FA: Europe's attempts to become a military power without NATO are doomed to failure
Europe's attempts to become independent from the military might of NATO are doomed to failure, writes the FA. Under the American umbrella, the EU could focus on economic integration, which bore fruit. Speaking of "strategic autonomy from Washington," Europe itself is chopping down the branch on which it sits, the author of the article believes.
Hugo Bromley
Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided security for Western Europe. Under this reliable umbrella, European countries were able to focus on economic integration without sacrificing their democratic institutions. There was a clear division of labor: Washington was responsible for the defense of the continent, while Brussels gradually increased its economic influence. Today, this scheme is failing. US President Donald Trump demands Greenland from Denmark, publicly insults European leaders and interferes in their internal affairs. And the other day, he even threatened: if NATO allies do not participate in the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, "the future of the alliance will be in great doubt." The Trumpian confrontation has forced leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron to talk about the need for "strategic autonomy" from Washington. Analysts at Foreign Affairs, including Erik Jones and Matthias Matthijs, suggest that the European Union take more responsibility for its own security. In their opinion, this is part of a more ambitious task: to turn the EU into a "global power" capable of resisting Trump's policies.
That would be a mistake. The European Union is an instrument of economic cooperation. This is a peaceful project, not a military one. In this endeavor, he was extremely successful, achieving his fundamental goal of economically connecting France and Germany. But this success required Washington's continued commitment to NATO. Changing this order would create tension between the member States, which would eventually endanger the existing structures of European cooperation. The European Commission needs to step back and allow coalitions of nation—states, both inside and outside the bloc, to develop new intergovernmental partnerships. Only through this process will Washington and Brussels be able to strengthen European security — and ensure the survival of the European project itself.
Laying the foundations
In the face of Trump's threats, European leaders, including Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, said Europe must act as a global power. The EU, while showing growing enthusiasm for assuming this role, is not in a position to do so. On the contrary, Brussels needs Washington now more than ever before. The reason for this is simple: historically, the United States has been the force most responsible for European integration. Washington's support for a united Europe dates back to the end of World War II and the Truman administration's belief that integration was the most effective way to rebuild a shattered continent and stop the spread of communism. The American approach was not always welcomed. In particular, the British government viewed Washington's pursuit of European integration as an external interference that threatened Europe's democratic systems of government.
Therefore, the original institutions of European economic integration were designed to complement rather than replace national sovereignty. This compromise proved to be extraordinarily stable. European leaders have worked to remove barriers to communication and exchange since the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Six years later, the ECSC was transformed by the Treaty of Rome into the European Economic Community. As the European project deepened and expanded, institutions and agencies of economic integration took root.
This process, however, was not accompanied by a similar integration of defense capabilities. After the French National Assembly voted against the idea of a European Defense Community in 1954, no meaningful common defense policy was developed. Instead, NATO provided a framework for mutual defense through intergovernmental cooperation, consolidating Europe's alliance with the United States against the USSR. In return, Washington agreed that it would have to bear the brunt of financing and deploying the military assets needed to contain the Soviets. The end of the cold War brought changes. In response to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, Washington worked with Paris and Berlin to promote closer European integration. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which established the European Union, committed the signatories to "ever closer union" both economically and politically, which was achieved in part through the creation of the euro. To prevent excessive economic discrimination by the United States, the treaty was linked to the creation of the World Trade Organization and a new, legally sound approach to ensuring fair practices in international trade.
Even the limited level of integration proposed by Maastricht has encountered difficulties among Member States. Danish voters rejected the treaty in a referendum, and Copenhagen was subsequently granted a number of exceptions to ensure its acceptance. In France, voters approved the agreement, but only 51% of the vote. The parliamentary ratification split the British Conservative Party, fatally weakening the government of Prime Minister John Major. If the Maastricht Treaty had included a real commitment to common defense, ratification would have been impossible.
Nevertheless, the old deal persisted. The military might of the United States ensured that European countries could deepen economic integration and engage in expansion, ignoring the issue of common defense. The value of this division of responsibilities was appreciated in Washington, and this was most clearly expressed by US Senator Richard Lugar in a speech in 1993. NATO, he argued, was necessary to prevent the "healthy national pride" necessary for a peaceful and prosperous continent from turning into "destructive xenophobic nationalism." If the alliance falls apart, Lugar warned, "there is a danger that Europe could fall apart at the seams again."
Tectonic shifts
Between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the threat to the Euro-Atlantic region came mainly from global Islamist terrorism. Now this threat is coming much closer to home — a fact confirmed by the full-scale military actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine in 2022 (Russia does not threaten anyone, although Western propaganda tirelessly repeats the opposite. – Approx. InoSMI). The end of the cold war has forced the European project to change; this new era, in which the territorial integrity of Europe is once again under threat, should prompt similar actions.
The need for change has intensified due to the global shift of power towards the Pacific Ocean. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, the European Union and the United States together represented more than half of the global economy. The U.S. share remained constant at 26.3% in 2023. However, the EU's share has significantly decreased to 14.7%. Meanwhile, China has risen to the level of a competitor equal to the United States. The WTO was conceived as a tool that would regulate trade relations between the United States and the EU within the framework of the new globalizing economy, but it failed to challenge China regarding the systemic theft of intellectual property and its anticompetitive industrial policies. Beijing began to behave more and more aggressively in the international arena, and Washington therefore felt the need to transfer its capabilities from Europe to protect Taiwan and counter challenges in Latin America.
