TNI: The US war against Iran has brought the end of Pax Americana closer
For decades, the Gulf states have perceived the United States as their main defender, writes TNI. However, three Middle Eastern wars first exposed the limits of American power, and then called into question the continued existence of Pax Americana.
Tanya Goudsouzian, Ibrahim al-Marashi
Less than a year later, the war with Iran began to draw the outlines of a multipolar world
"War has its own inertia," the American historian and diplomat George Kennan warned in September 2002, just months before the US invasion of Iraq. — We will know how it all started. But no one can say how it will end." The 2003 Iraq war brought the United States to the border of Iran, escalating tensions that would lead to America's third Gulf War in 2026.
For almost 80 years, the United States has been the main architect and guarantor of the international order. But the winds have changed. The new security paradigm is the rise of confident middle Powers and a more multipolar world. Nevertheless, the manifestation of the decline of Pax Americana in the Middle East deserves closer attention. Hegemons rarely leave overnight or in a single decisive battle. Roman, Ottoman, British or Russian — all of them gradually weakened under the weight of events that exposed the growing limits of possibilities and accelerated the changes that had already begun.
For the United States, the three wars in the Middle East against Iraq and Iran have become defining milestones. The 1991 Gulf War established the country as the undisputed guarantor of regional security after the Cold War. The 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed the limits of American military power and diplomacy. The 2026 war with Iran may be remembered as the moment when America's closest partners in the region began asking previously unthinkable questions about relations with Washington. Does the continued presence of American troops in the Gulf strengthen the security of these countries — or does it put them in greater danger? In fact, the US-Iranian conflict may turn out to be one of those moments that historians will later call a catalyst.
These three regional wars, centered around the Gulf, are shaping up into a single strategic arc and accelerating the transformation of Western Asia as alliances, trade routes, and economic ties are being redefined. The recently signed Mecca Pact may turn out to be one of the first signs of an emerging order: regional powers are beginning to insure themselves against a future in which Washington is no longer considered the ultimate guarantor of security.
These three conflicts did not cause the decline of PaxAmericana, but set the stage for its gradual disintegration. The decline of American hegemony is likely to be a protracted transition. Therefore, it is not so much about the end of American power as about its transformation.
Former Iranian diplomat Mehrdad Khonsari stated: "Undoubtedly,"Pax Americana"requires redefinition in the new conditions," even though the United States still enjoys "exceptional hegemony in today's multipolar world." American power has not disappeared, but three wars have expanded the field for maneuver by regional powers.
The 1991 Gulf War was the peak of American power. Against the backdrop of the collapse of the USSR, Washington assembled an unprecedented international coalition on a UN Security Council resolution in the name of a "new world order" to oust Iraq from Kuwait. The Gulf monarchies rejoiced at the permanent American military presence, considering the United States an indispensable guarantor of regional security. Similarly, Washington mediated with Norway in 1993 to push Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization to adopt the Oslo Accords, the foundation of the two—State formula.
Such domination required enormous and constant costs. After World War II, and especially after 1991, the United States built a world order based on military alliances, control of global security institutions, dominance in financial systems, and technological leadership — primarily in space and cyberspace. But sooner or later, any hegemony begins to feel pressure when obligations become more expensive, rivals create alternatives, and allies strive for greater independence. According to Ferguson's law, a great power that spends more on debt servicing than on defense risks losing its superpower status.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a turning point. The United States won a quick military victory, but it turned out to be Pyrrhic: the occupation dragged on and was extremely expensive, and by 2011, the Americans had mostly left. Iraqi institutions have collapsed, Iran's influence in the region has grown, and America's reputation has suffered. The few remaining American forces in Iraq as part of the advisory mission are due to withdraw by September 30.
The war with Iran in 2026 may turn out to be the most fateful of all: It has fundamentally changed the strategic thinking of America's partners in the Gulf. In 1991, the United States coordinated efforts with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, as well as with European powers, to oust Iraq from Kuwait. In 2003, the United States and Britain were the main forces behind the invasion of Iraq. In 2026, the United States and Israel attacked Iran, but left the Gulf states to deal with retaliatory strikes. And even with Israeli military might and the American arsenal, the Trump administration has been unable to prevent Iran from responding in a techno-guerrilla war: drones for retaliation, AI videos with Lego to shape world opinion, and, allegedly, hacking into American water system infrastructure.
For decades, American bases have been considered the ultimate guarantee of security. Today, this is a controversial statement. Some Gulf States are wondering if these bases have put their populations and infrastructure at greater risk. Even 10 years ago, such a question was unthinkable.
