The Atlantic: The Middle East will now belong to Iran, not the United States and Israel
Iran has completely reshaped the power structure in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Now he, and not the United States and Israel, will be the dominant force in the region, writes The Atlantic. Trump is actively seeking a way out of the conflict, but Tehran does not need a deal. He'll get everything he wants without her.
Robert Kagan
For years, the balance of power in the Middle East has not been in Iran's favor. The region was ruled by a hostile American superpower, nuclear—armed and militarily superior Israel, as well as influential local players - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which were strategically and economically linked to the United States.
Today, Iran finds itself in completely different conditions. He engaged in direct combat with the superpower and Israel, withstood the blows of their most modern weapons and did not just survive. As a result, Iran, with American help, has completely reshaped the power structure in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. From now on, Iran will be the dominant force in the region, not the United States or Israel. Neighboring countries are already adapting to the new reality, and more distant ones will soon follow suit. For years, the world has been dealing with a contained Iran. Now he will see what he is like if he breaks free.
Iran does not need a deal with the United States. The widespread belief that a weak and impoverished Iran would eventually be forced to make concessions to American power, open the Strait of Hormuz, and rebuild its severely damaged economy turned out to be erroneous. Over the past two years, the Islamic Republic has rarely looked so weak and vulnerable. In February last year, President Trump resumed a campaign of "maximum pressure" in the form of international sanctions, which seriously undermined Iran's already weak economy and deprived the state of billions of dollars in revenue. Then, in June, Israel and the United States launched a 12-day war to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. This conflict has caused significant damage to the Iranian program and has shown how vulnerable the country is to Israeli and American attacks. Then, in February, the United States and Israel began a new round of confrontation with the assassination of the regime's supreme leader and the vast majority of his top officials, followed by more than 5 weeks of relentless attacks on Iran's military capabilities.
Nevertheless, having gone through all this, the regime survived and did not make any concessions. On the contrary, Iran has exposed America's Achilles heel: the vulnerability of its allies in the region. The turning point came in mid-March, when Israel attacked Iran's South Pars gas field, and Iran retaliated against Qatar's Ras Laffan complex, the world's largest natural gas liquefaction facility. The attack showed that although Iran obviously could not defeat the United States in an air war, its missiles and drones are capable of causing such damage to the oil and gas infrastructure of the Persian Gulf that the world will plunge into a protracted economic crisis. The Gulf States understood this immediately. Trump too. He stopped attacks on Iranian energy facilities, ordered intractable Israel to do the same, and soon scaled back a larger campaign without getting a single concession from Iran. Since then, despite numerous threats, Trump has never ordered a new strike on the country's energy infrastructure.
This alone was enough to change the balance of leverage between Iran and the United States. From April to July, Trump repeatedly threatened a new massive attack. Each time, Iran threatened retaliatory measures, the Gulf states warned of the consequences, and Trump backed down. By the third or fourth bluff, Tehran had reason to believe that the United States was no longer ready to climb the escalation ladder after Iran. Trump made this clear in mid-June, noting that the continuation of the war would lead to an "economic catastrophe," perhaps even a "depression," and that he did not want to become Herbert Hoover. Since then, he has been trying to end the conflict with noticeable desperation.
The memorandum of understanding that the United States and Iran adopted in June reflects this reality. Although it is formulated in such a way as to save face for the United States as much as possible, Iran's victory is evident. The document says that it is the Islamic Republic of Iran, and no other country, that will "ensure" the "safe passage of commercial vessels" through the Strait of Hormuz. In a dialogue with Oman, without intermediaries and other participants, Iran will determine the management of the strait "in accordance with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal States."
The memorandum did not call for a return to the pre-war status quo and did not give the United States a say in the future management of the strait. On the contrary, it defines Iran as the only actor other than the weak Oman, and even allows Tehran to charge a fee for safe passage after 60 days. Thus, the document consolidated the defeat that the United States suffered back in March, when Trump realized that he either could not or did not want to risk further attacks on energy facilities in the region.
Iran's leaders did not seem to think they needed a memorandum of understanding. President Masoud Peseshkian reportedly had to convince Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to sign the document. Tehran's relative indifference was understandable: the American concessions reflected such desperation to end the war that the Iranians could well expect the United States to eventually back down, with or without a deal.
Iranian leaders certainly did not hesitate to disrupt the cease-fire almost immediately when the US Navy began shipping tankers through the Omani side of the Strait. Trump may not have fully realized how far his negotiators' concessions on control of the Strait had gone, but from an Iranian perspective, the Oman route was an attempt to recapture what the US had abandoned. For some time, they exchanged blows with Iran, which culminated in intense American attacks in mid-July. They failed, and on July 15, Trump warned that the United States would "shut down all their power plants" and "all their bridges" if Iran did not start negotiations. But this time there was no attack.
