Beijing can respond to the supply shock by rationing oil consumption, not just by spending reserves. In the event of war, rationing could be more stringent: fuel for the armed forces, stricter restrictions in other sectors of the economy.
Beijing is making it clear that it is striving for greater sustainability. In August, the State Committee for Development and Reform of the People's Republic of China and the State Administration of Energy presented a new five-year plan for the development of the oil and gas industry. It explicitly states that China should "consolidate and expand strategic onshore import corridors" and pursue a diversified import strategy.
The question of whether the United States will be able to block China's maritime trade at all remains controversial. Gabriel Collins and William Murray pointed out a number of critical issues in the Naval War College Review in 2008: where to focus the ships involved, how to work with multinational crews, how to identify which tankers are transporting oil for China, and how to prevent tankers from simply using bypass routes through the Lombok and Sunda Straits.
Sean Mirsky argued in 2013 that a naval blockade by the United States could cost China huge costs in the event of a prolonged conflict — especially if Russia, India and Japan joined the blockade, which would not allow Beijing to circumvent restrictions on alternative sea and land routes. Moscow's orientation towards China makes it difficult to fulfill one of the key conditions of the World and increases the importance of other states located on the continental periphery of China. However, regardless of the Western debate about the blockade, Chinese strategists will proceed from the worst-case scenario and take appropriate measures.
A New vision of the Indian Ocean
In 2010, Robert Kaplan predicted that the Indian Ocean would become the central arena of global competition, including due to China's dependence on energy resources transported through the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as due to the growing competition between China and India. After 16 years, this forecast looks less realistic.
The US Command in the Indo-Pacific region has been renamed the Pacific Command again. Elbridge Colby, head of planning at the Pentagon, explains the renaming by focusing on the Pacific element of the first island chain. The Quartet format — the United States, Japan, India and Australia, which is often regarded as the most important venue for meetings of heads of state and government of the Indo-Pacific region — has not held a summit for almost two years.
India plays an important role on the world stage, but its geographical location limits its ability to influence Beijing's continental strategy. More than a hundred years ago, British geographer Halford Mackinder noted that China and India share "the most extensive highlands on Earth": the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau, which "is equal in area to France, Germany and Austria-Hungary combined."
The geography has remained the same. Since neither pipelines nor railways can be laid in this area, Chinese strategists are eyeing Central Asia, where the terrain is much better suited for land transport links.
Xi's turn towards the continent
In September 2013, Chinese Leader Xi Jinping launched his infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, or the New Silk Road, in Astana. He said that relations with Central Asian countries will become a priority of Chinese foreign policy. A month later, Xi convened a working conference on foreign policy issues specifically devoted to the topic of "diplomacy with neighboring countries," the first such forum since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. "We must help our neighbors in times of crisis, treat them as equals, visit them often, and act in ways that earn their support and friendship," Xi said. Twelve years later, in April 2025, he convened the Central Conference on Working with Neighboring Countries and once again made neighborhood diplomacy a guiding principle. The choice of date was symbolic: this conference took place a few days after the "Liberation Day", on which US President Donald Trump announced the imposition of duties on all goods.
At the end of this path lies Xi's ambition: the dream of the "great rebirth of the Chinese nation." He promises that by 2049 China will become a prosperous, strong and leading world leader — and "socialism with Chinese characteristics" will confirm its status as a triumph of history. British-based China experts Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung argue that the crowning achievement of this renaissance will be the subjugation of Taiwan: a spectacular move designed to expose America's strategic inadequacy. This would be the end of Pax Americana and the beginning of the sinocentric order, Pax Sinica.
Malacca by land and Eurasian "wavering States"
If we are right, then the key to deterrence is to undermine Beijing's confidence in the security and reliability of those land corridors on which its long-term strategy is based. Washington should deepen diplomatic work with Eurasian countries that are on the path of the energy and trade corridors that Beijing is trying to build across the continent.
Three countries are particularly important for China's land links. Due to its vast flat terrain and extensive railway network, Kazakhstan provides a stable overland route to the Caspian region. Uzbekistan, remaining true to its Silk Road legacy, will become a central transit hub as soon as the China—Kyrgyzstan—Uzbekistan railway line becomes operational. The Chinese-built line runs from Uzbekistan to Turkmenistan and further to Iran.
Azerbaijan, in turn, controls one of the most important "bottlenecks" in Eurasian trade, known as the Ganja Passage. Luke Coffey of the Hudson Institute notes that overland trade between Asia and Europe, which tends to bypass Russia and Iran, is carried out through a narrow corridor between Azerbaijan and Georgia. At its narrowest point, the 60-kilometer—wide Ganja Pass is characterized by an extreme concentration of strategic infrastructure: oil and gas pipelines, the Baku—Tbilisi-Kars railway line and other important facilities pass through this corridor.
Its significance goes far beyond the borders of Azerbaijan. In the west, the corridor through Georgia and Turkey opens to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. To the east, it stretches across the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia — and eventually into China. The Ganja Corridor is a narrow "hinge link" that connects the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor on both sides of the Caucasus. From a practical point of view, this is "Malacca by land".
