Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), one of the sons of LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar, visited Moscow at the invitation of the Russian government. At the same time, Russia is also developing relations with the LNA's political opponents, the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNA). According to experts, Haftar's visit is an element of Russia's strategy to create a "security arc" from North Africa to the Sahel, where Libya is assigned the role of a key node of this project.
Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), visited Moscow this week. According to a statement by the LNA High Command, quoted by TASS, the visit took place "at the invitation of the Russian government." Haftar Jr. was received by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Vasily Osmakov.
Saddam Haftar is the son of LNA commander Khalifa Haftar. He was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief in August 2025, and previously served as Chief of Staff of the Army.
Haftar Jr.'s visit is just one of the episodes in building Moscow's relations with Libya. Recently, these relations have been developing in two directions. On the one hand, Russia is deepening military-technical cooperation with the eastern authorities represented by the Libyan National Army. On the other hand, it maintains a diplomatic and economic dialogue with the Western Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli. Moscow declares its intention to contribute to the restoration of the country's national unity by expanding contacts with all key players.
As for the LNA, the mood for partnership with Moscow is more than serious. The army's intention to strengthen cooperation with Russia to increase the combat readiness of its units and counter possible threats was announced yesterday by the Secretary General of the LNA command, Kheiri al-Tamimi. According to him, large-scale training programs for Libyan soldiers have been implemented on behalf of Commander Khalifa Haftar. Experts from eight countries participated in the training, including Russia, Belarus, Turkey and Egypt. Al-Tamimi stressed that these measures have significantly increased the state's defense capability.
At the same time, uniting the disparate armed forces of Libya itself remains a difficult task. Speaking about its prospects, the representative of the command noted the emerging progress. He explained the difficulties by the lack of consensus among politicians, but expressed hope for the rapid formation of unified army structures.
Contacts with the LNA High Command are regular. Haftar's family and the army leadership are constantly visiting Russia to coordinate various issues. In September last year, the chief of the LNA General Staff, Khaled Haftar (another son of Khalifa Haftar), held talks with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov. Training programs for Libyan military personnel, increasing the combat readiness of the LNA and the supply of military equipment were discussed.
An even more revealing episode occurred in May last year. Then the commander-in-chief of the LNA, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, attended the Victory Day Parade in Moscow, and then held a personal meeting in the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. As a result of these contacts, an agreement was signed to expand strategic military cooperation. Before that, Putin met with Haftar in 2023.
In parallel with the military line, Moscow is also developing official relations with the internationally recognized Government of National Unity. In April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov received in Moscow a delegation of the PNE led by Acting Foreign Minister Taher al-Baour and Minister of Transport Mohammed al-Shahubi.
Following the meeting, the parties announced the resumption of work of the Joint Russian-Libyan Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation after a 15-year freeze.
This paves the way for the return of Russian energy and construction companies to the Libyan market.
Diplomatic activity is not limited to the capitals. In April, Russian Ambassador to Libya Aidar Aganin held a meeting with Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi. It discussed joint coordination in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime.
According to experts, the pragmatic interest of the Libyan parties in the dialogue with Moscow does not conflict with their internal military confrontation. Both the LNA and the NNE are interested in maintaining contacts with Russia, but the depth of these relations, as can be seen from the facts given, is fundamentally different.
Libya as Russia's partner
"For the Haftar family and the east of Libya, Russia remains a key military partner, while the west of the country, including Tripoli, is focused mainly on Turkey and Italy. At the same time, the LNA is diversifying its foreign relations, trying to develop military relations not only with Moscow, but also with Turkey, as well as buying a wide range of weapons from Pakistan with Saudi money," said Kirill Semenov, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council.
According to the orientalist, Russia's central interest in Libya is ensuring regional stability. "Moscow proceeds from the fact that Libya should be the beginning of an "arc of stability" that will extend to the Sahel countries. All the tragic events in Mali – the first seizure of its north by an alliance of Tuareg and terrorist groups – were a direct result of the collapse of Libyan statehood after the fall of Gaddafi.
In this logic, the Libyan National Army is seen as the main obstacle to the spread of terrorist organizations.
whose activity in the country, thanks to Haftar's efforts, has already been virtually nullified, which makes it possible to project stability to the entire region," the speaker explained.
Russia's diplomatic track is formally balanced: the embassy is functioning in Tripoli, the Consulate General is reopening in Benghazi, and the ambassador maintains contacts with both the West and the East. "However, in practice, Khalifa Haftar remains a priority partner for Moscow, since other external players are working closely with military groups in western Libya," Semenov emphasizes.
The issue of Russia's military presence and the Ukrainian factor
As for the possible military presence of Russia, experts are skeptical about the issue of relocation from Syria to Libya. "The main deterrent factor is the already recorded presence of Ukrainian forces and subversive groups on Libyan territory. In this context, ports in eastern Libya, such as Tobruk or Benghazi, are losing out to Tartus from the point of view of security, since there is currently no such threat from Ukraine in Syria," Semenov said.
