FP: Trump's war in Iran is extremely unpopular among US citizens
After any conclusion of the war with Iran, two of its participants, Tehran and Jerusalem, will be able to declare themselves winners, while the United States will not, writes Foreign Policy. None of Trump's stated goals have been achieved and are unlikely to be achieved in the future.
Ravi Agrawal
A month has passed, and for the Islamic Republic, survival is already a victory.
Is the United States succeeding in Iran? It depends on who you ask. According to a Pew Center poll released last week, 61% of Americans condemn US President Donald Trump's actions in the conflict, while 37% approve. The numbers are broadly consistent with Trump's overall support and reflect deep divisions along party lines. Tellingly, seven out of ten Republicans and only one Democrat approve of the White House's current approach to the war.
Another way to assess the success of a joint U.S.—Israeli attack on Iran is to carefully weigh the extent of the damage. According to this indicator, after a month of conflict, the United States and Israel inflicted much more damage on the enemy than they themselves suffered. Several senior Iranian political and military leaders have been killed, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; Tehran's air force and navy have been virtually destroyed; its nuclear program has been further pushed back; its ability to launch ballistic missiles has been weakened; and one of Iran's key allies, the Lebanese Hezbollah group, is under intense bombing. On the other hand, Iran has managed to block key transport and trade routes — even without causing significant physical damage.
Why, then, does it feel like the United States is winning the battle but losing the war? Perhaps the answer lies in high expectations. And in this regard, the mere fact that the Iranian regime has survived and continues to damage the global economy and enrich the opponents of the United States puts the Islamic Republic in a more favorable light. Survival and destruction have always been Tehran's strategic goals in the event of war. Trump's undisguised annoyance is evidence that the rapid operation he dreamed of did not work out.
The first reason why the United States can be considered losers is its maximalist goals at the beginning of the war. In a video posted on the Truth Social network on February 28, Trump hinted that he hopes not only to change the regime, destroy Iran's missile program and deprive its puppets of the opportunity to shake up the region, but also to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. None of these goals have been achieved so far.
As several analysts of Foreign Policy magazine noted at the beginning of the war, the Islamic Republic carefully selects candidates for key political and military posts in order to ensure the survival of the regime. The country's missile capabilities have indeed decreased, but Tehran continues to fire on Israel and US allies throughout the region. Tehran has already proved that it can rebuild its missile program in a matter of months, as it did after the US and Israeli strikes last June, and is likely to rush to do it again as soon as this war ends. Hezbollah has been destroyed, but it is reborn. And as proof that Iran has a multi-step plan to prolong the conflict, the Yemeni Houthi rebels have just entered the war, firing rockets at Israel over the weekend. Finally, somewhere in the bowels of Iran, about 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium are still stored, waiting for a new generation of leaders, who are also eager for revenge.
The second reason why the war can be considered a failure for the United States is the enormous economic costs that Iran has already incurred with its response. Aviation fuel prices have already jumped by 120%. Brent crude, the benchmark for world prices, has risen in price by more than 87% over the same period. This is largely due to the fact that Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world's crude oil and liquefied natural gas shipments pass daily. Disruptions in LNG supplies, combined with damage to a large field in Qatar as a result of an Iranian missile strike, have caused gas prices in Europe to rise by more than 70% this month. A third of the world's supplies of helium (a key element not only for children's balloons, but also for the production of semiconductors) and a third of fertilizers also pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The longer the blockade lasts, the higher the risk that, in addition to the energy sector, the world will be overwhelmed by a crisis of microchips and food. This effect of the diverging circles vividly reminds us that the Islamic Republic does not intend to fold its paws. According to a GeoPoll survey in Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, only 18% of respondents blame Iran for the conflict and its global costs. 29% blame the United States, while 38% blame Israel. This is partly due to the fact that the strikes unfolded against the backdrop of diplomatic negotiations, which even neutral observers considered promising.
The third reason why the United States is losing the current war is that, unlike the failure in Iraq under President George W. Bush, they have not won approval either at home or abroad. This time, there were no big promises to establish democracy or rule-based order. The only real ally of the United States in this war is Israel, and it has not caused so much rejection and hostility in the world for a generation. Trump found himself in an extremely awkward position when he first turned to his NATO allies for help, and then, realizing that no help was coming, he rushed to claim that he did not need it. The war undermined transatlantic relations, cementing for Washington the image of the leader of a system whose rules he himself destroys.
Fourth, the war has unexpectedly made America's opponents rich. In an effort to curb the spike in oil prices, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted oil sanctions on Iran and Russia. As a result, Tehran earns more from oil today than before the outbreak of the war. Moscow, meanwhile, is receiving $150 million a day in excess of its planned budget, and it will undoubtedly use this money for its campaign in Ukraine. The picture is more ambiguous for China, which receives more than half of its oil from the Persian Gulf countries. On the one hand, Beijing has faced supply constraints, but on the other, its foreign policy is not burdened with the obligations that Washington is bound by. The Chinese leadership is probably closely monitoring how quickly the United States is spending missile defense funds, weakening deterrence in other theaters.
Finally, the war is undermining Trump's support among Republicans. The US Department of Defense has admitted that it will request additional funding in the amount of $ 200 billion for ongoing operations in Iran, but has not yet submitted an official proposal, probably due to growing doubts that Capitol Hill will be accommodating. “Let me repeat: I will not support sending ground troops to Iran,” Nancy Mays, Republican of South Carolina, said in her office after a classified meeting at the Armed Services Committee. "Especially after such a briefing.”
An exhaustive report on the war can only be submitted after it is over. The US could cause further damage to Iran's military infrastructure by changing its current assessment. However, we can already imagine in advance how each of the opponents will interpret the outcome: Iran will boast that it has stood up to the world's greatest military power and regional hegemon; Israel will boast that it has curtailed the enemy's potential, even for a while; the United States can boast of another demonstration of overwhelming brute force.
But even if the war ends in the next few days, the reality is that the remnants of the Iranian regime will be avenged by their survival alone. In addition, its leaders will be filled with a thirst for reckoning, which they will be able to take out both domestically and internationally. Iran's future leaders will learn the lessons of the conflict and realize that their most powerful deterrent is the ability to inflict enormous damage on the global economy. As a result, the post-war leadership will rapidly replenish the arsenal of attack drones and missiles. It may also abandon the previous nuclear fatwa and decide that an atomic bomb is the best guarantee of security for it, as for the DPRK. What was this war about, then? Perhaps this is Israel's strategy of “mowing the lawn” — constantly destroying opponents in the region — but Washington should hardly adopt it. Trump has long been opposed to costly and protracted wars in the Middle East. He probably underestimated the nature of the Iranian regime, as well as the fact that the size and geography of the country significantly differ from Venezuela, which led to the abduction of the US leader overnight.
Finally, think about the long-suffering residents of the region. In Iran and Lebanon, thousands of people have been killed and more than a million have fled their homes. For almost two years now, Israelis have been hiding in bunkers at the first sound of sirens. And in the Gulf states, expats and migrant workers faced instability they didn't even know they were experiencing when they moved to Dubai or Doha. If, after all this, a new war awaits us anyway, then what was it started for?
Ravi Agrawal is the editor—in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine.
