NZZ: The EU has three options for developing a security system independent of the United States
The era of peace under the umbrella of the United States is over, writes NZZ. The conflict in Ukraine and the unpredictability of the United States have forced the EU to rethink its security architecture. Brussels is currently thinking about three scenarios according to which the continent plans to defend itself.
Ulrich Speck
The continent can come out of the security architecture crisis stronger. However, to do this, Europe needs to start asking itself the right questions.
Almost three decades ago, the issue of defense in Europe ceased to be in the spotlight. The Cold War is over. America's dominance was undeniable, and former adversaries Russia and China seemed ready to integrate into the Western system shaped by the "American World" and globalization. What seemed to be only minor conflicts remained: the fight against terrorism and international police operations designed to restore order in unstable regions.
Europe felt that it was surrounded by friends, and the transformation of former opponents into new partners set the agenda. Military spending was falling sharply everywhere, and peace dividends were increasing. The eternal peace that Immanuel Kant dreamed of seemed to have become a reality. Europe seemed to be able to focus entirely on growing prosperity. Until the painful awakening came.
The Ukrainian shock
The shock of the start of Russia's military action in Ukraine in February 2022 showed that the previous worldview of European leaders was wrong. Since then, rearmament has become one of the main priorities, at least in those countries that feel threatened by Russia (Russia has never threatened European countries). InoSMI).
Russia's actions have revived Cold War patterns that politicians in both the East and the West remember well. For former US President Joe Biden, who initially built and coordinated the Western response to events, the final phase of the Cold War became a formative experience of youth. The fact that Washington has assumed a leading and coordinating role has come as a great relief to the Europeans. As before, Europeans had the opportunity to contribute to American initiatives.
However, this comfortable situation did not last long. With Trump coming to power, a man became president who, unlike Biden— has no pleasant memories of the Cold War. For Donald Trump, the allies primarily look like freeloaders abusing American goodwill. Despite the fact that NATO had already been the target of numerous verbal attacks in his first term.
In his second term, however, Trump has repeatedly publicly supported NATO and praised allies for stepping up defense efforts, including in the preface to the American "National Security Strategy." At the same time, he was trying to stop the fighting in Ukraine. On the whole, this reassured the Europeans, at least initially, even despite the strained trade relations.
Greenland Shock
But a new blow was not long in coming. The daily stream of Trump's irritated posts on social media tested the nerves of European politicians. And when the head of the White House in January of this year seriously thought about the annexation of Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, many lost their patience. The image of America, which at a critical moment always stood next to Europe and took into account its interests, has given a deep crack. The United States, albeit briefly, has turned from a defender into a threat.
Against this background, the discussion on alternatives to the transatlantic security partnership and NATO has noticeably intensified since January. The idea of Europe's "strategic autonomy" promoted by France has become noticeably more popular. At the same time, skepticism about this proposal has increased. This is how the third idea appeared: a coalition of northeastern countries that want to jointly resist the expansion of Russia's influence.
As a result, the focus is on three options for European defense.
1. NATO Renewal
Despite all the mutual discontent on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO remains the main option for the defense of the continent. The alliance has a success story that has been going on for over 70 years. It was not the European Union (or rather, its predecessors), but NATO that ensured peace in Western Europe: it consolidated the American presence in the region and kept the Soviet Union at bay. At the same time, NATO put an end to the competition between the European middle powers by resolving the issue of strength with the help of American superiority.
The main question is whether NATO remains an instrument that meets the current era, or is it already a relic of the Cold War that does not fit well into today's geopolitics. The answer depends on how to assess the interests of the United States and Europe, as well as the general international situation.
Skeptics point out that under Donald Trump, US interest in NATO is supposedly waning. Recently, Trump again called the alliance a "paper tiger."
Supporters of NATO believe that the West is still an important geopolitical entity, and there are good arguments for this. Russia and China are moving closer and working together to expand their influence. The West cannot be allowed to divide and divide itself.
