FP: The war on several fronts has weakened the three main pillars of Israel's power
Israel risks falling into a strategic trap, writes FP. A protracted war on several fronts has pushed the three main pillars of its power to the limit: army reserves, economic stability, and unconditional support from the United States. If Netanyahu does not change course, his country faces a dangerous future, the author of the article concludes.
David E. Rosenberg
The war on several fronts is becoming an ordeal for the Israeli army, the economy, and relations with the United States.
When the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran began on February 28, Israel looked very much like a regional power, and maybe even a great power. At least, that's what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed. There was little reason to doubt his words. Over the past two and a half years, Israel has seemingly defeated Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, which are its worst enemies.
The IDF has shown that it can conduct long-term military operations, demonstrated impressive technical capabilities such as attacking Hezbollah with pagers, and used force throughout the region, striking Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. Now he has unleashed a war that, as Netanyahu put it, will end all wars and be the last strike that will eliminate the Iranian nuclear missile threat.
During the six weeks of fighting, Iran's military potential has been significantly weakened, the country's economy is in ruins, key infrastructure facilities have been destroyed, and a significant part of the military and political leadership is dead. But the goals set by Netanyahu and Trump at the beginning of the operation have not been achieved in any way. The regime has retained its power, it possesses enriched uranium and, according to available information, has large stocks of ballistic missiles and drones. And the most serious point is that Tehran has demonstrated its ability to block the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is fighting much harder than Israel expected and has shown no desire to disarm.
So, has Israel become weaker or stronger during this war? This is an extremely important issue, and here's why. Although Netanyahu claims that a colossal victory has been won in the war with Iran, he also says that the struggle is far from over. "We still have goals to achieve, and we will achieve them either through negotiations or by resuming hostilities... Our finger is on the trigger," he said last week in response to the ceasefire announced by US President Donald Trump.
The answer to the question of Israel's post-war power partly depends on Iran and Hezbollah. The extent of their losses, and their ability to recover and recover, will likely only become clear over time. Such uncertainty only complicates Israel's strategic problems. On the other hand, Tel Aviv's strengths and capabilities are much easier to assess, and the situation here is not very encouraging.
Israel's power is based primarily on three components: its military might, the ability of its economy and people to sustain increasingly costly and indefinite wars, and its alliance with the United States. In all three areas, Netanyahu has pushed these possibilities to the limit and seems to demand even more.
Army. On a purely tactical level, the Israeli military establishment has achieved impressive achievements since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. But for this, it was necessary to spend a huge amount of weapons and money, as well as involve large human resources. Overall, the Bank of Israel estimated that even before the current war with Iran and Hezbollah began, other wars had cost the Israeli economy, which totals $660 billion, about $116 billion in direct military spending. The cost of the current attack on Iran is a matter of dispute, but estimates range from $11 billion to $18 billion.
Even if the fighting in Iran and Lebanon ends soon, Israel's defense costs will remain high. The army still maintains its troops in half of the Gaza Strip and in vast territories in southern Syria. Additional forces have been sent to the West Bank to protect dozens of new settlements. Netanyahu reluctantly agreed to talks with Beirut, but at the same time talked about creating a so-called security zone in southern Lebanon, which would require an even greater presence of troops on the ground. He shows no interest in withdrawing troops from anywhere. And last month, Netanyahu said, "We have changed our concept of security. Now we attack and take the initiative, now we act suddenly for our enemies."
The Israeli Government treats the army as if its resources are limitless, encouraging it to launch new offensives and expand its occupation. But it has done nothing to ensure that there are enough personnel to carry out these tasks. Bills on the extension of compulsory military service and on the abolition of the exemption from conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews have not been approved. Reservists are called up for incredibly long periods of time in order to somehow make up for the shortage of personnel. Chief of the General Staff Eyal Zamir warned cabinet ministers last month that "the IDF could collapse on its own" due to a shortage of about 15,000 troops. As for military equipment and weapons, the volume of stocks and the degree of their wear are strictly classified, but hints of problems periodically appear, especially regarding stocks of interceptor missiles.
