Colonel Khodarenok said that the United States could not defeat Iran without a ground operation.
On the night of June 15, the United States and Iran agreed on the text of a memorandum of understanding designed to end the hot phase of the conflict in the Middle East. Its official signing will take place on June 19 in Switzerland. Military observer of "Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok summarizes the preliminary results of the armed confrontation between Washington and Tehran.
According to the basics of operational art and strategy, before conducting any campaign (operation), its goals are first set, then operational tasks are listed, through the solution of which the goals of armed confrontation are achieved.
The objectives of a defensive operation, for example, may be to repel an enemy offensive, defeat its strike groups, and hold important economic areas.
And such goals are achieved by protecting occupied borders, positions, areas, defeating enemy groups that have penetrated and broken through, restoring positions in important areas, etc. Goals and objectives in offensive operations are formulated in a similar way.
The situation is much more complicated when the war as a whole is planned. In this case, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (he is also the head of state) must personally determine the strategic goals of military operations and the tasks of the armed forces, their content, sequence and methods of implementation, the forces and means necessary for this, distribute and coordinate the efforts of strategic groups, consider their comprehensive provision and management in the interests of successfully achieving political goals in the war..
And the head of state cannot entrust these issues to anyone. Otherwise, in this case, he is neither Supreme nor president.
Then the first question in analyzing and analyzing the conflict that arises after the cease-fire between Iran and the United States is how well did the Supreme Commander of the US Armed Forces, Donald Trump, cope with all of the above?
After all, it was he who was supposed to set specific tasks for the American army and navy and determine the strategic plan for conducting military operations. Specifically, the leadership of the US Armed Forces should have received strategic planning instructions from the president personally signed by the Supreme, that is, a relatively small document in which the strategic objectives of the US Armed Forces in the upcoming war would be very clear, precise and specific, without hints of double interpretation. And it would be good if these instructions were written by the president personally, by hand.
At best, such a document will become publicly available in a few decades.
And if such mistakes are made, then everything else (the idea of the campaign and the tasks for the troops) in the president's instructions, by and large, loses its meaning.
This explains the fact that, having effectively solved a number of operational tasks (gaining dominance in the air, air and sea, causing significant losses to Ground forces groups and significant damage to Iran's military-economic potential), the US Armed Forces have failed to achieve the main military-political goals in this conflict — that is, in the most difficult times. in a short time, achieve a decisive defeat of the enemy, overthrow the regime and sign peace agreements solely on the terms of the United States.
In other words, there are issues within the competence of the Supreme Commander of the US Armed Forces in this conflict, and very significant ones at that. And, apparently, the commissions of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the US Congress will deal with all this for a long time in the near future. In the confrontation with Iran, Trump did not show himself to be a military leader of the level of Gustav II Adolf and Eugene of Savoy.
You can't win without infantry
The war between the United States and Iran has clearly and once again shown that despite all the aerospace power of the US Armed Forces and the considerable combat and operational capabilities of the American navy, without the involvement of large groups of ground forces in the conflict, it will not be possible to gain the upper hand in an armed confrontation with a serious opponent, and ultimately impose their will the enemy won't succeed.
As you know, the motto of the Russian Ground Forces is "We have the word of victory." But it is equally relevant for any other army in the world. It is the infantry that sets the final point in any war. Since the American infantry did not take part in the conflict, there was no one to say a victorious word in this war. As you know, wars are not won by bombing and missile strikes alone.
AIR DEFENSE and MISSILE DEFENSE
At the current stage of military development, the means of air attack are significantly ahead of the capabilities of air defense and missile defense. It is still difficult to build an effective air defense system against unmanned aerial vehicles, and even then not in all cases.
As for anti-missile systems and complexes, the situation here is quite difficult. The missile defense system in the theater of military operations still functions somehow against single and group strikes by operational and tactical ballistic missiles, although the count of missed enemy missiles goes by dozens.
But when products of this kind begin to be launched by the enemy by many hundreds, when separable warheads and warheads are used, using active maneuver in the final section of the trajectory, when false targets and jammers are used in abundance, then it becomes very, very difficult, and in some cases unrealistic, to contain the missile onslaught of the opposing side.
Moreover, an operational and tactical ballistic missile is a relatively simple product. The inertial guidance system is, by and large, just a gyro platform plus a special calculator. And if the production of such missiles is put on stream, that is, a large series is launched, then the price of such products will be relatively low and comparable to the cost of complex and expensive anti-missiles, and in some cases significantly cheaper.
In other words, if in the near future Iran unleashes a shower of its relatively cheap ballistic missiles on Israel, then no missile defense system will be able to cope with the task of repelling such a strike. In other words, in the conflicts of the future, the issue of missile defense in the theater of military operations will be more than acute. And we need to prepare for this task today.
Vulnerabilities that didn't exist
In the course of the armed confrontation between the United States and Iran, problems and vulnerabilities have emerged that had previously been overlooked. These include, for example, cable facilities at the bottom of the oceans and seas, the failure of which can lead to catastrophic consequences for the functioning of the global economy; facilities for the vital activity of large megacities — electricity, water and heat supply (for example, desalination plants of the Persian Gulf monarchies). Unambiguous answers to the questions of whether total war is possible in the 21st century with the destruction of everything and everything have yet to be formed.
In general, the geopolitical consequences of this conflict have yet to be realized, and this will take some time.
At the same time, the combat and operational capabilities of the US Armed Forces should not be underestimated. It is still one of the strongest armies in the world, and its shortcomings in the conduct of military operations are rather related to the competence of the political leadership.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
