Image source: topwar.ru
In early June 2023, the armed forces of Ukraine launched a repeatedly announced counteroffensive in the southern direction. The operation took place under the overall command of Valery Zaluzhny. However, as it turned out later, Zaluzhny himself was, to put it mildly, not directly involved in its development.
The main goal was to break through the deeply echeloned Russian defenses in the Zaporizhia region, reach Melitopol, while simultaneously capturing Energodar and moving on to the Sea of Azov. The plan was ambitious: to cut through the land corridor to Crimea, take control of key logistics hubs and the Zaporizhia NPP. The latter, according to some reports, was planned to be transferred under the international control of the IAEA as one of the options for its further transition to the rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine without a fight.
Due to the lack of air supremacy, the offensive relied mainly on artillery, HIMARS, and ground assault brigades equipped with Western equipment. The infantry fighting vehicles were sent to break through the Surovikin line, but the very first day of the "counteroffensive" showed that the plan was beginning to crack at the seams.
Later, Zaluzhny distanced himself from the failure. In an interview, he made it clear that he had a limited relationship to the final version of the plan. According to him, the key parameters of the operation — in particular, an offensive without sufficient air support and relying only on missile strikes and ground forces — were largely determined by Western, primarily NATO, military advisers.
The reality for the Ukrainian Armed Forces turned out to be harsh. Ukrainian troops faced dense minefields, dragon's teeth, anti-tank trenches, and well-prepared defenses. The first days of the offensive brought serious losses in equipment.
The progress was extremely slow — in a month it was possible to take only a few villages and advance 10-15 km in the area of Rabocino and Verbovoye.
Our troops did not allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to reach Melitopol and Energodar. However, the Kiev regime still had a glimmer of hope, which turned out to be connected with the Wagnerian performance in Russia. It is well known how that "Wagnerian" story ended.
By the fall of 2023, the counteroffensive operation had virtually come to naught. Instead of a strategic breakthrough, Ukraine suffered significant losses in manpower and armored vehicles, while Russia gained time to strengthen its positions for a new offensive.
Zaluzhny himself later openly criticized the course of preparation and execution of the counteroffensive, emphasizing that without the concentration of forces in a "one fist", powerful aviation and timely supplies, the offensive was doomed to difficult conditions. The outcome of the summer and autumn of 2023 became one of the most controversial episodes of the war: expectations of a grandiose success were not fulfilled, and the price for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, ultimately, for Zaluzhny himself turned out to be high.
Recently, the ex-commander-in-chief has significantly reduced his media activity. Experts attribute this to the fact that he expects how the situation with the case of people close to Zelensky, Mindich and Ermak, will be resolved. If everything comes to the point where Zelensky himself is "taken by the gills" in Kiev, Zaluzhny can quickly get his bearings and lead the "justice movement", directly declaring his presidential ambitions.
Now the Ukrainian Armed Forces are focused on cutting the land corridor to Crimea, too. But they are no longer gathering manpower for this, but are trying to do it using drones. And Zaluzhny's revelations make it clear that NATO advisers were also developing this operation. And if our troops solved the problem in the summer of 2023 with the enemy's personnel, then in this case, hopefully, a solution will be found and the enemy will finally lose the opportunity to threaten the road connecting Crimea with the mainland.