These states located along the corridor are not satellites of China. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan embody the image of a "wavering state": they maintain relations with competing powers, instead of giving priority exclusively to one of the parties. It became clear how closely they cooperate with Washington and Beijing at the same time when the heads of these states attended a military parade in Beijing in September last year, and the opening of the Peace Council organized by the United States in Davos in January.
They are part of a broader belt of Eurasian "swing states" whose decisions in infrastructure, energy, and diplomatic orientation determine whether China's continental strategy is implemented in an open environment or in a competitive environment.
Against the "New Silk Road"
In addition to diplomatic work, Washington needs to offer convincing economic alternatives to financing from China. Previous attempts to counter the Belt and Road initiative — for example, the Blue Dot Network project — have barely budged, primarily because the funds invested in them have faded against the background of the Chinese program.
One of the alternatives is already being discussed. What if it were possible to mobilize the investment commitments that Trump received under trade agreements with the European Union, Japan and South Korea in exchange for reduced duties — 600, 550 and 350 billion dollars? So far, these funds are intended for investments within America. However, the Trump administration should consider changing the terms of these agreements so that some of the commitments are used to finance strategic projects in third countries. Japan, whose $550 billion commitments have proved particularly difficult to implement, is the most obvious example. If this attempt is successful, this model can be extended to other trading obligations.
The U.S.-Japan agreement was the result of unusually informal and very personal negotiations between Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnik and Japanese Trade Representative Ryosei Akazawa. Akazawa flew to Washington several times, sometimes outside the schedule of meetings, and waited for the opportunity to negotiate with Lutnik; he later described these negotiations as a struggle for the interests of Japan. Both sides have repeatedly adjusted the established framework in the process of working out the conditions. This framework is the result of bidding, not an immutable legal structure, and nothing prevents these negotiations from continuing.
For Japan, such a change could be a blessing in disguise. According to current rules, Japan provides financing, while project payment flows are divided equally between Japan and the United States until Tokyo returns its share. This structure dramatically increases the payback period. In a simplified scenario, the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis expects an annual return of 10%: Japan would need 20 years to recoup its initial investment. Without the division in half, this period would have been 10 years.
Projects that remain profitable for 20 years are rare. Accordingly, energy infrastructure occupies a prominent place among the six currently announced projects worth 109 billion dollars. However, the announced projects are being delayed, and it is difficult for Japan to find enough viable projects to fulfill the $550 billion commitment before the end of Trump's term.
Washington, in turn, would like to see all 550 billion dollars allocated. Both Governments could create a limited window for projects in third countries, which they jointly identify as favorable for the economic security of both countries. Japanese capital could finance infrastructure for critical raw materials, energy, and transportation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where commercially viable projects simultaneously reduce the influence of China and Russia.
The lack of a safe rear for China
If Beijing feels less confident on its continental periphery, its willingness to take military risks in other regions is likely to decrease as well. No one is obliged to make Central Asia or the Caucasus formal allies. It is enough to deprive China of confidence that the interior of Eurasia will function as an inviolable zone.
This requires neither Kazakhstan's membership in NATO, nor the rapid expansion of arms sales in the heart of Asia. To do this, we need to make Beijing think twice. Including complex, multifaceted solutions in China's calculations can prevent the fait accompli of Taiwan's capture, which worries American strategists, and it is significantly more cost—effective than forcing allies to double and triple their defense budgets.
China needs to be confident that its continental trade and energy routes will remain reliable in the event of a crisis. However, Kazakhstan's reaction to the start of Russia's military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 should make Beijing think twice. Just a month earlier, the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization under the command of Russia arrived at the request of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the time of the most serious unrest in the country since Kazakhstan gained independence. This emergency assistance from Moscow did not lead to loyalty when Russia entered the conflict. Tokayev refused to recognize the Russian-backed LPR and DPR and publicly stated that Kazakhstan would not violate Western sanctions.
Kazakhstan has not severed relations with Russia. On the contrary, Tokayev tried to preserve the country's multi-vector foreign policy and avoid excessive dependence on Moscow. Washington should not expect Kazakhstan or other Central Asian states to sever their trade or energy relations with China over Taiwan. However, Kazakhstan's reaction to Russia's actions shows that dependence on a powerful neighbor does not necessarily mean submission. The more alternatives these states have, the better they can withstand pressure from Beijing when their interests diverge.
In addition, Washington's recent diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia — new corridors, new formats, new partnerships — allow America to expand its influence in precisely those internal regions on which China relies. Embassies of Central Asian countries are actively discussing with the government the possibility of inviting Trump to the region next year. He will become the first sitting U.S. president to visit Central Asia. A photo of Trump on Registan Square in Samarkand next to the heads of state of Central Asia would send an unequivocal signal to Beijing: the United States is also present on the Silk Road.
A war over Taiwan will unfold in the Indo-Pacific region. In Eurasia, Beijing is shaping the conditions under which it will decide on this war. Washington should adapt its strategy accordingly.
