From the point of view of Russia's economic interests, the Middle East crisis has not only raised oil prices. The consequences will be much more serious and not always positive. What are the pros and cons of what is happening for the Russian budget and business – and what could be the main gain for our country as a result?
If the current truce develops into peace negotiations and the situation in the Persian Gulf begins to gradually return to normal, the economic consequences of the conflict will still be felt for quite a long time. This is not just about a one-time jump in oil prices.
In a few weeks, the crisis has disrupted supplies, raised the cost of freight and insurance, and hit the markets for gas, fertilizers, and metals. The IMF is already talking about a long "scar" for the global economy: oil flows during the crisis decreased by 13%, supplies of liquefied natural gas – by 20%, and the consequences, according to the fund, affected about 80% of the world's countries. Even shipping companies assume that after the situation stabilizes, it will take weeks, not days, to return to normal operations.
For Russia, the first and most obvious effect is an increase in revenues from oil and gas exports. Reuters estimates that revenues from the main Russian oil tax could almost double in April to about $9 billion (about 700 billion rubles), and the Urals price rose to $77 per barrel in March, 73% higher than the February level.
The effect on the gas market is no less noticeable: according to Reuters, prices for liquefied natural gas jumped by more than 80% during the crisis, and confidence in supplies from the Persian Gulf was undermined even after the truce was announced. For Russia, this means not just a one-time price premium, but an expansion of the room for maneuver: Russian LNG is becoming more in demand in Asia. Despite the current sanctions, there have already been reports of new LNG shipments to customers in South Asia.
Russian metallurgists, primarily non-ferrous metal producers, receive a separate benefit. The most obvious example is aluminum. Its price on the London Metal Exchange rose from $3,067.5 per ton in mid-February to $3,531.5 by April 1. The conclusion of the truce led to only a small correction to $3,455.
Due to disruptions in the Middle East and capacity damage in the region, Japanese aluminum premiums have risen to 350-353 dollars per ton, meaning that in Japan the price of aluminum reaches 3805 dollars per ton, a maximum in 11 years. Reuters reports that Rusal is already reorienting some of its supplies from China to Japan and other Asian countries, including South Korea. The Middle East produced about 7 million tons of primary aluminum in 2025, or about 9% of the global supply, so any prolonged loss of the Middle Eastern metal automatically increases the importance of Russian supplies.
The effect is even more pronounced in the fertilizer market. About a third of the world's marine fertilizer trade passes through Hormuz, and this narrow passage was almost closed at a time when the global market was already tense. Reuters writes that the price of urea has increased by about $ 80 per ton compared to pre–crisis levels, and the World Bank recorded a jump in urea prices by almost 46% in just one month - between February and March.
In such a situation, Russia becomes one of the natural beneficiaries: it can increase the supply of nitrogen and complex fertilizers to those markets where Middle Eastern products have become more expensive or less reliable.
It is no coincidence that India has already negotiated to increase purchases from Russia, Belarus and Morocco. A window of opportunity is also opening up for Belarus, primarily in potash fertilizers, where it remains one of the major global players and, together with Russia, is able to partially capture demand from Middle Eastern suppliers.
Against this background, the prospects for Russian agricultural exports are also improving. Russia remains the world's largest wheat exporter, and rising energy and fertilizer prices are rapidly being transferred to food markets. The FAO reported that in March, its world food price index rose by 2.4% in a month, while wheat prices rose by 4.3%.
The Russian government has already explicitly stated that the country is able to increase the supply of those resources and food products that are becoming more scarce in the world. For the Russian agro-industrial complex, this means a chance not only to make money on higher prices for grain and oil, but also to strengthen its position in the markets of the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
But the current situation brings Russia not only advantages. The rising cost of shipping and insurance tariffs inevitably eats up part of the gains from the increased price of oil and gas. Military insurance premiums for ships in the region jumped by more than 1,000% in some places: the rate increased from about 0.25% of the cost of the vessel to 3%, which means multimillion additional costs for each voyage. For Russian exporters, this means a simple thing: even if a barrel has become more expensive, part of the premium goes to carriers, insurers and owners of bypass logistics routes.
There is a second, deeper disadvantage: weakening demand for non-primary Russian exports.
If the crisis really leaves a long "scar" on the global economy, then the import volumes of many countries will adjust to the negative. And this is bad for the supply of Russian metals, chemicals, fertilizers, wood and some machine-building products.