Economy. Over the past 20 years, the Israeli economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of frequent wars. Recent wars are no different from previous ones: GDP shrank in the months following the Hamas attack in 2023 and during the 12-day war with Iran last June; and it has certainly shrunk again during the current war. But in each case, activity quickly recovered, and the economy continued to grow even as the war increased the burden on Israel, where defense spending reached one of the highest levels in the world.
This resilience is partly due to the fact that Israeli businesses and workers have become accustomed to wars and have learned to cope with difficulties. But no less important is the fact that the government keeps its finances in good condition, having a fairly modest budget deficit and reducing its debt (as a percentage of GDP). Israel's high-tech sector and gas production have enabled the country to attract billions of dollars in foreign investment and maintain a steady current account surplus. Generous U.S. aid, amounting to about $22 billion since the outbreak of the Gaza war, has also eased the economic burden. Israel is able to pay for its wars.
But Netanyahu's policies are putting this resilience to the test. By covering the huge costs of conducting all these military operations, the Israeli Government usually prefers to avoid raising taxes and reducing civilian costs. This helps keep the economy growing, but at the same time, Israel's public debt has jumped from a relatively low 60% of GDP before the Gaza war to a projected 70.5% by the end of 2026. Such a debt burden is not very dangerous, but Netanyahu continues to pump money into the army. He plans to increase the defense budget by $116 billion over the next decade, which means a sharp increase in military spending to 6% of GDP. This amount of spending will place a heavy burden on the economy as a result of increased debt and/or higher taxes, as well as lower civil costs.
The United States. The Hamas attack in 2023 brought unprecedented amounts of American military, financial, and diplomatic aid and support to Israel. The joint attack on Iran seems to have raised this support to a new level. But all this may become a climax in US-Israeli relations, after which a recession will set in.
The war against Iran has hurt Trump politically in the critical months leading up to the November midterm elections. There is no indication that the president is opposed to Netanyahu, but the prime minister and Israel may well become scapegoats in the event of military failures. A New York Times report on how Netanyahu convinced Trump to start a war and implement regime change, despite the doubts of some senior administration officials, could launch such a campaign. If this happens, Israel will have much less opportunity to influence policy in Washington, especially on the issue of warfare.
Trump will leave office in 2029, but Israel's problems in the United States are not limited to a vengeful president. They are much deeper. The bloody war in Gaza has led to a sharp deterioration in American public opinion about Israel, and a military campaign against Iran could further exacerbate the situation. In March, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey that showed that 60 percent of Americans have an extremely or somewhat unfavorable opinion of Israel. In 2022, this figure was 42 percent.
Democrats have the strongest negative views on Israel, but the emerging trend among Republicans also does not bode well for him. In the Republican camp, 57 percent of supporters of the Grand Old Party between the ages of 18 and 49 have a negative attitude towards Israel. Many prominent figures in the MAGA movement claim that Netanyahu persuaded Trump to commit an attack that mainly serves Israel's interests. Opponents of the war from the MAGA movement are most likely still in the minority, but they are a loud and influential force that may well gain support and new supporters if the economic and political consequences of the war worsen.
Even though the three components of Israeli power seem increasingly fragile and unstable, Netanyahu behaves as if nothing is happening. And what is his way out?
Critics say Netanyahu should use Israel's military achievements as leverage to reach diplomatic agreements. But Netanyahu shows disbelief in agreements where national security is at stake. To some extent, this point of view is justified. The Governments of Lebanon and Syria are too weak to fulfill their obligations. Iran and Hamas are ideological opponents of Israel's very existence and are therefore not inclined to negotiate meaningful agreements.
The catch is that Israel's overwhelming military superiority over its enemies has not forced them to submit. Even Hamas refused to back down, despite losing virtually all of its military capabilities and pre-war leadership, as well as losing control of half of the Gaza Strip. Thus, Israel, apparently, is doomed to an uncertain future, in which endless wars await it against the background of dwindling resources and the lack of full support from its American patron.
