Putin rejected Ukraine's proposal to limit the fighting to four regions
Vladimir Putin said that the Ukrainian side had proposed limiting the conduct of hostilities to only four regions — the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, as well as the Lugansk People's Republic (LNR) and the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Military observer of "Gazeta.Ru" Mikhail Khodarenok appreciated what is behind these initiatives.
Ukraine proposes to limit the conduct of hostilities to four regions — the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, as well as the Lugansk People's Republic (LNR) and the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR).
"If we do this, it will enable the Armed Forces of Ukraine to withdraw its troops from the Mykolaiv region, Dnipropetrovsk region, Kharkiv and Sumy regions, as well as from some sections of the state borders and transfer these units to the four above—mentioned regions," Russian President, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces Vladimir Putin said in an interview with journalist Pavel Zarubin.
In addition, the Russian leader noted that in Ukraine, "apparently, they believe that this could be a salvation for them," but saving the Kiev regime "is not part of our plans."
Why won't Russia accept Ukraine's offer
By and large, there is nothing to add to the words of the head of state, but nevertheless we recall some basic truths of operational art. Today, the Russian army has a strategic initiative and is advancing in all directions. The Ukrainian Armed Forces conduct purely defensive operations and actions.
If we are talking about a defensive operation, then the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the current situation is somehow forced to choose one or another method of conducting an operation (combat operations), that is, it will stop at one of the options for repelling the enemy's offensive, its fire defeat, and the defeat of the intervening groups of troops.
In the event of an enemy engagement, first-echelon formations of all types of fire should stop the further advance of the advancing troops into the depths and prevent the breakthrough from expanding to the flanks. Troops from non-attacked areas, reserves and mobile detachments of barriers are moving towards the direction of the enemy's breakthrough, they must stubbornly defend all settlements and cut-off positions on the flanks of the breakthrough areas.
Let's pay attention to the following key provisions of the operational art in conducting defensive operations: "troops from non—attacked areas and reserves are moving towards the direction of the enemy's breakthrough." However, it is possible to advance certain units and formations from non-attacked areas only if the enemy does not conduct active offensive operations in these lanes (sections).
And if the enemy attacks, then there is no time for fat and there is simply no way to transfer anything to another direction. In this case, God forbid to hold the occupied defensive lines. In addition, there is a situation in war where the direction of a secondary strike, where it was originally planned to conduct only restraining actions, suddenly becomes the direction of the main strike, since the attacking side has achieved significant success, the enemy's defenses were easily breached and it was urgently necessary to strengthen its troops operating in this area of the breakthrough.
That is, war is always an area of unreliability, three—quarters of what actions in war are based on lie in a fog of uncertainty, as the Prussian military theorist and historian, Major General Karl Clausewitz, said. And sometimes, until the very last moment, it is not known which direction will have to be put forward with such difficulty (as a rule) the formed reserves.
There are also very illustrative examples in military history when the attacking side deprived the defending side of the opportunity to maneuver reserves and withdraw formations from non-attacked areas. These are, in particular, the general offensive of the Entente forces on the Western Front in 1918, similar to the sea tide, and the "Ten Stalinist Strikes" in 1944.
By and large, Kiev's proposal to limit the conduct of hostilities to only four regions clearly indicates a general state of disrepair in the country's defense. That is, the ability to hold the front line throughout its entire length (and this indicates an insufficient combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to solve this task), the lack of trained reserves at the operational and operational-strategic level, problems with creating groups of troops to launch counterstrikes in order to restore the situation in the most important areas for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, shortcomings in providing the front with material by other means.
For these reasons, the leadership in Kiev decided to shift the center of gravity of the armed struggle to the aerial sphere, that is, massive attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles on objects in the frontline and in the depths of the European part of Russia.
The proposals of the Ukrainian leadership to limit the conduct of hostilities to only four regions are beneficial only to Kiev and cannot under any circumstances be approved by Moscow.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