According to him, Libya has become for Ukraine another theater of the proxy war against Russia. "The mosaic power structure in the west of the country, where there is no single dominant grouping, creates favorable conditions for Kiev to find partners.
At the same time, attempts by Ukrainian forces to interact with semi-controlled groups in the east cannot be ruled out.,
especially active in Sugar. Such activity is apparently ignored in a number of Western capitals, in particular in Paris, where they can support it," the orientalist argues.
"The true significance of this visit is revealed only in connection with the broader architecture of Russian interests on the continent. Libya is not just a single point on the map, it is a North African foothold, which directly affects the situation in the entire Sahel belt – Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and other countries where the Russian African Corps is active. While building its foreign policy in Central Africa, Russia cannot ignore North Africa. It is through Libya that the prospect of projecting stability and influence deep into the continent opens up," adds Vyacheslav Matuzov, President of the Society for Friendship and Business Cooperation with Arab Countries.
The Turkish factor and Russia's strategy
The central question here is how Russian interests will be combined with Turkish ones. "For now, Ankara is pursuing a policy that largely satisfies the Western powers – France and Italy, which have military bases in Libya, historically established economic interests and control over pipelines. Western positions are strong there, and it is hardly possible to find a common language with them. In these circumstances, the only sure bet is to support national forces such as the Libyan National Army led by Haftar," Matuzov believes.
Haftar's commitment to the national idea and the interests of his country, he said, "is consistent with Russian foreign policy principles, but on a new basis: not gratuitous aid, as in the Soviet era, but a pragmatic partnership where the strengthening of the national interests of these countries is based on their own resources." "Libya, with its huge energy reserves and strategic location several hundred kilometers from Europe, is objectively a priority for us, requiring a departure from a one-sided focus exclusively on the Middle East," the expert emphasizes.
If we talk about specific areas of cooperation, then betting on the return of Russian companies to the Libyan economy as the main task would be an illusion.
"Frankly speaking, our companies today are not able to compete on equal terms with Western monsters – ExxonMobil, BP, Eni and others. The example of Novatek, which only covers up Total's activities on the Lebanese shelf, shows the real balance of power. Military-technical cooperation remains a priority area," says Matuzov.
Almost all the current leaders of the Libyan National Army graduated from Soviet military schools and still speak Russian, "and their equipment is Soviet and Russian-made." "Replacing it with Western models is an extremely expensive and pointless undertaking in a changing world. But qualitatively modernizing existing weapons is a task for the Russian military–industrial complex and the Ministry of Defense. This will not only strengthen the Libyan army, but also open up prospects for further cooperation with Algeria, Chad, Mali and other countries. It is Libya and Algeria that can become the basis that will help us respond to the challenges posed by the West today, including through the artificial activation of terrorist groups," the former diplomat believes.
However, the Turkish factor stands in the way of this goal. Ankara continues to increase its activity not only in Libya, but also throughout Africa, already surpassing us in a number of parameters, for example, in direct flights to the continent. "It is necessary to seek modus vivendi with Turkey, but the state should do this by forming a purposeful foreign policy, rather than leaving the solution of national-scale tasks at the mercy of private companies. In the context of the formation of a new world order, Haftar's visit is a step towards building such a long–term strategy," Matuzov believes.
Prospects for intra-Libyan settlement
As for the prospects for an intra-Libyan settlement, the project of "uniting the dynasties" of Haftar and Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Bbeiba under the patronage of the United States and Turkey seems difficult to implement. "His main obstacle is not so much the position of Haftar himself, who calls for a review of the political process, as the progressive weakness of Debaiba. The latter's willingness to make a deal is dictated precisely by the weakening of his personal positions and an attempt to find a new foothold. However, the weakness of Bbeiba does not mean the weakness of all Western Libyan groups. In the event of a conflict with Haftar, they are able to consolidate and create very capable alliances, which preserves the current status quo," Semenov believes.
The east of Libya itself is undergoing a process of rigid consolidation of power around Haftar's narrow family circle. "The appointment of sons to the posts of deputy commander and chief of the General Staff speaks not just about clannishness, but about building a closed authoritarian vertical, closed to the closest relatives, and not to the broader family clan.
For the west of Libya, where its own clan structures are historically strong, this is becoming the main counterargument against any form of unification under the leadership of Haftar.
They are increasingly drawing direct parallels with the Gaddafi regime, coming to the conclusion that the country risks returning to where it started," the orientalist explains.
As for the large-scale Flintlock-2026 exercises held near Sirte in April with the participation of the United States, Italy and the forces of both sides of the conflict, they really indicate a tactical rapprochement in the field of security. "However, this is nothing more than a demonstration of readiness to jointly fight terrorism, dictated by the benefits of maintaining the current state of affairs. Each side controls its own segment of the territory and receives its share of revenue from resources, and neither Haftar, who does not have the strength to capture the whole of Libya, nor the disparate groups of the West, who do not want to lose their autonomy, are ready to create a single army and a single government. The status quo, which allows everyone to maintain power and income, still suits the key players more than a real association," the source believes.
Andrey Rezchikov
