An Nahar: Israel, Turkey and Iran are fighting for the governance of the Middle East
The main question in the Middle East is no longer who will win the war, but who will determine the rules of the regional order, writes An Nahar. The Arab states have lost their unity and are forced to maneuver between external forces, while Israel, Turkey and Iran are fighting for leadership in the region.
Nawaf Kabara
The United States still has something that other powers do not: a wide network of bases and alliances, close military and economic ties, and great opportunities to influence the balance of power in different regions of the world.
In 1998, my students asked me a question that was difficult to answer unequivocally at the time: what will be the future of the Middle East?
Then I replied that, in my opinion, the Middle East is gradually turning into a kind of large corporation, headed by the United States. I assumed that in the future the main conflict would unfold not only between the Arab countries and Israel, but also around the question of who would control the management of this regional corporation. In my opinion, Israel, Iran and Turkey will be the main participants in this struggle.
Almost three decades later, it seems that we have found ourselves in the very center of this conflict. Today, the main question in the Middle East is no longer just who controls the territories, who will win the war, or who has the most military power. Something else is much more important: Who will determine the rules of the regional order? Who will set the boundaries of state influence? Who will decide the fate of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean? And who will be able to influence decision-making in the Arab world?
The region has gradually moved from a phase when the Arab world, despite its weakness and internal divisions, played an important role in shaping the regional order, to a phase when it itself became the arena of struggle for what that order would be. This is the real tragedy.
From the Arab-Israeli conflict to the struggle for the Arab world
In the second half of the 20th century, the main conflict in the Middle East was the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, various Arab projects competed with each other — Nasserist, Baathist, monarchist and Islamist. At the same time, the Arab States themselves, regardless of how we felt about their policies, played an important role in determining the future of the region.
However, the situation has changed today. Now there are three main projects in the region — Israeli, Turkish and Iranian. Each of them sees his own place, role and sphere of influence in the Middle East in his own way. The Arab States are forced to maneuver between these projects, acting either from their national interests, or from the interests of their own regimes and security considerations.
Thus, today there is practically no single "Arab axis" that would oppose other forces in the region. Some Arab states are moving closer to the United States, others are coordinating their actions with Turkey, others are developing strategic relations with Israel, others are establishing ties with Iran, and others are trying to maintain balance and maintain relations with all sides.
Even the Gulf States are no longer acting as a single political bloc. Today, each country independently determines its interests, builds relationships and chooses allies. The events of 2026 show that some countries in the region are already looking for new ways to ensure their security and new alliances, as the previous confidence in the ability of the existing order to maintain stability has noticeably weakened.
The Israeli project: from territorial control to regime control
When we talk about "Greater Israel," we should not reduce this concept only to a specific geographical area. There are indeed religious and nationalist forces in Israel that hold expansionist views. However, from the point of view of strategy, another understanding of "Greater Israel" is more important — as the idea of Israel as the main power determining the order in the Middle East.
In other words, to implement its project, Israel does not need to control the entire territory of the region. A more effective way to achieve hegemony is to become such a powerful military, technological, and intelligence power that no major decision in the Middle East can be made without taking its interests into account.
Israel enjoys significant military and technological superiority, a close strategic alliance with the United States, and its intelligence and military capabilities far exceed what one would expect from a country of its size and population.
From this perspective, weakening competing regional Powers and preventing the emergence of a force capable of balancing Israel are becoming fundamental elements of its security strategy.
In recent decades, Iran has been the main regional challenge to this strategy. However, the weakening of Iran does not mean the end of the struggle for influence in the Middle East. On the contrary, it may lead to the emergence of a new competitor. And this competitor is Turkey.
The Turkish project: influence without occupation
Turkey does not need to revive the Ottoman Empire to become a leading power in its region.
The modern Turkish project is much more complicated and pragmatic. Turkey aspires to become a power without taking into account the interests of which it is impossible to make decisions on Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and, possibly, a significant part of the Arab world.
It uses economic and trade ties, energy, defense industry, military force, diplomacy, cultural influence, and its position in NATO to expand its sphere of influence.
It would be a mistake to simplify modern Turkish politics to the concept of "neo-Ottomanism." Rather, Turkey seeks to create a regional order that meets its interests and security and limits the influence of its opponents in neighboring countries. It's more like creating your own sphere of influence than trying to rebuild a historical empire.
However, Turkey's growing role is increasingly leading Ankara to clash with the Israeli project.
The interests of Turkey and Israel overlap in key regions, primarily in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. Their rivalry also affects the Red Sea, trade routes, energy resources, and influence on regional politics. Therefore, relations between Turkey and Israel are gradually shifting from individual political differences to a deeper strategic rivalry.