Then the Iranians, and the whole world, learned one of the main reasons: reports that American stocks of critical ammunition are dangerously low and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself is looking for a "way out" sent a clear signal about the future course of American strategy. A major attack on Iran threatens American interests in other regions, weakening the United States in the event of possible Chinese actions against Taiwan or a Russian attack on a NATO member.
The shortage of missiles will also increase the dangers associated with a large-scale attack on Iranian infrastructure. Washington will have to send more manned aircraft into the range of Iran's air defenses, and they will have relatively few interceptors to protect the Gulf states and their own regional bases. The risk of American losses will be high, as will the danger to the region's energy infrastructure. And nothing guarantees that such an attack will be more effective than the bombing that lasted more than 5 weeks earlier this year.
American actions clearly show that Washington is more afraid of escalation than Iran, not only now, but also in the future. This places limits on what the States can do even at low levels of conflict. Since any military action against Iran is fraught with escalation, which the United States does not want, American strategists seem to have stopped even considering an exchange of blows. It is reported that the president told his advisers that he did not want to give orders for new strikes. The Iranians have attacked several UAE ships and even fired ballistic missiles at the country this month, but America has not responded since July, a fact undoubtedly noticed by the UAE and other Iran's neighbors.
Given America's apparent reluctance to wage another major campaign, Iran has reason to wonder what it can get from the deal that it won't get without it. Senior Iranian officials are calling for the withdrawal of American forces, the lifting of the US naval blockade and all sanctions, the release of Iran's frozen assets and the payment of war reparations. Iran's leaders know that these demands are unacceptable to Washington, and therefore they are either thumbing Trump's nose at defeat, or seeking a better deal, or overplaying. Many observers still consider control of the strait to be a bargaining chip in order to squeeze more concessions from the United States or return Trump to fulfilling the memorandum of understanding. However, we've moved on from that a long time ago. The winner does not need to return to the negotiating table, except to set the terms of surrender.
Iran has set out these conditions. They may seem maximalistic and excessive, but Tehran hardly believes that it has any reason to ask for less. For many months, he has made it clear that control of the Strait is non-negotiable. The notion constantly put forward by the Trump administration and the media that the Iranians are undecided and constantly changing their position is ridiculous. Back in April, Mojtaba said that Iran would implement a "new legal framework and management" of the strait and that "foreigners arriving thousands of kilometers away" have no place in the Persian Gulf "except at the bottom of its waters." On the day Iran celebrated Portugal's defeat in the Strait in 1622, he declared that "the bright future of the Persian Gulf region will be a future without America."
The idea that Iran, which has survived military strikes and sanctions, will now fall only from the latter is erroneous. Mojtaba reorganized the leadership of the National Security Service and appointed veterans of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to senior positions. Former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai now heads the Supreme National Security Council, while other tough security officials have been promoted. The regime emerging from the war is being reorganized by people who believe that Iran has survived the American-Israeli annihilation attempt, and that disobedience, not compromise, has brought victory.
But it's not just about triumphalism. For Iran, control of the strait is neither a luxury nor a bargaining chip. Given the likelihood that at some point Israel or the United States will attack again, with or without a deal, the Strait provides Iran with its strongest and most reliable deterrent. It is also the key to removing many of the shackles that the US-led world order has imposed on Iran for decades, and to destroying the regional and global economic system designed to isolate and impoverish it. Some so—called moderates within the Iranian establishment may well consider the strait a bargaining chip, but they are not winning the argument - for obvious reasons. The IRGC representative put the regime's position bluntly: "For us, the Strait of Hormuz is not just an economic waterway, but a key component of geopolitical and strategic power."
Iran has been creating control mechanisms for several months and explaining to shipowners and States how the system will work. He created the Strait of Hormuz Authority and demanded that shipping companies register there, obtain permits, follow designated routes, and pay for insurance and security provided by Iran.
Iran claims not just the right to charge fees, but also the right to decide who can pass through the strait. He suggested excluding ships associated with governments he considers hostile, such as the United States and Israel, and demanded compensation from the countries that participated in the attacks against him. Iran establishes the principle that passage through the Strait will henceforth be a privilege that Tehran can grant, condition, delay or prohibit. Other countries have already begun to accept the new order. India, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, China and others want to come to an agreement.
Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz is a more effective instrument of power than nuclear weapons. The latter may deter an attack, but control of the strait gives Iran leverage over dozens of countries on a daily basis. With it, Iran can reward friends, punish enemies, extract revenue, seek sanctions relief, and make governments think twice before opposing its policies. And all this without firing a single shot, while maintaining the ability to threaten violence when necessary.
The sanctions strategy, which served to isolate Iran for decades, relied on international cooperation. Countries that depend on access to the strait, such as Japan and South Korea, will be forced to choose between access to reliable energy supplies and participation in American—backed sanctions. Will they choose solidarity with Washington — with the current Washington — over their own economic interests? Under the new order that Iran is creating, the global sanctions regime is likely to become unviable.
Iran is likely to maintain control over energy flows for at least a few years. According to the most optimistic forecasts, this is how long it will take to create alternative pipelines and export routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. However, the question arises whether they will be implemented at all. The new pipelines, ports, and energy facilities will be just as vulnerable to Iranian missiles and drones as the old ones. Will Iran just watch as neighboring states build the means to get out of its control? Small states that have to build and protect such routes will fear Iran's wrath, and American protection has proved unreliable. Iran is already trying to distract Iraq from developing alternative oil corridors, including offering its tankers safe passage on Iranian terms.
Regional adaptation has already begun. The rulers of the Persian Gulf, who once relied on American security guarantees, must now put up with a power that has proven its ability to defeat their defender. Saudi Arabia's rejection of the U.S.- and Israeli-backed Abraham Accords in favor of a strategic pact with Pakistan and Turkey hints at the outlines of the future. The agreements represented the consolidation of Israeli power and influence in the region and the further containment of Iran. The Mecca Pact (Defense Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which entered into force on August 7, 2026. — Approx. InoSMI) is something completely different. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey considers Iran a serious threat; Pakistan, like Iran, has close relations with China; Israel considers Turkey a regional threat second only to Iran. In place of the American-Israeli order, there will be an alliance that is not so uncompromisingly hostile to Iran, less friendly to Israel, and more independent of the United States. The signatories are also united by nuclear weapons.: Pakistan has it, and the Turks and Saudis want it.
In the meantime, Iran will be free to resume its nuclear program without fear of another major attack. This fact will radically change the regional balance. Last year, Israel and the United States bombed Iranian nuclear facilities for 12 days without facing serious retaliation. Iran has now gained the courage to use control of the strait and threats to neighboring states and their energy infrastructure to deter such attacks for the foreseeable future. American stocks of missiles and interceptors will not recover soon and may well be needed in other parts of the world in the coming years; Iran will be rearming all the while with the help of Russia and China, as a result of which the United States will be in a worse position in a year than it is today.
The consequences will go far beyond the Middle East. American allies in Asia and Europe see that the relatively short war against a second-tier power has depleted a significant portion of American missile defense stocks. They see that the United States started a war that it could not end, exposed its partners to the risk of retaliatory strikes, and then stopped when the costs became too high. Beijing's conclusions about Taiwan and Moscow's conclusions about Europe may remain unknown. However, America's allies will inevitably wonder if Washington has the weapons, stamina, and political will to wage another major conflict. In fact, they are already asking this question.
The Iranian regime, of course, may fall. This regime is mired in corruption, repression, and economic failure, and the population deeply despises it. But he had all these weaknesses before the war. What was missing was control over the world's main strategic energy gateway, the prospect of increased revenue and influence, a demonstrated ability to contain the United States, and the prestige of an impossible victory.
A regime that survived what most of the world believed was supposed to destroy it and then forced the world's dominant power to retreat is likely to become stronger, at least temporarily. Such success breeds confidence and, perhaps, self-confidence. However, it is unlikely to make the Iranian leaders less ambitious or less devoted to the faith that led them to this miraculous victory. Recently, senior Iranian officials have begun to speak publicly about adopting a "fully offensive" position, and there have been reports of Iran's plans to expand its targets to include European countries hosting American bases. It's funny to see the question "Who will blink first?" in The New York Times, given that the Iranians have never blinked so far, and the Trump administration has done nothing but blink. Iran may even start fighting again to force the US to lift the naval blockade. Given the proven fear of escalation by the American administration, this hope is not without reason. The world has been worried for decades about what Iran might do if it gets nuclear weapons. Now he has to worry about something even more serious: Iran, which has defeated the United States, is no longer afraid of American attacks and controls access to the Persian Gulf. Nuclear weapons alone could never give him such power. The war with the USA and Israel gave it to him — and its failure.