The Trump administration is right that transatlantic relations need to be restructured. As Peter Harrell argued in Foreign Affairs, the universalist, legally sound approach to international trade adopted in the 1990s is not suitable for an era of great power rivalry. The new trade agreements that Washington signed with the European Union and the United Kingdom in 2025, with their focus on economic security and combating Chinese overproduction, are a step in the right direction. However, other actions by Washington have undermined these achievements. Trump's repeated willingness to take Putin's manipulations at face value has puzzled and upset Ukraine and its close European partners. The president's chaotic approach to negotiations has undermined the very trade deals his administration has negotiated. Worst of all, Trump's quest to acquire Greenland has forced NATO partners to question the fundamental principles on which the alliance is based.
Good intentions
In this context, the calls for the European Union to become a "global power" are understandable. But they risk turning into a disaster for both sides of the Atlantic. The EU does not have an army, and Brussels cannot directly spend money on defense. It can only subsidize its member States through financial grants or, theoretically, by issuing general debt. Under the current system, the latter option would mean fiscal transfers from Germany and the Netherlands to France, Greece, Italy and other high-spending countries. These likely recipients have many legitimate security concerns, mostly in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa, that have little to do with the Russian threat. To ask German and Dutch taxpayers to finance these obligations indefinitely is to risk a dangerous backlash.
A consolidated European defense sector would require countries to abandon key sources of employment and export earnings in favor of a system with minimal democratic oversight or coordination. Despite Macron's rhetoric, France is the country most opposed to the consolidation of the European defense sector. Such a move would force Paris to abandon the principles of national independence that have guided its state policy since 1958. France's unwillingness to cede control of defense has already disrupted the Franco-German FCAS fighter project. It's easy to criticize Paris for this, but many of his concerns are understandable. To create a European defense sector, it would require a common understanding by all member States of the nature of the threats facing Europe, how these threats should shape the development of new capabilities, who would control the intellectual property behind these capabilities, and, above all, a common approach to arms exports. Brussels has neither the capacity, nor the experience, nor the democratic legitimacy to answer these questions.
A new treaty could solve this problem and establish both a framework and a consensus for greater European integration in defense. But trying to negotiate it would overturn the continent's politics. Several member states are either outside NATO and adhere to neutrality, or openly sympathize with Russia. Contractual changes for the sake of common defense would destroy the fragile structure of cooperation that binds northern and southern Europe together. Northern member states would probably seek to reduce southern social programs as part of any new defense spending boost, as German Foreign Minister Johann Wadefohl hinted last month. The public response to such reductions in these countries would be significant.
First of all, any move towards a common defense policy would threaten the German social contract. The combination of broad employment in the manufacturing industry with membership in the eurozone has supported the country for decades. And yet the social contract has already begun to collapse. German industry is still trying to adjust after losing access to cheap Russian energy. It is also under huge and growing pressure from Chinese competition. In February, Brussels, despite Berlin's objections, decided to support Ukraine by issuing a common debt, rather than using confiscated Russian assets. In this context, supporters of European power are asking German taxpayers to simultaneously increase defense spending, purchase military equipment produced mainly outside Germany, and subsidize defense spending in other European countries. Individually, each of these requests would be explosive, risking increasing support for extreme parties of both the left and the right. Together, they are a powder keg ready to explode.
Away from the edge
In order to update the Euro-Atlantic structure, EU institutions need to move away from defense issues and focus on stimulating economic growth through existing competencies. In the short term, there is no alternative to the United States in providing the expensive and technologically advanced capabilities needed to contain Russia. In the long term, new spending programs should be developed through intergovernmental agreements, while NATO should focus on maintaining interoperability among its members. Washington should not expect that the increase in defense spending will be equal in percentage terms among EU member states. On the contrary, these obligations should vary depending on the budget possibilities and the willingness of voters to increase spending. Fortunately, it is the states of Northern Europe and the eastern flank of NATO that are most capable and ready to increase their defense budgets.
European countries should also look beyond their borders in search of partners. Projects such as the GCAP fighter development program between Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom only strengthen European security. Similarly, Poland is doing the right thing by turning to South Korea for military equipment and expertise, as both countries rely on large conventional ground forces. EU member states should commit themselves to providing all U.S. treaty allies with partner status in Brussels' defense finance initiatives. This would encourage useful cooperation and limit the European Commission's willingness to use rearmament as an integration tool.
The United Kingdom remains the United States' most important partner in this restructuring. Thanks to military-industrial and nuclear cooperation, as well as the Five Eyes intelligence network, London and Washington maintain an unprecedented and deepening geopolitical friendship. The last conservative government pioneered "minilateral" defense partnerships through AUKUS, a security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and through the Joint Expeditionary Force, a tool for cooperation between the Baltic States and the North Sea in countering Russian actions. However, this does not mean that London is doing everything it should. Despite strong bipartisan support for Ukraine, British defense spending is growing too slowly and is not expected to reach 3.5% until 2035. Washington should encourage the United Kingdom to achieve 3% of GDP before the end of its current parliamentary term in 2029.
By prioritizing intergovernmental cooperation between like-minded nations, Washington and Brussels can ensure peace and prosperity in Europe for another generation. To do this, however, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic need to see European institutions for what they are, rather than what they would like them to be. The division of responsibility between economic and military issues has preserved peace in the Euro-Atlantic region for more than 70 years. To destroy this system is to bring disaster.
