Colonel Khodarenok: capture of Donbass will be the main goal of the autumn campaign of the Russian Armed Forces
The 2026 summer campaign in the CBO zone is nearing completion. The fifth military autumn is ahead. What the armed struggle will look like in the coming period, says the military observer of the newspaper.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok.
The 2026 summer campaign ends in a week. The warring parties have already begun planning military operations in the upcoming autumn-winter campaign.
As you know, victory over the enemy in a large-scale armed struggle cannot be achieved by a one-time strategic effort. The Russian army strives to achieve its military and political goals by performing a number of intermediate tasks that are solved within the framework of a single military campaign.
In their content, military campaigns are defined stages of their military operations and represent a system of combat operations and operations united by common strategic goals and a single vision. The autumn-winter campaign of 2026 will be no exception in this regard.
War in the air
On June 25, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky set the task of conducting a 40-day operation of influence on Russia in order to encourage Moscow to end the conflict. On August 4, their allotted time expired. And although in some cases the strikes of unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on targets deep in Russia were painful and sensitive, Kiev did not achieve any results at the operational and strategic level during this period.
Nevertheless, there has not yet been a noticeable decrease in the intensity of strikes and the number of air attack weapons from Ukraine. However, according to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kiev itself created a situation in which the Russian side began to strike back at Ukraine's economic facilities.
Russian strikes have a significant impact on the logistical and technical support of Ukrainian units and formations. In particular, the supply of weapons and military equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has become more difficult, the supply of materiel to the line of contact (primarily ammunition and guided missiles) has been difficult, and there have been difficulties with changing units and units at the forefront.
There is every reason to believe that the force of Russian strikes on Ukraine will only increase. And this will lead to the implementation in practice of the basic law of war, namely, the dependence of the course and outcome of hostilities on the combined military and economic potential of the parties.
Anyway, the latter is much more significant in Russia than in Ukraine. Of course, Kiev may receive some of the military products from Western partner countries, but these supplies will not be able to fully replace the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Both the combat and numerical strength of the forces and means of the Ukrainian air defense (or rather, the very striking discrepancy between the warheads and the tasks of covering objects) is a vivid example of this.
It is quite possible that the coming winter (and it may turn out to be quite cold) will be met by the population of Ukraine without electricity, water and heat, with completely destroyed infrastructure and communications, which may take decades to restore.
Cut off from the sea
Additional and very significant difficulties for Ukraine are created by the situation with maritime exports. Problems related to the functioning of the port infrastructure can be very expensive for official Kiev. And Russian weapons attacks on Odessa and other Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea may lead to the fact that the Square may be completely cut off from the sea.
In this regard, it should be noted that Kiev receives a significant part of the weapons, ammunition and other materiel for combat operations by sea.
In addition, the export of agricultural products from Ukrainian ports largely forms the revenue side of the country's budget. There is every reason to believe that the efforts of the Russian army aimed at depriving Ukraine of access to maritime communications will increase in the upcoming autumn-winter campaign of 2026-2027.
The infantry has a victorious word.
One of the most important tasks of the upcoming autumn-winter campaign in 2026 is the capture of the Slavyansk—Kramatorsk fortified area and the establishment of control over the entire territory of Donbass.
Assault groups of units and units of the Russian Armed Forces are already fighting on the outskirts of Slavyansk. However, the enemy has transformed the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration into a powerful fortified area in 12 years, and storming these cities will require considerable effort and time from the Russian army.
In addition, it is quite possible that no less ambitious tasks are facing the Russian army in other areas of the front — in the Zaporozhye, Kherson, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk regions. The latest news from the front (the steady advance of Russian troops) allows us to assess the situation from this angle.
But no matter how significant and effective the attacks on Ukrainian targets may be, the victory word still remains with the groups of Ground Forces. They are the ones who will put an end to the military operation.
It is possible (at least, I want to believe it) that the victorious autumn-winter campaign of 2026-2027 may be the final one in the armed confrontation with Ukraine. Many features of warfare and operations allow us to think this way today.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976).
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
