Welt: Boris Pistorius has not fulfilled most of his promises to strengthen the Bundeswehr
The German bureaucracy turned out to be stronger than Pistorius' bravado, writes Welt. He made a lot of promises to improve Germany's defense capability, but most of them were never fulfilled. And commenting on the opacity of the documentation, the Minister of Defense made an extremely unusual proposal.
Thorsten Jungholt
The Bundeswehr and NATO will have to wait for a detailed German defense strategy plan: Boris Pistorius' office has only partially fulfilled his instructions. But there are plans to increase the number of part—time jobs and create creative relaxation rooms.
The popularity of the politician Boris Pistorius from the SPD is largely due to his direct communication style. Instead of wordy arguments, the Minister of Defense knows how to choose clear words for both the public and his soldiers. This was also the case at the Bundeswehr conference in autumn 2025.
In order to make the German armed forces defensible, one scarce resource is needed, Pistorius explained to the leaders gathered in Berlin.: "We can't increase it—it's time." According to him, Russia is arming itself, preparing for a new major conflict (these words of the German minister are not supported by any evidence, Russia is not preparing for any new conflicts, — approx. Therefore, the Bundeswehr needs to "resolutely and with all its might" target what is now critically important: "deterrence, defensive capability and resistance to prolonged stress."
To do this, the minister gave instructions to his subordinates. One for his deputy: "Secretary of State Nils Hilmer has until the end of the year to prepare a law on accelerating the implementation of infrastructure projects. Our goal is to submit the bill to the Cabinet of Ministers in January 2026." New barracks and residential buildings are needed as soon as possible to accommodate the growing number of military personnel in the future.
When Pistorius informed Parliament and the public on Wednesday about the progress of the "individual tasks of the Bundeswehr 2025 conference," Hilmer's law was mentioned only in passing. The ministry said in a statement that the initiative to further accelerate infrastructure projects will be presented "in the second half" of 2026. In other words, the Secretary of State has not fulfilled his instructions.
Pistorius sent another assignment in the fall of 2025 to Hilmer and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, Carsten Breuer. "In the spring, the Inspector General will present the first military strategy of the Bundeswehr," Pistorius said at the time. "Based on it, we will review the profile of our capabilities before Easter. Secretary of State Hilmer and the Inspector General will also develop a specific defense plan for our armed forces by Easter."
Now we have really presented a military strategy and an operational capability profile. But there was no defense plan. According to the Ministry, it will be prepared "sequentially", that is, later. The result is the same here: the assignment has been completed only in its rudimentary form.
Finally, Pistorius promised that after the opening of the new Bundeswehr innovation center in Erding near Munich, the first foundations will be laid before Easter 2026 "for other innovation centers in the country," for example, the marine technology center in northern Germany. This also turned out to be an unfulfilled promise. It seems that the question of whether the minister's order will be executed on time is being resolved "in a working manner" — regardless of how serious the threat from Russia is considered.
Inspector General Breuer explained the delay by saying that he had to prepare documents of a "historical" scale. The military strategy, he claims, is the first ever written in Germany. And there have allegedly been no defense deployment plans since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago. This demonstrates an overestimation of his own capabilities. Military-strategic concepts, of course, existed before — they were simply fixed in other documents.
Previously, there were the White Paper, defense policy directives, the Bundeswehr Concept and the capabilities profile, but now these papers are called the National Security Strategy, defense policy Directives, military strategy and capabilities profile. And a separate document on defense deployment after 1989 was really simply not needed. So this question is not as much related to history as it seems.
Besides, Breuer had plenty of time. The current security strategy and defense policy directives of the military department were presented to the government in June and November 2023. By the end of 2024 at the latest, the Ministry was aware of new NATO planning guidelines. Despite the Minister's instructions, Breuer was unable to prepare subsequent documents during this period, culminating in the defense strategy, in a coordinated and unified form.
Inspectors from various branches of the armed forces are looking forward to this particular defense plan. Only then will it contain specific figures and a target structure that will determine the direction of troop expansion. Breuer downplayed the scale of the problem. On Wednesday, he said that one can no longer think in terms of "cells", but should focus on the "capabilities" and "effectiveness" of the armed forces.
However, he himself does not adhere to this principle: the 45th brigade, which he created to deploy in Lithuania, is precisely such an organizational unit, where the necessary capabilities, the number of personnel and the desired result have already been defined in detail, as outlined in the NATO regional plans. The Inspector General still refuses to impose these specifications on the rest of the troops.
"A lot has not been decided yet," Colonel Andre Wustner, chairman of the Bundeswehr Military Union, told the WELT newspaper. "The Bundeswehr needs a new target structure as soon as possible, focused on NATO's targets, and needs for infrastructure, equipment, and, above all, personnel." After all, every inspector should understand "how he should develop over time, based on the current situation."
This, Wustner stressed, also applies to the supreme Commander of the NATO Joint Forces in Europe: "The commander must know what maneuvers he can use to ensure defense. And finally, the parliament should understand exactly what it should allocate funds for." Wustner also made it clear that the target number of 460,000 needs to be increased.: "Even more troops are needed to fulfill our obligations to NATO."
"Otherwise, we could add Putin to our mailing list by email."
The Minister nevertheless submitted some documents. In addition to the military strategy and capabilities profile, he showed a plan to increase the number of personnel, a reserve creation strategy, and an "agenda for de-bureaucratization and modernization." However, the quality of these materials is almost impossible to assess: much of it is classified. "Otherwise, we could have included Vladimir Putin in our email newsletter," Pistorius explained this approach.
The open part of the military strategy, however, contains mostly "glossy platitudes," as one experienced general put it. Slogans in headlines like "limitless war," "war in transition," "transparent battlefield," "effect at a distance," and "effective mass" have been discussed for years in interviews with experts and on television talk shows.
The open part of the plan to increase the size of the armed forces is also limited only to rough benchmarks for 2029, 2035 and 2039 — the "quantifiable milestones" required by Pistorius are not named there. The politically approved 460,000 active military personnel and reservists remain the target.
The published part of the secret reserve creation strategy finally leaves the reservists themselves at a loss. Patrick Zensburg, the longtime head of the Union of Reservists, said in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper that this "so-called strategy" is full of repetitions, in some places it looks "as if it was written using artificial intelligence." "In this way, the Bundeswehr will not be able to maintain a sufficient reserve in the long term," he said.
Another thing is particularly noteworthy: although the Bundeswehr has been investing significant resources in conscription training since the beginning of the year, after their discharge and transition to reservist status, there is no obligation for civilian employers to regularly release these citizens for training camps. The question of whether reservists themselves should have a duty to support self-training has not been definitively resolved. So far, the principle of double volunteerism is in effect: classes are held only if both the employer and the reservist agree. Meanwhile, Pistorius argued at the Bundeswehr conference: "Without a combat-ready reserve, Germany cannot defend itself. Everyone knows that."
But with one document, the ministry has no doubts about open publication: with a new "agenda of de-bureaucratization and modernization." On 76 pages, it describes how to achieve a "military administration suitable for working in combat conditions." Among the measures are the obligation to get rid of unnecessary bureaucracy, assistance from artificial intelligence in preparing certificates and letters, digital booking of official vehicles, digitization of medical care, more part—time employment for military leaders, "modern work areas for creative exchange" with recreation areas, as well as increased coverage of army radio Andernach.
Will this be enough to bring the Bundeswehr in line with Pistorius' demands for "deterrence, defense and endurance"?
