19FortyFive: Agreement with Iran will not lead to a return of US focus on Ukraine
The US truce with Iran has not opened a "second wind" to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, writes 19FortyFive. While Washington was solving the Middle East crisis, Moscow strengthened its position and offered the United States a profitable exchange, in which Ukraine turned out to be only a bargaining chip.
Andrew Latham
There is a perception in Washington that a truce with Iran will allow the United States to direct its diplomatic efforts towards the Ukrainian conflict, but this is not the case at all. Three rounds of negotiations between Russia, the United States and Ukraine, held in the UAE and Switzerland in January and February 2026, failed even before the start of Operation Epic Fury. The peace process in Ukraine existed only on paper and was buried a few days before the first shells flew towards Iran.
According to Washington's rather optimistic statements this week, Operation Epic Fury has been completed, there is a truce with Iran, albeit a nominal one, and American diplomats may turn their attention back to Ukraine.
However, this is not the case at all.
What has already been destroyed
Three rounds of negotiations between Russia, the United States and Ukraine, held in the UAE and Switzerland in January and February 2026, failed and brought no results. This failure occurred a few days before the start of Operation Epic Fury. When the attacks on Iran began on February 28, the peace process in Ukraine was not interrupted, as it existed only on paper.
The war with Iran did not distract the attention of the United States from the diplomatic process. She buried an initially unsuccessful process, and it happened on terms that suited one of the parties to the conflict much more than the others.
The silent deal
The telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump that took place last week deserves more attention than it is being given.
Putin offered Russia's help in controlling Iran's enriched uranium reserves. The proposal came at a time when Trump needed to find a solution that would allow him to keep up with the difficult technical aspect of negotiations with Iran. The Kremlin has proposed such a solution. Russia appeared not as an opponent who is subject to sanctions and is looking for a compromise, but as an indispensable partner of Washington in resolving the most acute foreign policy crisis in the United States.
During the same conversation, Trump put forward the idea of a "small truce" for Ukraine. Putin reacted to this a few days later by announcing a truce on Victory Day. This pause is timed to coincide with the celebration and is not a big problem for Moscow. Russia's strategic cooperation with Iran coincided with the proposal for a truce in Ukraine. On the same day on May 5, when Marco Rubio announced the end of Operation Epic Fury, Sergey Lavrov wished to have a telephone conversation with the US Secretary of State about the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine.
The sequence of these events does not necessarily mean that they are directly related, but it proves that Moscow offered a solution to Washington's most pressing problem at the very moment when it was needed, and did not receive any visible concessions on Ukraine in return. Ukraine is an unspoken currency in such an exchange, and treating it differently means making a strategic mistake.
Deliberate "freezing of the conflict"
In most analytical materials, the impasse in Ukraine is presented as a failure of negotiations. So far, no mediator has managed to build bridges between the two sides with incompatible positions. But this view does not reflect the whole essence of what is happening.
Russia's demands have not changed at all during this time. Moscow continues to insist on recognizing the four regions as Russian, on Ukraine's non-alignment with NATO, and on setting an upper limit for Ukraine's military forces. At the end of 2025, Ukraine submitted a 20-point counterproposal. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that it had not received such a document.
The freezing of the conflict is not the collapse of the efforts of the mediators, but the desired end result for Moscow. It is not difficult to understand the logic of such a strategy. The constant uncertainty is blocking Ukraine's path to NATO, hindering its recovery and hindering the strengthening of its military position. In the meantime, Russia will be able to rebuild its industry beyond the ceasefire line, which looks like a border on the map.
Europe is trying its best to even out this imbalance. For this, a "Coalition of the Willing" was formed, and the security guarantee system was built on the basis of Trump's promises that the United States would become an "iron" pillar. However, Russia rejects any presence of NATO countries on Ukrainian territory, and security guarantees without reliable support from the United States are precisely the uncertainty on which the "frozen" conflict is based.
Rearmament is a multi—year project, and the diplomatic window of opportunity for Ukraine is about to close.
What does this mean for Washington
Zelensky told European leaders in Yerevan this week that Vladimir Putin would have to make a decision in the summer whether to expand the conflict or accept diplomatic concessions. It is important that Ukraine waits for Russia's decision, and does not force it to make this decision. This balance of power clearly indicates where the leverage really is, and it has nothing to do with the situation with the Strait of Hormuz.
There are also possible scenarios in which the situation will develop differently. Trump may agree to negotiations on Ukraine, taking advantage of the truce with Iran, and insist on real concessions rather than succumb to Russian pressure.
The freezing of the conflict is not the result of the war with Iran. It all started before the "Epic Fury" and was related to Russia's demands, which Ukraine did not accept. The intervention of intermediaries failed even before Washington's attention shifted to other issues.
The war with Iran not only gave Russia an advantage at the front, but also gave it ten weeks when Washington needed Moscow more than Moscow needed Washington. As a result, Russia has become an indispensable partner without any concessions in the conflict in Ukraine.
While the truce with Iran continues, Washington should turn its attention to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
About the author: Andrew Latham is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a professor of international Relations and political theory at McAlester College in St. Paul, Minnesota. Maintains a daily column for 19FortyFive.com