The Iranian Project: Protecting a shrinking sphere of influence
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran began to build its regional project in a different way. Instead of relying solely on traditional military force, he has created a wide network of political, military, and non-governmental alliances stretching from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and Yemen.
The Shiite factor does occupy an important place in these networks, but it would be wrong to explain the Iranian policy solely on religious grounds. This project is based primarily on state interests: Tehran seeks to create strategic depth, prevent encirclement by opponents, and preserve the ability to influence events beyond its borders.
However, in recent years, this project has faced serious difficulties, and the conditions that once allowed it to expand its influence have changed.
Today, Iran seems to be fighting a different battle than it has in the last two decades. His main goal now is not to expand his sphere of influence, but to preserve as much as possible of what he has managed to create.
Direct clashes in 2016 marked a new stage in the US-Israeli confrontation with Iran. At the same time, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has shown that even under severe military and economic pressure, Tehran retains the ability to influence the global economy and international security.
After Iran: Will Turkey become Israel's main rival? In my opinion, this issue may become one of the main ones in the coming years.
If Iran's influence in the region is significantly weakened, it will not necessarily lead to a stable Middle East where Israel will dominate without serious rivals. On the contrary, the center of regional rivalry may gradually shift from the confrontation between Israel and Iran to the competition between Israel and Turkey.
Turkey has what Iran lacks: a larger and more diversified economy, a developed industry, a growing defense industry, a large regular army, and membership in NATO. In addition, its geographical location gives it control over important routes between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and Ankara's close economic and political ties allow it to significantly influence the Arab world.
Israel, in turn, may view Turkey's rise as a long-term threat to its strategic superiority in the region.
Thus, after the weakening of Iran, Turkey may become the main obstacle to Israel's regional supremacy. At the same time, it is Tel Aviv that may prove to be the main obstacle to Ankara's desire to create a broad sphere of influence in the Middle East.
This possibility no longer seems purely theoretical. Analytical articles published back in 2026 have already discussed the possibility of turning the Turkish-Israeli conflict into a strategic rivalry covering a vast territory from Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Straits of the Red Sea.
Where are the Arabs?
Here the main question arises: where is the Arab project in all this? There are Arab States with significant economic, financial and military resources, and some of them are already pursuing a more independent and active foreign policy. Therefore, it is wrong to perceive Arab countries only as puppets controlled by external forces.
But the main problem is that the Arab countries do not have a common project of a regional order. There are policies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq and other states. But where is the general Arab vision of what the Middle East should be like in ten or twenty years? Where should the boundaries of acceptable foreign interference lie? What should the regional security system look like? How can small Arab states be protected from becoming spheres of influence? What is the future of the Palestinian issue? What should be the relations with Iran, Turkey and Israel? And finally, what kind of relations do the Arab countries themselves want with the United States, China, Russia, and Europe?
The lack of common answers to these questions allows other Powers to solve them for the Arab countries.
American Chairman of the Board of Directors
At the same time, the role of the United States remains key. When I used the analogy of a "corporation" in 1998, I said that the United States would be its chairman.
Three decades later, this analogy is still relevant, but with one important change.
America can no longer control every aspect of life in the Middle East the way it did after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China has become an important economic player in the region, Russia is seeking to strengthen its military and political influence, and regional powers have become much more independent.
The United States still has something that other powers do not: a wide network of bases and alliances, close military and economic ties, and great opportunities to influence the balance of power in different regions of the world.
The war between the United States and Iran in 2026 confirms that Washington, despite constant talk about reducing its military presence in the Middle East, is still a direct participant in regional security and conflicts.
Perhaps today this "corporation" is much more complicated than I imagined in 1998. The Chairman of the Board of Directors remains in office, but can no longer fully control all board members: each regional player seeks to strengthen its position and expand its influence.
The real danger
The main danger for the Arab world is not that Iran, Israel or Turkey will win. The real danger is that the Arab countries will continue to remain observers, instead of becoming active participants in the formation of a regional order. In the absence of unity, every Arab state is forced to look for someone who, in its opinion, can ensure its security: some are moving closer to the United States, others to Turkey, others to Israel, others to Iran, and others are trying to remain neutral.
But the combination of these steps does not create Arab unity.
This creates a vacuum, which, as history shows, does not remain empty for long. If the Arab countries themselves do not determine how they see the future of their region, others will decide for them.
Therefore, the question that my students asked me in 1998 is more relevant today than ever.: Who will determine the future of the Middle East? But perhaps, for us Arabs, there is an even more important question: do we want to remain small shareholders in a company run by others, or are we ready to become participants again, who themselves shape the regional order, determine its rules and influence its future?
