JPost: Turkey's support for Iran endangers NATO interests
Turkey is increasing its influence in the region and endangers the interests of NATO and the United States, writes JPost. Ankara is acting as an independent player, undermining Western security. Experts warn that it is dangerous to ignore such actions.
Sinan Ciddi, Natalie Ecanow
Turkey's growing influence in the region and its ties to Hamas threaten the security of NATO and the United States.
While Iran and its proxy formations are being subjected to US-Israeli strikes, analysts are wondering if Turkey is waiting in the wings to become the next "curse" of the region. The answer is probably yes, albeit in a special form.
Turkey is not Iran, but seeing it as a source of problems or just a "complicated" country only emboldens a maturing hostile regime that has already proven its ability to undermine the interests of Western allies.
The claim that Turkey lacks the ideological rigidity or nuclear ambitions typical of Iran is true, but largely irrelevant. The real question is whether Turkey is undermining the interests of the United States, NATO, and regional security. Undoubtedly, Ankara is doing just that, and over time it is doing it more and more brazenly.
You don't have to look far into the past to find examples. Most recently, on March 9, Turkey deployed six American-made F-16 fighter jets in the occupied part of Cyprus. This step significantly worsened the situation in the disputed territory, not to mention a possible violation of US law. The deployment of six warplanes was also a clear act of intimidation against Israel, which is located less than 500 kilometers from Cyprus.
Turkey uses its influence in the region not to strengthen Western alliances, but to provoke the United States and its partners. Ankara is mediating in the search for a truce in the war with Iran, not out of a desire for peace, but because the weakened regime of the republic opens the way for it to become a regional leader. This trait is clearly evident in Turkey's relations with Hamas, which originated before the current conflict. Ankara's support is not limited to words.
Turkish support for Hamas should not be perceived as a common manifestation of differences with the West or as a natural expression of solidarity with the Muslim majority on the "Palestinian issue." In fact, it should be seen for what it is: a NATO member country defending an organization designated a terrorist organization by the United States, which undermines the security interests of the transatlantic alliance.
Turkey's relations with Hamas
Hamas, as a proxy formation of Iran, served Ankara's interests in undermining Israel's security structures, which Turkey would like to see intact after the end of the current war.
In 2011, Hamas deployed fighters in Turkey at the invitation of the Turkish government. In the following years, Ankara openly maintained contacts with representatives of the organization and granted citizenship to the group's late political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, and his deputy, Saleh al-Aruri.
Turkey facilitated the flow of money and material resources through the country's financial infrastructure, which emboldened Hamas to commit a massacre on October 7.
Turkey openly places its territory at the disposal of Hamas, allowing this organization to plan terrorist attacks, recruit new members, and raise funds. To this day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization. This is not the behavior of a "difficult ally" with whom the United States simply has disagreements.
Assessments that reduce Turkey's support for Hamas to a footnote overlook how entrenched this support is and how much it may strengthen in the future.
However, according to analysts, Turkey and Iran are not so similar when compared directly. Turkey is a NATO member and a candidate for membership in the European Union. The fact that it supports Hamas is perhaps the only clear coincidence with the Islamic Republic.
However, it is also true that no two opponents are the same. It is Turkey's attachment to the West that makes it a special and powerful opponent.
No other NATO ally simultaneously demands integration into the Western defense system and does not support the opponents of the same alliance. Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system perfectly illustrates this point.
By insisting on buying the Russian system, Turkey almost jeopardized the stealth of the American F-35 fighter jet, which Ankara intended to purchase. The reason why Turkey's simultaneous possession of both the S-400 and the F-35 would be dangerous is that these two systems, operated in close proximity to each other or networked, would allow Moscow to obtain valuable intelligence information — obtained from Erdogan or from Russians inside Turkey — useful. to shoot down F-35s manned by Americans or US allies.
The decision to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program and the imposition of sanctions by the United States did not allow such scenarios to come to life.
However, Erdogan did not back down after this failure. He actively delayed the expansion of NATO, delaying the entry of Finland and Sweden for almost 18 months in order to extort F-16 fighter jets from Washington.
Throughout Russia's military operation in Ukraine, Ankara has indeed sold UAVs to Kiev, while turning a blind eye to the sale of dual-use goods that benefit the Russian defense industry. Turkey has also created favorable conditions for illegal financial flows from Russia and still refuses to participate in the application of international sanctions against Moscow.
Such actions cannot be harmless attempts by the state to avoid the wrath of Russia, but rather the actions of a state that actively undermines collective defense within NATO while profiting from deals with its Russian opponent.
The rhetoric that Turkey is considered the new Iran should not be interpreted as a direct comparison of what the country is like. This is an expression designed to convey Ankara's potential role as a hostile hegemon that will replace Iran.
Of course, defining a new regional hegemon can bring electoral benefits, especially for Israeli leaders. Politicians often thrive when there is an enemy to rally around. However, politicians can just as easily strengthen their legacy by leveraging positive opportunities. For example, the "Abraham Accords" will go down in history as one of the defining achievements of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump.
These agreements were dictated not by fear of a regional "curse", but by economic opportunities and a sincere desire for the prosperity of the Middle East.
Trade between Israel and its Gulf partners has grown significantly since the signing of the agreements.
In other words, the careers of Israeli leaders do not depend on the rise of a new Iran. There are other trends that can be exploited, which means that warnings about Turkey should be perceived as more than just loud statements.
Moreover, although analysts correctly identify Turkey's ideological intentions as different from Iran's, they ignore the logical consequences of Turkey's behavior.
Turkey does not have a Quds force or a nuclear program, but it is strengthening its armed forces and presence in the Horn of Africa, Syria and Qatar.
Ankara is seeking to expand its influence and possibly establish new sovereign maritime borders in the eastern Mediterranean, challenging the established borders of Cyprus and Greece. The comparison of Iran and Turkey should not be theological — it should be strategic. And from a strategic point of view, Turkey is becoming more and more revisionist.
The big danger is not to mistakenly call Turkey Iran. It consists in continuing to treat Ankara as a normal ally when it no longer behaves as such. The country is not a "new Iran" in the literal sense — but it is no longer a reliable ally in NATO. The danger lies not in exaggerating Ankara's ambitions, but in continuing to justify them while they undermine the very structures of the alliance that have long supported the security of the West.