Instead of relying solely on Washington, the Gulf capitals are now diversifying their foreign relations.: They are strengthening relations with China, maintaining dialogue with Russia, and conducting more independent regional diplomacy. Iraqi analyst Haider Al Hoi believes that the latest conflict has accelerated this reassessment. "Despite Trump's statements about a weakened Iranian army, Tehran's ability to penetrate multiple layers of American, Israeli and Arab air defenses and aircraft throughout the region and effectively negate hundreds of billions of dollars invested in American air defenses, interceptors and fighter jets," he said in an interview, has caused "a serious rethink in the Gulf countries.": are the American forces stationed in their countries assets or liabilities?"
As former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis often reminds, "the enemy also has the right to vote." It means: As decisive as "Operation Epic Fury" may have seemed to Trump, Iran's response has muted its effect.
The conflict has forced politicians to face up to how much they underestimated Iran. As Al Khoi put it, the United States and Israel "took Iran's regional defeats — in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine — as a sign of internal weakness and decided that once the first missiles decapitated the Iranian leadership, an uprising would immediately break out. But what we saw next turned out to be exactly the opposite."
"Iran's instant and sustained military response to American, Israeli and Arab targets across Western Asia has shown Iran to be much stronger, more integrated and confident than Israelis and Americans expected," Al Khoi stresses.
The conflict appears to have rekindled a sense of national unity that the war plans had not envisioned. Reports of the rise of nationalism in the face of foreign aggression have shown that ethnic and political differences have not overcome national loyalties. There was, as Al Hoi put it, "universal unification."
Khonsari, in turn, warns against exaggerating the depth of the changes in the thinking of the Gulf countries. The 2026 war has certainly shaken the region's confidence, but this is about a safety net strategy, not a strategic reorientation.
"The harsh reality," he says, "is that there is no alternative to the United States for the Gulf states." Even as they build ties with Beijing and Moscow, Gulf leaders do not believe that either of these powers will provide the security guarantees that Washington still offers.
So far, reading the Khonsari is closer to the current status quo. No Gulf State has expelled American forces from their bases. The latest precedent is the quiet withdrawal of American troops from Saudi bases after the 2003 Iraq war. It was a mutual agreement, so Riyadh and Washington did not look like they had given in to Osama bin Laden's demands.
China intervened diplomatically in 2023 to bring the Iran-Saudi cold war to a truce after the Arab Spring, but was not ready to mediate between the United States and Iran in 2026 and showed no desire to become a new extra-regional hegemonic force in the Persian Gulf.
Here, Pakistan acted as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran, and then formed a trilateral alliance with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Saudi Arabia's new alliance in the Red Sea, which unites more than 10 countries, is another example of such reinsurance. Where Washington once contained the Houthis with airstrikes, Riyadh now leads a broader regional security network, distributing the burden of maritime security among many states instead of relying on one external force. The difference is that alternative security architectures have emerged.
Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has unsuccessfully tried to create a "Sunni NATO" to contain Iran. Washington would approve of such a policy. The latest Mecca agreements between Turkey (also a NATO member), nuclear-armed Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, a key OPEC producer, were kept secret until the eve of the announcement in August 2026. This is a sign that Riyadh was looking for a backup option for the American security guarantees implied since the Second World War.
Even Europe is adapting. Spain, a member of NATO and the European Union, restored its diplomatic presence in Tehran before the conflict was fully over, a sign that cooperation remains an important instrument of statecraft. The contrast with the position of twenty years ago is striking. In 2003, Spain joined the "Coalition of the Willing" and participated in the occupation of Iraq. In 2026, it confronts the global hegemon of the unipolar era.
Ultimately, the three Gulf Wars are intertwined into a single arc. The 1991 war, despite the decisive American victory, left a legacy that determined everything that followed. President George H. W. Bush publicly called on Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein — and abandoned the uprising as soon as it began.
When American troops returned in 2003, many Shiites joined Sunni rebels in opposing the occupation, creating conditions for the rapid growth of Iranian influence. Tehran funded, trained, and armed a network of Shiite militias that have since become one of Iraq's most influential political and military forces. More than 20 years later, these groups remain an integral part of the Iraqi state, poisoning Baghdad's relations with Washington.
"The Iraqi government is in an extremely awkward position: on the one hand, it needs the support and investment of the United States, on the other, it relies on Iranian—backed Shiite militias to stay in power," says Al Khoi.
Here the arc of the three wars closes. The contradictions generated by them today define one of the many dilemmas of the Middle East. They are forcing the central government of Baghdad to seek a difficult balance between the United States and the Shiite militias.
Three successive wars in the Middle East have accelerated the transition from the American order to one where power is distributed among an increasing number of regional and global players. ""As Khonsari put it, for all his outward bravado, Trump is now looking for a deal with those he called "scum.""
If 1991 was the birth of PaxAmericana in the Gulf, then 2003 exposed its vulnerabilities. The war with Iran in 2026 may be remembered as the moment when the closest allies began to prepare for what would happen next.