The World Bank expects South Asia's growth to slow to 6.3% in 2026 from 7.0% in 2025; India, the region's main engine, is expected to slow from 7.6% in fiscal year 2025/26 to 6.6% in 2026/27. For Turkey, the World Bank's latest estimate is only 2.8% growth in 2026 instead of the 3.7% expected back in January. For China, the World Bank now sees growth at around 4.0% in 2026, after 4.5% in 2025. For Russian suppliers, this means less generous external demand in those countries and regions where Russia has been trying to redirect trade flows in recent years.
Another problem is the inflation imported to Russia. In countries that produce goods, equipment, components and chemical products for the Russian market, gasoline, gas, electricity, transportation and insurance are becoming more expensive. A joint statement by the World Bank, the IMF and the World Food Program explicitly warns: Surging prices for oil, gas, and fertilizers, along with transportation bottlenecks, will raise prices for food and other goods.
The Bank of Russia has already called the Middle East escalation a new supply shock.: it accelerates the growth of costs in the world, provoking inflation. External inflation through imported goods will push up inflation within Russia. In addition to the direct negative impact, this will entail the risks of further maintaining the tight monetary policy of the Central Bank, which will have a depressing effect on the Russian economy.
Calculating the balance of advantages and disadvantages for the Russian economy from the consequences of the Gulf War, one must understand that Russia's main gain is not that oil, gas, aluminum or fertilizers have risen in price for a while.
The main advantage is the change in economic psychology in the vast expanse of Eurasia.
The crisis in the Persian Gulf has once again shown that political instability can instantly turn calculations on the benefits of a cheap sea route into an expensive and unreliable lottery. In such an environment, not only the price here and now, but also the long-term supply guarantee begin to weigh on governments and corporations. That is why there is a growing interest in overland routes, closer cooperation with neighbors and long-term contracts with friendly suppliers. This is evidenced by the reaction of Asian LNG buyers, India's negotiations on fertilizers, and the growing importance of pipeline routes independent of Hormuz.
In this sense, the story of the "Power of Siberia" becomes even more important. In 2025, Russia supplied 38.8 billion cubic meters of gas to China via the existing gas pipeline, which is more than the contractual level stipulated. And the Power of Siberia–2 project has already received political approval from Moscow and Beijing in 2025 in the form of a legally binding memorandum. Formally, this does not mean that all commercial issues have already been closed. But the crisis in the Persian Gulf itself dramatically reinforces the logic of the project.:
In China's eyes, the overland pipeline through Eurasia is becoming not just another import option, but insurance against a repeat of the Hormuz shocks.
The same applies to the Amur Gas Processing Plant. Launched in 2021, it is gradually becoming one of Russia's key eastern assets. According to Reuters, its design capacity for helium is up to 60 million cubic meters per year. This is a value comparable to the approximately 63 million cubic meters that Qatar produced in 2025, according to Reuters.
In other words, as the Amur gas Processing Plant reaches its design modes, Russia gets a chance to become one of the most important suppliers of strategic helium for Asia, primarily for China, where high-tech production is growing. This is not yet a complete replacement for the Middle Eastern proposal, but it is already quite a comparable alternative source.
Why is this important? Because helium is not an exotic, but one of the critical consumables of modern electronics and especially the production of chips.
Reuters reported that the shortage of helium due to the Middle East crisis has already begun to affect some production chains in the tech sector. South Korean chipmakers, according to the agency, have reserves for about four to six months, meaning they only had enough resources for the coming months; Taiwan is still holding the situation due to alternative supplies, primarily from the United States. This is an important caveat: there has not yet been a large-scale confirmed collapse in production in Taiwan and South Korea. But the logic of the crisis is obvious: the longer the shortage lasts, the higher the value of new continental sources of supply, and the greater the importance of the Amur Gas Processing Plant for Chinese industry and, more broadly, for the entire Eurasian cooperation.
Therefore, the main outcome for Russia looks like this: the crisis in the Persian Gulf really gives it a short-term price gain in oil, gas, metals, fertilizers and part of agricultural exports. But at the same time, it brings more expensive logistics, external inflation, the risk of prolonged tight Central Bank policy and cooling demand for non-primary exports.
The biggest strategic effect is different: Eurasia is even more convinced that the era of "cheap and fast at any price" is ending. Reliability, land corridors, long-term contracts and cooperation with neighbors come to the fore. And in this new scenario, Russia has a chance to capitalize not on a temporary change in the market, but to become an important participant in the restructuring of the entire architecture of relations on the continent.
Dmitry Skvortsov