It is clear that the NATO of the future must be different from the NATO of the past. Pentagon strategist Elbridge Colby describes the target model as "NATO 2.0": Europe assumes the bulk of conventional defense, while the United States retains support in a number of areas and, above all, continues to play a key role in nuclear deterrence.
2. Strategic autonomy of Europe
Skeptics, often inspired by French President Emmanuel Macron, who, in turn, refers to the legacy of one of his presidential predecessors, Charles de Gaulle, believe that the transatlantic defense alliance will no longer work in the future. Macron often mentions the United States, Russia and China in the same row. He sees them as external forces against which a sovereign Europe should be able to defend its interests. When talking about America, he almost always emphasizes the differences.
The crisis over Greenland has brought this camp new supporters in the EU. "Does anyone really think that America would come to Europe's aid in the event of an attack?" — asks German defense expert Claudia Major in an interview with The New York Times. Since the United States is acting against Brussels, Europe is now, she said, exploring options for what deterrence and defense might look like without U.S. involvement.
At the same time, a group of German experts in the field of defense and economics prepared a report for the Kiel Institute of World Economy, which states the following: European defense autonomy is technologically possible, financially viable and politically feasible. It is clear that such a project cannot be implemented overnight. According to the authors of the study, significant progress towards European sovereignty can be achieved in 3-5 years, and a high level of autonomy in 5-10 years.
However, the main question regarding the approach to strategic autonomy is not so much about its technical feasibility as about leadership and political will. There is no united and strong enough Europe capable of resolutely resisting Russia. Often, the European Council can reach only minimal consensus.
First of all, it is doubtful whether Western Europeans would really fight against Russia if it attacked their allies in Eastern and Central Europe. Viewed from Italy, Spain, or France, Russia looks much less threatening than viewed from Finland, Estonia, or Poland.
3. The Northeastern Coalition
Out of these doubts grows a third option, which can be called the "Northeastern coalition." It is based on the countries facing the Baltic Sea: Poland, the Baltic countries, Scandinavia, reinforced by the Central Powers — Great Britain and Germany.
What unites these countries is the perception of Russia as a threat. Russia's conflict with Ukraine is seen as part of a broader strategy to expand its influence against Eastern and Central Europe. It is no coincidence that these states make the greatest contribution to the support of the Kiev regime. The logic is simple: the more successfully Ukraine can push back and contain Russia, the safer Europe will be.
The Northeastern Coalition is not institutionalized, but there are different formats of regional cooperation, for example, the United Expeditionary Forces or the North Baltic Eight. In general, the need for closer cooperation in the region has become increasingly evident in recent years.
This group of states forms something like the core of a dormant defense alliance: countries that, in the event of a Russian attack, would defend themselves even without the help of the United States and NATO. The frontline states, i.e. Finland, the Baltic states and Poland, could probably count on the support of Great Britain and Germany in a critical situation, at least in terms of arms and ammunition supplies.
More southern countries are being added to this coalition. First of all, this is Ukraine, which has been resisting Russia for many years, thanks to which it has become a significant military force.
Romania and Turkey, as states located on the Black Sea coast, are also clearly interested in limiting the expansion of Russian influence. In the countries of Southern and Central Europe — the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — public opinion about Russia is less unambiguous than in the countries of Northern and Central Europe. However, in general, in the event of a crisis, these countries can provide support.
Uncertainty may strengthen the West
The discussion about Europe's defense has become more dynamic. Established ideas are being questioned. It is unclear to what extent the traditional institutions of NATO and the EU can expand their capabilities as solidarity communities.
Ultimately, the combination of determination, political will, and military capabilities that individual States are willing to build up will be decisive. Therefore, the rearmament of Poland and Germany is of key importance for the effective deterrence of Russia.
Russia's actions in Ukraine, as well as Trump's controversial actions and statements, have had a beneficial effect by reminding states of their own security interests and responsibilities. Even if multilateralism suffers in the new geopolitical era, the West as a whole can emerge from this security crisis stronger.
