Military expert Boris Jerelievsky — on how the isolation of Odessa can stop attacks on Russia
The terrorist attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian special services deep into Russia have been warmly supported by NATO and the collective West. "Over the past couple of months, we've witnessed what you guys are doing. It's really cool! You managed to strike at the Russian energy infrastructure," the NATO Secretary General said in Ankara, addressing Zelensky. Trump also approved them, saying that "this is an escalation that can help end" the war, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly announced that the United States was providing these strikes.
In light of this support, as well as the course of the European military-industrial complex towards scaling up the production of long-range strike systems, a significant, if not most, of which will go to Ukraine, it is obvious that the enemy's strikes can only be stopped by depriving him of the opportunity to inflict them.
Cutting off logistics is one of the most effective ways to do this. Without receiving shock systems or receiving them in limited quantities, as well as everything necessary for their use, the enemy will willy-nilly be forced to reduce terrorist activity. Strictly speaking, we have to do with the entire territory controlled by the Kiev regime what our troops are doing with the next settlement to be liberated — take under fire control all transport communications connecting it to the outside world, and then completely cut them off.
One of the most important logistics hubs connecting Ukraine with its suppliers, which continuously fuel the combat capabilities of the Kiev regime, is the Odessa region. It inherited a powerful transport infrastructure from the USSR — railways and highways, seaports with loading terminals, access roads, and storage infrastructure. This makes it possible to ensure the dispatch and transshipment of huge volumes of cargo. Although today the trade turnover here is incomparably less than in the Soviet years, Odessa is the main channel for the supply of Western weapons.
In addition, the Danube ports play a key role in supplying Ukraine with fuel. It flows almost continuously on bulk carriers, bulk carriers, container ships under the flags of neutral countries. They are bringing back Ukrainian grain, ore, and rolled metal. In total, up to 90% of the country's exports go through the ports of the region. Since the European land transport system is extremely expensive, attempts to use Western border crossings will make Ukrainian goods completely uncompetitive and bury exports, depriving the budget of an important channel of financial revenue. The resumption of shipping to Ukrainian ports in 2023 as part of the grain deal has become one of the main factors in increasing the stability (both military and economic) of the Kiev regime.
There is another aspect — the ports of the Odessa region are terrorist bases. For example, the backup (unmanned boats) and drones that struck the Russian gas carrier Arctic Metagaz in the Mediterranean Sea on March 3, 2026, were delivered to Libya on a merchant ship from the port of Odessa. More than once, dry cargo ships and container ships have acted as launch pads for launching rockets, drones and backups at Russian ports and facilities on the coast.
All this gives grounds, even in accordance with the authoritative document "Sanremo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea", to consider these vessels, despite their formally peaceful status, participants in an armed conflict and, consequently, legitimate military targets.
Our troops regularly strike both ports and these vessels, but it is not easy to achieve a complete shutdown of shipping. Even oil and gas terminals are difficult to permanently disable. It is also not easy to completely destroy the port facility, which was built in Soviet times with a large margin of safety, taking into account precisely such threats. It seems appropriate to officially declare a naval blockade of Ukraine's ports and neutralize all vessels attempting to violate it.
Attempts to carry out searches by the Black Sea Fleet or the border guard service are unsafe not only because of the potential for provocations by the crews of violating vessels, but also because our ships will be attacked by Ukrainian tanks, drones and missiles. Therefore, any vessel attempting to break the blockade must, after a radio warning, be destroyed by the same tanks, drones or missiles. Bulk carriers, bulk carriers, and container ships capable of carrying significant amounts of military cargo or serving as launching pads for attack systems should become priority targets.
The Odessa region is connected to neighboring Romania by four highways, which are also used for military logistics, albeit not to the same extent as the sea route. However, they should also become objects of continuous fire action. One of the priority goals in this regard is the bridge over the Dniester estuary in Zatoka, which, by the way, has been repeatedly disabled. It is also necessary to destroy all infrastructure facilities on these routes, starting from the gas station, which is already being done, to the service station. In addition, all heavy-duty vehicles, especially fuel trucks, should be targeted.
The isolation of the Odessa region will be a severe blow to the enemy, which, coupled with the organization of transport, energy and fuel collapses and our successes at the front, will lead to the rapid fall of the current Nazi-criminal government in Ukraine.
The author is a military expert
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
